From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8FACFC433E6 for ; Wed, 17 Mar 2021 13:35:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 465BC64F67 for ; Wed, 17 Mar 2021 13:35:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231252AbhCQNeu (ORCPT ); Wed, 17 Mar 2021 09:34:50 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:39618 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230044AbhCQNeb (ORCPT ); Wed, 17 Mar 2021 09:34:31 -0400 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2CD6E64F0F; Wed, 17 Mar 2021 13:34:29 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1615988070; bh=b1Wmu6NacmvzAaIQccj3wl847kOp6Ke4u2YxFVDmYtQ=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=w4TALWD8gi5n3EBzdhCVsCCc/3Y5Hzm92L0QoGpPCmhfOO1Ua8ox+uxczXUEj0CTJ MZU1uVkcQ/TtSm4h/KBe32KyGiBB9uN1zGk8P6QAPv0j/cw14mVkqR7Y4jpq2w5yZF H+rL1e6Pryimu5zbD1Nvh+/To4rj7xDq1VwyNpMU= Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2021 14:34:27 +0100 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: Michal Hocko Cc: Kees Cook , Andrew Morton , Alexey Dobriyan , Lee Duncan , Chris Leech , Adam Nichols , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, Uladzislau Rezki Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] seq_file: Unconditionally use vmalloc for buffer Message-ID: References: <20210315174851.622228-1-keescook@chromium.org> <202103161205.B2181BDE38@keescook> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Mar 17, 2021 at 01:08:21PM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote: > Btw. I still have problems with the approach. seq_file is intended to > provide safe way to dump values to the userspace. Sacrificing > performance just because of some abuser seems like a wrong way to go as > Al pointed out earlier. Can we simply stop the abuse and disallow to > manipulate the buffer directly? I do realize this might be more tricky > for reasons mentioned in other emails but this is definitely worth > doing. We have to provide a buffer to "write into" somehow, so what is the best way to stop "abuse" like this? Right now, we do have helper functions, sysfs_emit(), that know to stop the overflow of the buffer size, but porting the whole kernel to them is going to take a bunch of churn, for almost no real benefit except a potential random driver that might be doing bad things here that we have not noticed yet. Other than that, suggestions are welcome! thanks, greg k-h