From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux@dominikbrodowski.net,
Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: invalidate crngs and batches on cpuhp teardown
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 15:26:16 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YgpmiMURsT3OQLtM@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214134838.980159-1-Jason@zx2c4.com>
On 2022-02-14 14:48:38 [+0100], Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Now that we have a cpuhp teardown notifier, we can invalidate the keys
> used by the per-cpu crngs and the batches used by per-cpu batched
> entropy, so that if the cpus come back online, and the generation
> counter happens to have cycled all the way around to where it was
> before, it doesn't mistakenly use the old data. The chances of this
> happening are exceedingly rare, but since we now have the notifier
> setup, doing this is basically free.
Wasn't aware that random bits get bad over time ;)
> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
> ---
> drivers/char/random.c | 9 +++++++++
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
> index df5aef93da34..ce199af9bc56 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/random.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
> @@ -1225,6 +1225,15 @@ int random_dead_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
> * since the MIX_INFLIGHT flag will be cleared.
> */
> per_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness, cpu)->count = 0;
> +
> + /*
> + * We also want to invalidate per-cpu crngs and batches,
> + * so that if the CPU does come back online, it uses
> + * fresh entropy.
> + */
> + per_cpu_ptr(&crngs, cpu)->generation = ULONG_MAX;
> + per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu)->position = UINT_MAX;
> + per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu)->position = UINT_MAX;
I think if you want to do this, then it would also make sense to put it
into the startup callback. If there is an user doing get_random_u32()
then you would preload the "old" entropy. But on your way "online" you
would preload it with the new entropy.
> return 0;
> }
>
Sebastian
prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-14 14:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-14 13:48 [PATCH] random: invalidate crngs and batches on cpuhp teardown Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-14 14:00 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-14 14:26 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior [this message]
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