From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>, Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 02/24] KVM: VMX: Drop bits 31:16 when shoving exception error code into VMCS
Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 16:37:38 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YtWMUsjfkv+JcOXe@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <547250051f1578b7ddf60311be46b3eb7990ccc6.camel@redhat.com>
On Mon, Jul 18, 2022, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> On Fri, 2022-07-15 at 20:42 +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > Deliberately truncate the exception error code when shoving it into the
> > VMCS (VM-Entry field for vmcs01 and vmcs02, VM-Exit field for vmcs12).
> > Intel CPUs are incapable of handling 32-bit error codes and will never
> > generate an error code with bits 31:16, but userspace can provide an
> > arbitrary error code via KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS. Failure to drop the bits
> > on exception injection results in failed VM-Entry, as VMX disallows
> > setting bits 31:16. Setting the bits on VM-Exit would at best confuse
> > L1, and at worse induce a nested VM-Entry failure, e.g. if L1 decided to
> > reinject the exception back into L2.
> >
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 9 ++++++++-
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 11 ++++++++++-
> > 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> > index 8c2c81406248..05c34a72c266 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> > @@ -3822,7 +3822,14 @@ static void nested_vmx_inject_exception_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > u32 intr_info = nr | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
> >
> > if (vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code) {
> > - vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.error_code;
> > + /*
> > + * Intel CPUs will never generate an error code with bits 31:16
> > + * set, and more importantly VMX disallows setting bits 31:16
> > + * in the injected error code for VM-Entry. Drop the bits to
> > + * mimic hardware and avoid inducing failure on nested VM-Entry
> > + * if L1 chooses to inject the exception back to L2.
>
> Very small nitpick:
> I think I would still prefer to have a mention that AMD CPUs can have error code > 16 bit,
> The above comment kind of implies this, but it would be a bit more clear, but I don't
> have a strong preference on this.
Agreed, I'll reword this to make it abundantly clear that setting bits 31:16 is
architecturally allowed and done by AMD, and that this is purely an Intel oddity.
> > + */
> > + vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_error_code = (u16)vcpu->arch.exception.error_code;
> > intr_info |= INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
> > }
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > index b0cc911a8f6f..d2b3d30d6afb 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > @@ -1621,7 +1621,16 @@ static void vmx_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu);
> >
> > if (has_error_code) {
> > - vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE, error_code);
> > + /*
> > + * Despite the error code being architecturally defined as 32
> > + * bits, and the VMCS field being 32 bits, Intel CPUs and thus
> > + * VMX don't actually supporting setting bits 31:16. Hardware
> > + * will (should) never provide a bogus error code, but KVM's
> > + * ABI lets userspace shove in arbitrary 32-bit values. Drop
I'll update this to mention AMD CPUs as well.
> > + * the upper bits to avoid VM-Fail, losing information that
> > + * does't really exist is preferable to killing the VM.
> > + */
> > + vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE, (u16)error_code);
> > intr_info |= INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
> > }
> >
>
>
> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
>
> Best regards,
> Maxim Levitsky
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-07-18 16:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-07-15 20:42 [PATCH v2 00/24] KVM: x86: Event/exception fixes and cleanups Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 01/24] KVM: nVMX: Unconditionally purge queued/injected events on nested "exit" Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 02/24] KVM: VMX: Drop bits 31:16 when shoving exception error code into VMCS Sean Christopherson
2022-07-18 13:04 ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-07-18 16:37 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 03/24] KVM: x86: Don't check for code breakpoints when emulating on exception Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 04/24] KVM: nVMX: Treat General Detect #DB (DR7.GD=1) as fault-like Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 05/24] KVM: nVMX: Prioritize TSS T-flag #DBs over Monitor Trap Flag Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 06/24] KVM: x86: Treat #DBs from the emulator as fault-like (code and DR7.GD=1) Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 07/24] KVM: x86: Use DR7_GD macro instead of open coding check in emulator Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 08/24] KVM: nVMX: Ignore SIPI that arrives in L2 when vCPU is not in WFS Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 09/24] KVM: nVMX: Unconditionally clear mtf_pending on nested VM-Exit Sean Christopherson
2022-07-18 13:04 ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 10/24] KVM: VMX: Inject #PF on ENCLS as "emulated" #PF Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 11/24] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_x86_ops.queue_exception to inject_exception Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 12/24] KVM: x86: Make kvm_queued_exception a properly named, visible struct Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 13/24] KVM: x86: Formalize blocking of nested pending exceptions Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 14/24] KVM: x86: Use kvm_queue_exception_e() to queue #DF Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 15/24] KVM: x86: Hoist nested event checks above event injection logic Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 16/24] KVM: x86: Evaluate ability to inject SMI/NMI/IRQ after potential VM-Exit Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 17/24] KVM: nVMX: Add a helper to identify low-priority #DB traps Sean Christopherson
2022-07-18 13:04 ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 18/24] KVM: nVMX: Document priority of all known events on Intel CPUs Sean Christopherson
2022-07-18 13:04 ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 19/24] KVM: x86: Morph pending exceptions to pending VM-Exits at queue time Sean Christopherson
2022-07-18 13:05 ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 20/24] KVM: x86: Treat pending TRIPLE_FAULT requests as pending exceptions Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 21/24] KVM: VMX: Update MTF and ICEBP comments to document KVM's subtle behavior Sean Christopherson
2022-07-18 13:05 ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 22/24] KVM: x86: Rename inject_pending_events() to kvm_check_and_inject_events() Sean Christopherson
2022-07-18 13:05 ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 23/24] KVM: selftests: Use uapi header to get VMX and SVM exit reasons/codes Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 24/24] KVM: selftests: Add an x86-only test to verify nested exception queueing Sean Christopherson
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