public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] perf: Allow restricted kernel breakpoints on user addresses
Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2022 22:38:00 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YxevqB2OpJ9BLE+s@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220902100057.404817-1-elver@google.com>

On Fri, Sep 02, 2022 at 12:00:57PM +0200, Marco Elver wrote:
> Allow the creation of restricted breakpoint perf events that also fire
> in the kernel (!exclude_kernel), if:
> 
>   1. No sample information is requested; samples may contain IPs,
>      registers, or other information that may disclose kernel addresses.
> 
>   2. The breakpoint (viz. data watchpoint) is on a user address.
> 
> The rules constrain the allowable perf events such that no sensitive
> kernel information can be disclosed.
> 
> Despite no explicit kernel information disclosure, the following
> questions may need answers:
> 
>  1. Is obtaining information that the kernel accessed a particular
>     user's known memory location revealing new information?
>     Given the kernel's user space ABI, there should be no "surprise
>     accesses" to user space memory in the first place.
> 
>  2. Does causing breakpoints on user memory accesses by the kernel
>     potentially impact timing in a sensitive way?
>     Since hardware breakpoints trigger regardless of the state of
>     perf_event_attr::exclude_kernel, but are filtered in the perf
>     subsystem, this possibility already exists independent of the
>     proposed change.
> 

Changelog forgot to tell us why you want this :-)

I don't see any immediate concerns, but it's late so who knows..

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-09-06 20:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-09-02 10:00 [PATCH] perf: Allow restricted kernel breakpoints on user addresses Marco Elver
2022-09-05 15:53 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2022-09-06 20:38 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2022-09-07  7:40   ` Marco Elver
2022-09-07 12:39 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-09-08  7:58   ` Marco Elver

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=YxevqB2OpJ9BLE+s@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net \
    --to=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=acme@kernel.org \
    --cc=alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=dvyukov@google.com \
    --cc=elver@google.com \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=jolsa@kernel.org \
    --cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=namhyung@kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox