From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] efi/x86: use naked RET on mixed mode call wrapper
Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 20:46:34 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YtWqit2B3UYIWht1@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wiWQOsxqE+tvZi_MjzGaqfG6Xo5AhbYXtiLWcKVVvbycQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Jul 18, 2022 at 11:34:02AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> Why would we have to protect the kernel from EFI?
Yes, we cleared this up on IRC in the meantime.
This was raised as a concern in case we don't trust EFI. But we cannot
not (double negation on purpose) trust EFI because it can do whatever it
likes anyway, "underneath" the OS.
I'm keeping the UNTRAIN_RET-in-C diff in my patches/ folder, though - I
get the feeling we might need it soon for something else.
:-)
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH
GF: Ivo Totev, Andrew Myers, Andrew McDonald, Martje Boudien Moerman
(HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-07-18 18:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-07-15 19:45 [PATCH] efi/x86: use naked RET on mixed mode call wrapper Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-07-15 22:51 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-07-18 11:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-18 13:59 ` Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-07-18 16:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-18 16:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-07-18 16:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-18 17:19 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-07-18 18:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-18 18:46 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2022-07-19 15:22 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-07-19 17:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-07-19 19:45 ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/amd: Use IBPB for firmware calls tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
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