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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Balbir Singh <sblbir@amazon.com>,
	Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] x86/speculation, KVM: only IBPB for switch_mm_always_ibpb on vCPU load
Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 21:32:33 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Ymw9UZDpXym2vXJs@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <645E4ED5-F6EE-4F8F-A990-81F19ED82BFA@nutanix.com>

On Fri, Apr 29, 2022 at 05:31:16PM +0000, Jon Kohler wrote:
> Selftests IIUC, but there may be other VMMs that do funny stuff. Said
> another way, I don’t think we actively restrict user space from doing
> this as far as I know.

"selftests", "there may be"?!

This doesn't sound like a real-life use case to me and we don't do
changes just because. Sorry.

> The paranoid aspect here is KVM is issuing an *additional* IBPB on
> top of what already happens in switch_mm(). 

Yeah, I know how that works.

> IMHO KVM side IBPB for most use cases isn’t really necessarily but 
> the general concept is that you want to protect vCPU from guest A
> from guest B, so you issue a prediction barrier on vCPU switch.
> 
> *however* that protection already happens in switch_mm(), because
> guest A and B are likely to use different mm_struct, so the only point
> of having this support in KVM seems to be to “kill it with fire” for 
> paranoid users who might be doing some tomfoolery that would 
> somehow bypass switch_mm() protection (such as somehow 
> sharing a struct).

Yeah, no, this all sounds like something highly hypothetical or there's
a use case of which you don't want to talk about publicly.

Either way, from what I'm reading I'm not in the least convinced that
this is needed.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

  reply	other threads:[~2022-04-29 19:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-22 16:21 [PATCH v3] x86/speculation, KVM: only IBPB for switch_mm_always_ibpb on vCPU load Jon Kohler
2022-04-28 12:51 ` Jon Kohler
2022-04-29 16:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-29 17:31   ` Jon Kohler
2022-04-29 19:32     ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2022-04-29 20:08       ` Jon Kohler
2022-04-29 20:29       ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-29 20:59         ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-29 21:59           ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-29 22:22             ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-29 23:23               ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-30  9:50                 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-30 14:50                   ` Jon Kohler
2022-04-30 16:08                     ` Borislav Petkov
2022-05-06 15:42                       ` Jon Kohler
2022-05-10 14:44                       ` Sean Christopherson
2022-05-10 15:03                         ` Jon Kohler
2022-05-10 15:50                           ` Sean Christopherson
2022-05-12 13:44                             ` Borislav Petkov
2022-05-12 17:56                               ` Jon Kohler
2022-05-10 14:22                     ` Sean Christopherson
2022-05-10 14:49                       ` Jon Kohler

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