From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] perf: Allow restricted kernel breakpoints on user addresses
Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2022 22:38:00 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YxevqB2OpJ9BLE+s@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220902100057.404817-1-elver@google.com>
On Fri, Sep 02, 2022 at 12:00:57PM +0200, Marco Elver wrote:
> Allow the creation of restricted breakpoint perf events that also fire
> in the kernel (!exclude_kernel), if:
>
> 1. No sample information is requested; samples may contain IPs,
> registers, or other information that may disclose kernel addresses.
>
> 2. The breakpoint (viz. data watchpoint) is on a user address.
>
> The rules constrain the allowable perf events such that no sensitive
> kernel information can be disclosed.
>
> Despite no explicit kernel information disclosure, the following
> questions may need answers:
>
> 1. Is obtaining information that the kernel accessed a particular
> user's known memory location revealing new information?
> Given the kernel's user space ABI, there should be no "surprise
> accesses" to user space memory in the first place.
>
> 2. Does causing breakpoints on user memory accesses by the kernel
> potentially impact timing in a sensitive way?
> Since hardware breakpoints trigger regardless of the state of
> perf_event_attr::exclude_kernel, but are filtered in the perf
> subsystem, this possibility already exists independent of the
> proposed change.
>
Changelog forgot to tell us why you want this :-)
I don't see any immediate concerns, but it's late so who knows..
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-09-06 20:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-09-02 10:00 [PATCH] perf: Allow restricted kernel breakpoints on user addresses Marco Elver
2022-09-05 15:53 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2022-09-06 20:38 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2022-09-07 7:40 ` Marco Elver
2022-09-07 12:39 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-09-08 7:58 ` Marco Elver
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