From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, ardb@kernel.org,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, weiyongjun1@huawei.com,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, pjones@redhat.com,
konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2022 15:43:04 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YfFP6OHqBVNWKL2C@iki.fi> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220126025834.255493-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
On Tue, Jan 25, 2022 at 09:58:26PM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Back in 2013 Linus requested a feature to allow end-users to have the
> ability "to add their own keys and sign modules they trust". This was
> his *second* order outlined here [1]. There have been many attempts
> over the years to solve this problem, all have been rejected. Many
> of the failed attempts loaded all preboot firmware keys into the kernel,
> including the Secure Boot keys. Many distributions carry one of these
> rejected attempts [2], [3], [4]. This series tries to solve this problem
> with a solution that takes into account all the problems brought up in
> the previous attempts.
>
> On UEFI based systems, this series introduces a new Linux kernel keyring
> containing the Machine Owner Keys (MOK) called machine. It also defines
> a new MOK variable in shim. This variable allows the end-user to decide
> if they want to load MOK keys into the machine keyring.
>
> By default, nothing changes; MOK keys are not loaded into the machine
> keyring. They are only loaded after the end-user makes the decision
> themselves. The end-user would set this through mokutil using a new
> --trust-mok option [5]. This would work similar to how the kernel uses
> MOK variables to enable/disable signature validation as well as use/ignore
> the db. Any kernel operation that uses either the builtin or secondary
> trusted keys as a trust source shall also reference the new machine
> keyring as a trust source.
>
> Secure Boot keys will never be loaded into the machine keyring. They
> will always be loaded into the platform keyring. If an end-user wanted
> to load one, they would need to enroll it into the MOK.
>
> Unlike previous versions of this patch set, IMA support has been removed
> to simplify the series. After acceptance, a follow-on series will add IMA
> support.
>
> Steps required by the end user:
>
> Sign kernel module with user created key:
> $ /usr/src/kernels/$(uname -r)/scripts/sign-file sha512 \
> machine_signing_key.priv machine_signing_key.x509 my_module.ko
>
> Import the key into the MOK
> $ mokutil --import machine_signing_key.x509
>
> Setup the kernel to load MOK keys into the .machine keyring
> $ mokutil --trust-mok
>
> Then reboot, the MokManager will load and ask if you want to trust the
> MOK key and enroll the MOK into the MOKList. Afterwards the signed kernel
> module will load.
>
> I have included a link to the mokutil [5] changes I have made to support
> this new functionality. The shim changes have now been accepted
> upstream [6].
>
> Upstream shim is located here [7], the build instructions are here [8].
> TLDR:
>
> $ git clone --recurse-submodules https://github.com/rhboot/shim
> $ cd shim
> $ make
>
> After building shim, move shimx64.efi and mmx64.efi to the vendor or
> distribution specific directory on your EFI System Partition (assuming
> you are building on x86). The instructions above are the minimal
> steps needed to build shim to test this feature. It is assumed
> Secure Boot shall not be enabled for this testing. To do testing
> with Secure Boot enabled, all steps in the build instructions [8]
> must be followed.
>
> Instructions for building mokutil (including the new changes):
>
> $ git clone -b mokvars-v3 https://github.com/esnowberg/mokutil.git
> $ cd mokutil/
> $ ./autogen.sh
> $ make
>
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=136185386310140&w=2
> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1479737095.2487.34.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com/
> [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1556221605.24945.3.camel@HansenPartnership.com/
> [4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/1e41f22b1f11784f1e943f32bf62034d4e054cdb.camel@HansenPartnership.com/
> [5] https://github.com/esnowberg/mokutil/tree/mokvars-v3
> [6] https://github.com/rhboot/shim/commit/4e513405b4f1641710115780d19dcec130c5208f
> [7] https://github.com/rhboot/shim
> [8] https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/BUILDING
>
> Eric Snowberg (8):
> integrity: Fix warning about missing prototypes
> integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
> integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys
> KEYS: store reference to machine keyring
> KEYS: Introduce link restriction for machine keys
> efi/mokvar: move up init order
> integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found
> integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is
> true
>
> certs/system_keyring.c | 44 ++++++++++-
> drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c | 2 +-
> include/keys/system_keyring.h | 14 ++++
> security/integrity/Kconfig | 13 ++++
> security/integrity/Makefile | 1 +
> security/integrity/digsig.c | 15 +++-
> security/integrity/integrity.h | 17 +++-
> .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 18 ++++-
> .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 5 ++
> security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 4 +-
> .../platform_certs/machine_keyring.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++
> 11 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
>
>
> base-commit: e783362eb54cd99b2cac8b3a9aeac942e6f6ac07
> --
> 2.18.4
>
Thank you. I'll pick these soon. Is there any objections?
/Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-01-26 13:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-01-26 2:58 [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26 2:58 ` [PATCH v10 1/8] integrity: Fix warning about missing prototypes Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26 2:58 ` [PATCH v10 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26 2:58 ` [PATCH v10 3/8] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26 2:58 ` [PATCH v10 4/8] KEYS: store reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26 2:58 ` [PATCH v10 5/8] KEYS: Introduce link restriction for machine keys Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26 2:58 ` [PATCH v10 6/8] efi/mokvar: move up init order Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26 2:58 ` [PATCH v10 7/8] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26 2:58 ` [PATCH v10 8/8] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true Eric Snowberg
2022-04-11 11:06 ` Michal Suchánek
2022-04-11 16:39 ` Eric Snowberg
2022-04-11 17:24 ` Michal Suchánek
2022-04-11 20:34 ` Eric Snowberg
2022-04-11 21:35 ` Michal Suchánek
2022-01-26 13:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2022-01-26 13:58 ` [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-26 22:06 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-02-08 9:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-08 15:26 ` MAINTAINERS update suggestion (subject change) Mimi Zohar
2022-02-20 19:00 ` [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-22 11:59 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-02-22 12:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-22 12:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-02-23 15:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-22 13:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-02-23 15:33 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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