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From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>,
	Derek Manwaring <derekmn@amazon.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/36] Attack vector controls
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2025 19:45:07 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Z88zM52t8b1oSfr2@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250310164023.779191-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>


* David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> wrote:

> David Kaplan (36):
>   x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation
>   x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation
>   x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation
>   x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation
>   x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation()
>   x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation
>   x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation
>   x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation
>   x86/bugs: Only allow retbleed=stuff on Intel
>   x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation
>   x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation
>   x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation
>   x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation
>   x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation
>   x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation
>   x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation
>   Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls
>   cpu: Define attack vectors
>   x86/Kconfig: Arch attack vector support
>   x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector
>     controls.
>   x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds
>   x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa
>   x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio
>   x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds
>   x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds
>   x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds
>   x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1
>   x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed
>   x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user
>   x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi
>   x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2
>   x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf
>   x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso
>   x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti
>   x86/bugs: Print enabled attack vectors
>   cpu: Show attack vectors in sysfs

Just an overall meta comment: could you please capitalize all the 
acronyms properly and consistently in titles, changelogs and the code 
itself:

  s/mds
   /MDS

  s/srso
   /SRSO

etc. For single patches we maintainers will routinely fix such issues, 
but for a 36-patch series it's rather tedious ...

Also, please put no periods into titles, and titles should begin with a 
verb.

Thanks,

	Ingo

  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-03-10 18:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-03-10 16:39 [PATCH v4 00/36] Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 01/36] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 02/36] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 03/36] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-13  9:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-13 14:19     ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-13 19:26     ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-18 14:16       ` MMIO and VERW Borislav Petkov
2025-03-18 16:25         ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-18 16:34           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-18 16:56             ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-18 17:37               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-18 18:15                 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-18 18:55                   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-24  9:29       ` [PATCH v4 03/36] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation Borislav Petkov
2025-03-24 17:41         ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-25 11:31           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 04/36] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-10 16:24   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 19:10     ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 05/36] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 06/36] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 07/36] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 08/36] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 09/36] x86/bugs: Only allow retbleed=stuff on Intel David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 10/36] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 11/36] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-12  9:49   ` kernel test robot
2025-04-10 16:26   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 19:20     ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-10 16:41   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 19:20     ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-14 23:48       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-15 14:56         ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 12/36] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 13/36] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-10 17:08   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 19:25     ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 14/36] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 15/36] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 16/36] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-10 17:38   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 21:12     ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 17/36] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-04-10 18:14   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 21:15     ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-14 23:51       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-15 14:59         ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-15 15:32           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-15 16:10             ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-15 16:47               ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-15 17:06                 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 18/36] cpu: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-04-10 18:12   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 21:20     ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 19/36] x86/Kconfig: Arch attack vector support David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 20/36] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-03-12 11:32   ` kernel test robot
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 21/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 22/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 23/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 24/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 25/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 26/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 27/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 28/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 29/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 30/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 31/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 32/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 33/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 34/36] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 35/36] x86/bugs: Print enabled attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 36/36] cpu: Show attack vectors in sysfs David Kaplan
2025-03-10 18:45 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2025-03-10 20:46   ` [PATCH v4 00/36] Attack vector controls Kaplan, David

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