From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, x86@kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/19] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack
Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 12:24:10 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YqsEyoaxPFpZcolP@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220616084643.19564-4-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
On Thu, Jun 16, 2022 at 04:46:27AM -0400, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
> @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
> static inline void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {}
> #endif
>
> -extern __noendbr void cet_disable(void);
> +extern __noendbr void ibt_disable(void);
>
> struct ucode_cpu_info;
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> index c296cb1c0113..86102a8d451e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> @@ -598,23 +598,23 @@ __noendbr void ibt_restore(u64 save)
>
> -__noendbr void cet_disable(void)
> +__noendbr void ibt_disable(void)
> {
> if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
> wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, 0);
Not sure about this rename; it really disables all of (S) CET.
Specifically, once we do S-SHSTK (after FRED) we might also very much
need to kill that for kexec.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
> index 0611fd83858e..745024654fcd 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
> @@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
> /* Interrupts aren't acceptable while we reboot */
> local_irq_disable();
> hw_breakpoint_disable();
> - cet_disable();
> + ibt_disable();
>
> if (image->preserve_context) {
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
> --
> 2.27.0
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-06-16 10:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-06-16 8:46 [PATCH 00/19] Refresh queued CET virtualization series Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 01/19] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 02/19] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 03/19] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 10:24 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2022-06-16 17:12 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-06-17 11:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-17 21:18 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-06-16 10:25 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 17:36 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 04/19] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 10:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 17:12 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 05/19] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 06/19] KVM: x86: Report XSS as an MSR to be saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 07/19] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on writes to MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 08/19] KVM: x86: Load guest fpu state when accessing MSRs managed by XSAVES Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 09/19] KVM: x86: Add #CP support in guest exception classification Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 10/19] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and flags Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 11/19] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for CR4.CET Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 12/19] KVM: VMX: Emulate reads and writes to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 13/19] KVM: VMX: Add a synthetic MSR to allow userspace VMM to access GUEST_SSP Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 14/19] KVM: x86: Report CET MSRs as to-be-saved if CET is supported Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 15/19] KVM: x86: Save/Restore GUEST_SSP to/from SMM state save area Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 16/19] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise CET to userspace Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 10:59 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 15:27 ` Yang, Weijiang
2022-06-25 6:55 ` Yang, Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 17/19] KVM: VMX: Pass through CET MSRs to the guest when supported Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 18/19] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested VMX Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 19/19] KVM: x86: Enable supervisor IBT support for guest Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 11:05 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 11:19 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 15:56 ` Yang, Weijiang
2022-06-16 9:10 ` [PATCH 00/19] Refresh queued CET virtualization series Christoph Hellwig
2022-06-16 11:25 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 10:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 10:21 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-06-16 14:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 15:06 ` Yang, Weijiang
2022-06-16 15:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-06-18 6:43 ` Yang, Weijiang
2022-07-14 19:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 15:04 ` Yang, Weijiang
2022-07-15 15:58 ` Sean Christopherson
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