From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Guilherme G . Piccoli" <gpiccoli@igalia.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/reboot: Disable virtualization in an emergency if SVM is supported
Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 14:39:06 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Yn0cCl+C+BE2yfPb@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87tu9vvx19.ffs@tglx>
On Thu, May 12, 2022, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Wed, May 11 2022 at 23:43, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > Disable SVM on all CPUs via NMI shootdown during an emergency reboot.
> > Like VMX, SVM can block INIT and thus prevent bringing up other CPUs via
> > INIT-SIPI-SIPI.
>
> With the delta patch applied, I'd make that:
>
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> @@ -530,29 +530,25 @@ static inline void kb_wait(void)
>
> static inline void nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart(void);
>
> -/* Use NMIs as IPIs to tell all CPUs to disable virtualization */
> -static void emergency_vmx_disable_all(void)
> +static void emergency_reboot_disable_virtualization(void)
> {
> /* Just make sure we won't change CPUs while doing this */
> local_irq_disable();
>
> /*
> - * Disable VMX on all CPUs before rebooting, otherwise we risk hanging
> - * the machine, because the CPU blocks INIT when it's in VMX root.
> + * Disable virtualization on all CPUs before rebooting to avoid hanging
> + * the system, as VMX and SVM block INIT when running in the host
> *
> * We can't take any locks and we may be on an inconsistent state, so
> - * use NMIs as IPIs to tell the other CPUs to exit VMX root and halt.
> + * use NMIs as IPIs to tell the other CPUs to disable VMX/SVM and halt.
> *
> - * Do the NMI shootdown even if VMX if off on _this_ CPU, as that
> - * doesn't prevent a different CPU from being in VMX root operation.
> + * Do the NMI shootdown even if virtualization is off on _this_ CPU, as
> + * other CPUs may have virtualization enabled.
> */
> - if (cpu_has_vmx()) {
> - /* Safely force _this_ CPU out of VMX root operation. */
> - __cpu_emergency_vmxoff();
> + cpu_crash_disable_virtualization();
>
> - /* Halt and exit VMX root operation on the other CPUs. */
> + if (cpu_has_vmx() || cpu_has_svm(NULL))
> nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart();
> - }
What about leaving cpu_crash_disable_virtualization() inside the if-statement?
It feels wierd to "disable" virtualization on the current CPU but ignore others,
e.g. if there's some newfangled type of virtualization in the future, I would be
quite surprised if only the CPU doing the transfer needed to disable virtualization.
if (cpu_has_vmx() || cpu_has_svm(NULL)) {
/* Safely force _this_ CPU out of VMX/SVM operation. */
cpu_crash_disable_virtualization();
/* Disable VMX/SVM and halt on other CPUs. */
nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart()
}
> }
>
>
> @@ -587,7 +583,7 @@ static void native_machine_emergency_res
> unsigned short mode;
>
> if (reboot_emergency)
> - emergency_vmx_disable_all();
> + emergency_reboot_disable_virtualization();
>
> tboot_shutdown(TB_SHUTDOWN_REBOOT);
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-12 14:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-05-11 23:43 [PATCH 0/2] x86/crash: Fix double list_add nmi_shootdown bug Sean Christopherson
2022-05-11 23:43 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/crash: Disable virt in core NMI crash handler to avoid double list_add Sean Christopherson
2022-05-12 9:14 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2022-05-12 10:51 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-12 14:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-05-12 14:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-05-12 15:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-11 23:43 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/reboot: Disable virtualization in an emergency if SVM is supported Sean Christopherson
2022-05-12 8:37 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2022-05-12 10:57 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-12 14:39 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2022-05-12 15:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-13 11:10 ` [PATCH] x86/nmi: Make register_nmi_handler() more robust Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-15 11:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-15 11:39 ` [PATCH V2] " Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-17 7:34 ` [tip: x86/core] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
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