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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] perf: Allow restricted kernel breakpoints on user addresses
Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2022 14:39:15 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YxiQ87X1eUB2rrtF@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220902100057.404817-1-elver@google.com>

On Fri, Sep 02, 2022 at 12:00:57PM +0200, Marco Elver wrote:

> +/*
> + * Check if unprivileged users are allowed to set up breakpoints on user
> + * addresses that also count when the kernel accesses them.
> + */
> +static bool perf_allow_kernel_breakpoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
> +{
> +	if (attr->type != PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT)
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * The sample may contain IPs, registers, or other information that may
> +	 * disclose kernel addresses or timing information. Disallow any kind of
> +	 * additional sample information.
> +	 */
> +	if (attr->sample_type)
> +		return false;

This feels a bit weird; should that perhaps be is_sampling_event()?

> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Only allow kernel breakpoints on user addresses.
> +	 */
> +	return access_ok((void __user *)(unsigned long)attr->bp_addr, attr->bp_len);
> +}
> +
> +int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
> +{
> +	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable() &&
> +	    !perf_allow_kernel_breakpoint(attr))

I'm on the fence about this; one the one hand it feels weird to have a
breakpoint exception here and not a pmu specific callback for instance;
OTOH, leaving security policy like that up to pmu drivers sounds like a
really bad idea too.

Keep it as is I suppose, just me thinking out loud or so.

> +		return -EACCES;
> +
> +	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
> +}



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-09-07 12:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-09-02 10:00 [PATCH] perf: Allow restricted kernel breakpoints on user addresses Marco Elver
2022-09-05 15:53 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2022-09-06 20:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-09-07  7:40   ` Marco Elver
2022-09-07 12:39 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2022-09-08  7:58   ` Marco Elver

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