From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/sev: Fully map the #VC exception stacks
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 2021 22:39:25 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YVdx/SRNkeRFnIuX@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YVcSuVqmTPiw4YLk@zn.tnic>
It doesn't get any more straight-forward than this.
We can ifdef around the ESTACKS_MEMBERS VC and VC2 arrays so that those
things do get allocated only on a CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT kernel so that
we don't waste 4 pages per CPU on machines which don't do SEV but meh.
Thoughts?
---
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
index 3d52b094850a..13a3e8510c33 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@
char MCE_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
char MCE_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \
char VC_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
- char VC_stack[optional_stack_size]; \
+ char VC_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \
char VC2_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
- char VC2_stack[optional_stack_size]; \
+ char VC2_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \
char IST_top_guard[guardsize]; \
/* The exception stacks' physical storage. No guard pages required */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index a6895e440bc3..88401675dabb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -46,16 +46,6 @@ static struct ghcb __initdata *boot_ghcb;
struct sev_es_runtime_data {
struct ghcb ghcb_page;
- /* Physical storage for the per-CPU IST stack of the #VC handler */
- char ist_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
-
- /*
- * Physical storage for the per-CPU fall-back stack of the #VC handler.
- * The fall-back stack is used when it is not safe to switch back to the
- * interrupted stack in the #VC entry code.
- */
- char fallback_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
-
/*
* Reserve one page per CPU as backup storage for the unencrypted GHCB.
* It is needed when an NMI happens while the #VC handler uses the real
@@ -99,27 +89,6 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_es_enable_key);
/* Needed in vc_early_forward_exception */
void do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr);
-static void __init setup_vc_stacks(int cpu)
-{
- struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
- struct cpu_entry_area *cea;
- unsigned long vaddr;
- phys_addr_t pa;
-
- data = per_cpu(runtime_data, cpu);
- cea = get_cpu_entry_area(cpu);
-
- /* Map #VC IST stack */
- vaddr = CEA_ESTACK_BOT(&cea->estacks, VC);
- pa = __pa(data->ist_stack);
- cea_set_pte((void *)vaddr, pa, PAGE_KERNEL);
-
- /* Map VC fall-back stack */
- vaddr = CEA_ESTACK_BOT(&cea->estacks, VC2);
- pa = __pa(data->fallback_stack);
- cea_set_pte((void *)vaddr, pa, PAGE_KERNEL);
-}
-
static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long sp = regs->sp;
@@ -787,7 +756,6 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void)
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
alloc_runtime_data(cpu);
init_ghcb(cpu);
- setup_vc_stacks(cpu);
}
sev_es_setup_play_dead();
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
index f5e1e60c9095..82d062414f19 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
@@ -110,6 +110,13 @@ static void __init percpu_setup_exception_stacks(unsigned int cpu)
cea_map_stack(NMI);
cea_map_stack(DB);
cea_map_stack(MCE);
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
+ if (sev_es_active()) {
+ cea_map_stack(VC);
+ cea_map_stack(VC2);
+ }
+ }
}
#else
static inline void percpu_setup_exception_stacks(unsigned int cpu)
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-10-01 20:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-10-01 4:40 [PATCH] x86/sev: Fully map the #VC exception stacks Tom Lendacky
2021-10-01 4:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-10-01 8:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-01 11:50 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-10-01 12:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-01 13:00 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-10-01 13:29 ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-10-01 13:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-01 20:39 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2021-10-04 15:08 ` [PATCH] x86/sev: Make the #VC exception stacks part of the default stacks storage Borislav Petkov
2021-10-04 21:41 ` [PATCH -v2] " Borislav Petkov
2021-10-05 16:28 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-10-05 20:32 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-10-06 19:56 ` [tip: x86/core] " tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov
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