Re: [PATCH v2 33/39] x86/cpufeatures: Limit shadow stack to Intel CPUs

Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04T23:25:08Z

On Tue, 2022-10-04 at 14:17 -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On October 4, 2022 1:50:20 PM PDT, Nathan Chancellor <
> nathan@kernel.org> wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 04, 2022 at 08:34:54PM +0000, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
> > > On Tue, 2022-10-04 at 14:43 -0500, John Allen wrote:
> > > > On 10/4/22 10:47 AM, Nathan Chancellor wrote:
> > > > > Hi Kees,
> > > > >
> > > > > On Mon, Oct 03, 2022 at 09:54:26PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > > > > On Mon, Oct 03, 2022 at 05:09:04PM -0700, Dave Hansen
> > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > On 10/3/22 16:57, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > > > > > > On Thu, Sep 29, 2022 at 03:29:30PM -0700, Rick
> > > > > > > > Edgecombe
> > > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > > > Shadow stack is supported on newer AMD processors,
> > > > > > > > > but the
> > > > > > > > > kernel
> > > > > > > > > implementation has not been tested on them. Prevent
> > > > > > > > > basic
> > > > > > > > > issues from
> > > > > > > > > showing up for normal users by disabling shadow stack
> > > > > > > > > on
> > > > > > > > > all CPUs except
> > > > > > > > > Intel until it has been tested. At which point the
> > > > > > > > > limitation should be
> > > > > > > > > removed.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <
> > > > > > > > > rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > So running the selftests on an AMD system is sufficient
> > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > drop this
> > > > > > > > patch?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Yes, that's enough.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I _thought_ the AMD folks provided some tested-by's at
> > > > > > > some
> > > > > > > point in the
> > > > > > > past. But, maybe I'm confusing this for one of the other
> > > > > > > shared
> > > > > > > features. Either way, I'm sure no tested-by's were
> > > > > > > dropped on
> > > > > > > purpose.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I'm sure Rick is eager to trim down his series and this
> > > > > > > would
> > > > > > > be a great
> > > > > > > patch to drop. Does anyone want to make that easy for
> > > > > > > Rick?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > <hint> <hint>
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Hey Gustavo, Nathan, or Nick! I know y'all have some fancy
> > > > > > AMD
> > > > > > testing
> > > > > > rigs. Got a moment to spin up this series and run the
> > > > > > selftests?
> > > > > > :)
> > > > >
> > > > > I do have access to a system with an EPYC 7513, which does
> > > > > have
> > > > > Shadow
> > > > > Stack support (I can see 'shstk' in the "Flags" section of
> > > > > lscpu
> > > > > with
> > > > > this series). As far as I understand it, AMD only added
> > > > > Shadow
> > > > > Stack
> > > > > with Zen 3; my regular AMD test system is Zen 2 (probably
> > > > > should
> > > > > look at
> > > > > procurring a Zen 3 or Zen 4 one at some point).
> > > > >
> > > > > I applied this series on top of 6.0 and reverted this change
> > > > > then
> > > > > booted
> > > > > it on that system. After building the selftest (which did
> > > > > require
> > > > > 'make headers_install' and a small addition to make it build
> > > > > beyond
> > > > > that, see below), I ran it and this was the result. I am not
> > > > > sure
> > > > > if
> > > > > that is expected or not but the other results seem promising
> > > > > for
> > > > > dropping this patch.
> > > > >
> > > > > $ ./test_shadow_stack_64
> > > > > [INFO] new_ssp = 7f8a36c9fff8, *new_ssp = 7f8a36ca0001
> > > > > [INFO] changing ssp from 7f8a374a0ff0 to 7f8a36c9fff8
> > > > > [INFO] ssp is now 7f8a36ca0000
> > > > > [OK] Shadow stack pivot
> > > > > [OK] Shadow stack faults
> > > > > [INFO] Corrupting shadow stack
> > > > > [INFO] Generated shadow stack violation successfully
> > > > > [OK] Shadow stack violation test
> > > > > [INFO] Gup read -> shstk access success
> > > > > [INFO] Gup write -> shstk access success
> > > > > [INFO] Violation from normal write
> > > > > [INFO] Gup read -> write access success
> > > > > [INFO] Violation from normal write
> > > > > [INFO] Gup write -> write access success
> > > > > [INFO] Cow gup write -> write access success
> > > > > [OK] Shadow gup test
> > > > > [INFO] Violation from shstk access
> > > > > [OK] mprotect() test
> > > > > [OK] Userfaultfd test
> > > > > [FAIL] Alt shadow stack test
> > > >
> > > > The selftest is looking OK on my system (Dell PowerEdge R6515
> > > > w/ EPYC
> > > > 7713). I also just pulled a fresh 6.0 kernel and applied the
> > > > series
> > > > including the fix Nathan mentions below.
> > > >
> > > > $ tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack_64
> > > > [INFO] new_ssp = 7f30cccc5ff8, *new_ssp = 7f30cccc6001
> > > > [INFO] changing ssp from 7f30cd4c6ff0 to 7f30cccc5ff8
> > > > [INFO] ssp is now 7f30cccc6000
> > > > [OK] Shadow stack pivot
> > > > [OK] Shadow stack faults
> > > > [INFO] Corrupting shadow stack
> > > > [INFO] Generated shadow stack violation successfully
> > > > [OK] Shadow stack violation test
> > > > [INFO] Gup read -> shstk access success
> > > > [INFO] Gup write -> shstk access success
> > > > [INFO] Violation from normal write
> > > > [INFO] Gup read -> write access success
> > > > [INFO] Violation from normal write
> > > > [INFO] Gup write -> write access success
> > > > [INFO] Cow gup write -> write access success
> > > > [OK] Shadow gup test
> > > > [INFO] Violation from shstk access
> > > > [OK] mprotect() test
> > > > [OK] Userfaultfd test
> > > > [OK] Alt shadow stack test.
> > >
> > > Thanks for the testing. Based on the test, I wonder if this could
> > > be a
> > > SW bug. Nathan, could I send you a tweaked test with some more
> > > debug
> > > information?
> >
> > Yes, more than happy to help you look into this further!
> >
> > > John, are we sure AMD and Intel systems behave the same with
> > > respect to
> > > CPUs not creating Dirty=1,Write=0 PTEs in rare situations? Or any
> > > other
> > > CET related differences we should hash out? Otherwise I'll drop
> > > the
> > > patch for the next version. (and assuming the issue Nathan hit
> > > doesn't
> > > turn up anything HW related).
>
> I have to admit to being a bit confused here... in general, we trust
> CPUID bits unless they are *known* to be wrong, in which case we
> blacklist them.
>
> If AMD advertises the feature but it doesn't work or they didn't
> validate it, that would be a (serious!) bug on their part that we can
> address by blacklisting, but they should also fix with a
> microcode/BIOS patch.
>
> What am I missing?

I have not read anything about the AMD implementation except hearing
that it is supported. But there are some microarchitectual-like aspects
to this CET Linux implementation, around requiring CPUs to not create
Dirty=1,Write=0 PTEs in some cases, where they did in the past. In
another thread Jann asked how the IOMMU works with respect to this edge
case and I'm currently trying to chase down that answer for even Intel
HW. So I just wanted to double check that we expect that everything
should be the same. In either case we still have time to iron things
out before anything gets upstream.