From: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
To: Janis Schoetterl-Glausch <scgl@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, arnd@arndb.de,
borntraeger@linux.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] uaccess: Add mechanism for arch specific user access with argument
Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2022 20:20:05 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Yfwq5fsRiWfWCSAB@osiris> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220203181141.2682997-2-scgl@linux.ibm.com>
On Thu, Feb 03, 2022 at 07:11:40PM +0100, Janis Schoetterl-Glausch wrote:
> KVM on s390 needs a mechanism to do accesses to guest memory
> that honor storage key protection.
>
> On s390 each physical page is associated with 4 access control bits.
> On access these are compared with an access key, which is either
> provided by the instruction or taken from the CPU state.
> Based on that comparison, the access either succeeds or is prevented.
>
> KVM on s390 needs to be able emulate this behavior, for example during
> instruction emulation. KVM usually accesses the guest via
> __copy_from/to_user, but in this case we need to also pass the access key.
> Introduce __copy_from/to_user_opaque functions KVM can use to achieve
> this by forwarding an architecture specific argument.
> These functions are the same as their non _opaque counterparts, except
> for the additional argument and also reside in include/linux/uaccess.h
> so that they will not go out of sync should their counterparts change.
>
> Signed-off-by: Janis Schoetterl-Glausch <scgl@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> include/linux/uaccess.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> index ac0394087f7d..cc2c7c6e2b92 100644
> --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
> +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> @@ -114,6 +114,20 @@ __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
> return raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> }
>
> +#ifdef uaccess_opaque
> +static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
> +__copy_from_user_opaque(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n,
> + struct uaccess_opaque opaque)
> +{
> + might_fault();
> + if (should_fail_usercopy())
> + return n;
> + instrument_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> + check_object_size(to, n, false);
> + return raw_copy_from_user_opaque(to, from, n, opaque);
> +}
> +#endif /* uaccess_opaque */
> +
> /**
> * __copy_to_user_inatomic: - Copy a block of data into user space, with less checking.
> * @to: Destination address, in user space.
> @@ -148,6 +162,20 @@ __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
> return raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> }
>
> +#ifdef uaccess_opaque
> +static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
> +__copy_to_user_opaque(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n,
> + struct uaccess_opaque opaque)
> +{
> + might_fault();
> + if (should_fail_usercopy())
> + return n;
> + instrument_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> + check_object_size(from, n, true);
> + return raw_copy_to_user_opaque(to, from, n, opaque);
> +}
> +#endif /* uaccess_opaque */
I don't think this is acceptable for several reasons:
- we really don't want an "opaque" copy_to_user variant with completely
different semantics for each architecture
- even if this would be only for s390 it is anything but obvious for the
reader what the semantics of "opaque" are
- making a double underscore variant of something the regular api is really
not nice
So I guess we have three options:
- add a "key" variant to common code, where the semantics are clearly that
"key" is a matching access key required to access a user space page
- have this completely in s390 arch code and accept the burden (and risk)
of keeping instrumentation, etc. in sync
- add some macros similar to the SYSCALL_DEFINE macros, which allow to
create architecture specific copy_to/from_user variants with additional
parameters.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-03 19:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-01-26 17:33 [RFC PATCH 0/2] uaccess: Add mechanism for key checked access to user memory Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-26 17:33 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] " Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-26 17:33 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] s390/uaccess: Provide raw_copy_from/to_user_key Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-31 13:39 ` [RFC PATCH 0/2] uaccess: Add mechanism for key checked access to user memory Christian Borntraeger
2022-02-03 18:11 ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-02-03 18:11 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] uaccess: Add mechanism for arch specific user access with argument Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-02-03 19:20 ` Heiko Carstens [this message]
2022-02-03 18:11 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] s390/uaccess: Provide raw_copy_from/to_user_opaque Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
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