From: Simon Brand <simon.brand@postadigitale.de>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Possibility to disable icotl TIOCSTI
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 2022 18:48:45 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Yz8jDbLap91dRVyH@hostpad> (raw)
Hello,
in the past there have been attempts to restrict the TIOCSTI ioctl. [0, 1]
None of them are present in the current kernel.
Since those tries there have been some security issues (sandbox
escapes in flatpak (CVE-2019-10063) [2] and snap (CVE 2019-7303) [3],
runuser [4], su [5]).
I ask to merge the patches from linux-hardening [6, 7] so users can
opt out of this behavior. These patches provide the
`SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT` Kconfig (default no) and a
`tiocsti_restrict` sysctl.
Escapes can be reproduced easiliy (on archlinux) via a python script:
```
import fcntl
import termios
with open("/dev/tty", "w") as fd:
for c in "id\n":
fcntl.ioctl(fd, termios.TIOCSTI, c)
```
Now run as root:
# su user
$ python3 /path/to/script.py ; exit
uid=0(root) ...
At least to me, this result was not expected.
I asked it before on kernelnewbies mailing list. [8]
Please set me in CC, because I have not subscribed to this list.
Best and thank you,
Simon
[0] https://lkml.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1NBnrsPnHN6D9nbOJP6+Q6zEV9vfx9q7ME4Eti-vRmhQ@mail.gmail.com/T/
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/lkml/20170420174100.GA16822@mail.hallyn.com/T/
[2] https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/issues/2782
[3] https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/KnowledgeBase/SnapIoctlTIOCSTI
[4] https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=815922
[5] https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=628843
[6] https://github.com/anthraxx/linux-hardened/commit/d0e49deb1a39dc64e7c7db3340579
[7] https://github.com/anthraxx/linux-hardened/commit/ea8f20602a993c90125bf08da3989
[8] https://www.spinics.net/lists/newbies/msg64019.html
next reply other threads:[~2022-10-06 18:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-06 18:48 Simon Brand [this message]
2022-10-11 21:12 ` Possibility to disable icotl TIOCSTI Randy Dunlap
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