From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Cc: "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] KVM: VMX: Don't rely _only_ on CPUID to enforce XCR0 restrictions for ECREATE
Date: Thu, 6 Apr 2023 12:12:03 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZC8J2J9Js7Z99k6/@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2cedc5ca5e1d126a0abf3b651c6fef1a8970fcfd.camel@intel.com>
On Thu, Apr 06, 2023, Huang, Kai wrote:
> On Wed, 2023-04-05 at 18:44 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 05, 2023, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > > On Tue, 2023-04-04 at 17:59 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > Explicitly check the vCPU's supported XCR0 when determining whether or not
> > > > the XFRM for ECREATE is valid. Checking CPUID works because KVM updates
> > > > guest CPUID.0x12.1 to restrict the leaf to a subset of the guest's allowed
> > > > XCR0, but that is rather subtle and KVM should not modify guest CPUID
> > > > except for modeling true runtime behavior (allowed XFRM is most definitely
> > > > not "runtime" behavior).
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> > > > ---
> > > > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 3 ++-
> > > > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c
> > > > index aa53c98034bf..362a31b19b0e 100644
> > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c
> > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c
> > > > @@ -175,7 +175,8 @@ static int __handle_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > > > (u32)attributes & ~sgx_12_1->eax ||
> > > > (u32)(attributes >> 32) & ~sgx_12_1->ebx ||
> > > > (u32)xfrm & ~sgx_12_1->ecx ||
> > > > - (u32)(xfrm >> 32) & ~sgx_12_1->edx) {
> > > > + (u32)(xfrm >> 32) & ~sgx_12_1->edx ||
> > > > + xfrm & ~vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0) {
> > >
> > > Perhaps this change is needed even without patch 2?
> > >
> > > This is because when CPUID 0xD doesn't exist, guest_supported_xcr0 is 0. But
> > > when CPUID 0xD doesn't exist, IIUC currently KVM doesn't clear SGX in CPUID, and
> > > sgx_12_1->ecx is always set to 0x3.
> >
> > Hrm, that's a bug in this patch. Drat. More below.
> >
> > > __handle_encls_ereate() doesn't check CPUID 0xD either, so w/o above explicit
> > > check xfrm against guest_supported_xcr0, it seems guest can successfully run
> > > ECREATE when it doesn't have CPUID 0xD?
> >
> > ECREATE doesn't have a strict dependency on CPUID 0xD or XSAVE. This exact scenario
> > is called out in the SDM:
> >
> > Legal values for SECS.ATTRIBUTES.XFRM conform to these requirements:
> > * XFRM[1:0] must be set to 0x3.
> > * If the processor does support XSAVE, XFRM must contain a value that would
> > be legal if loaded into XCR0.
> > * If the processor does not support XSAVE, or if the system software has not
> > enabled XSAVE, then XFRM[63:2] must be zero.
> >
> > So the above needs to be either
> >
> > xfrm & ~(vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 | XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE)
> >
> > or
> >
> > (xfrm & ~XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE & ~vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0)
> >
> >
> > I think I prefer the first one as I find it slightly more obvious that FP+SSE are
> > allowed in addition to the XCR0 bits.
>
> The above check doesn't verify xfrm is a super set of 0x3. I think we verify
> that per SDM:
Oooh, right. It's not that FP+SSE are always allowed, it's that FP+SSE must always
be _set_. So this?
xfrm & ~(vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 | XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE) ||
(xfrm & XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE) != XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE
> 39.7.3 Processor Extended States and ENCLS[ECREATE]
>
> The ECREATE leaf function of the ENCLS instruction enforces a number of
> consistency checks described earlier. The execution of ENCLS[ECREATE] leaf
> function results in a #GP(0) in any of the following cases:
> • SECS.ATTRIBUTES.XFRM[1:0] is not 3.
> • The processor does not support XSAVE and any of the following is true:
> — SECS.ATTRIBUTES.XFRM[63:2] is not 0.
> — SECS.SSAFRAMESIZE is 0.
> • The processor supports XSAVE and any of the following is true:
> — XSETBV would fault on an attempt to load XFRM into XCR0.
> — XFRM[63]=1.
> — The SSAFRAME is too small to hold required, enabled states ...
>
>
> And in the ECREATE pseudo code, the relevant parts seem to be:
>
> (* Check lower 2 bits of XFRM are set *)
> IF ( ( DS:TMP_SECS.ATTRIBUTES.XFRM BitwiseAND 03H) ≠ 03H)
> THEN #GP(0); FI;
>
> IF (XFRM is illegal)
> THEN #GP(0); FI;
>
> The first part is clear, but the second part is vague.
>
> I am not sure in hardware behaviour, whether XCR0 is actually checked in
> ECREATE. It's more likely XCRO is actually checked in EENTER.
>
> But I think it's just fine to also check against XCR0 here.
ECREATE doesn't check XCR0, it checks that XFRM represents a legal XCR0 values
for the platform, which in KVM is tracked as guest_supported_xcr0.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-06 19:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-05 0:59 [PATCH 0/3] KVM: x86: SGX vs. XCR0 cleanups Sean Christopherson
2023-04-05 0:59 ` [PATCH 1/3] KVM: VMX: Don't rely _only_ on CPUID to enforce XCR0 restrictions for ECREATE Sean Christopherson
2023-04-05 10:52 ` Huang, Kai
2023-04-06 1:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-06 3:02 ` Huang, Kai
2023-04-06 19:12 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2023-04-12 10:12 ` Huang, Kai
2023-04-20 10:55 ` Huang, Kai
2023-04-05 0:59 ` [PATCH 2/3] KVM: x86: Don't adjust guest's CPUID.0x12.1 (allowed SGX enclave XFRM) Sean Christopherson
2023-04-05 0:59 ` [PATCH 3/3] KVM: x86: Open code supported XCR0 calculation in kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid() Sean Christopherson
2023-04-05 3:05 ` [PATCH 0/3] KVM: x86: SGX vs. XCR0 cleanups Huang, Kai
2023-04-05 9:44 ` Huang, Kai
2023-04-06 2:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-06 10:01 ` Zhi Wang
2023-04-12 12:07 ` Huang, Kai
2023-04-12 15:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-13 0:20 ` Huang, Kai
2023-04-13 22:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-14 13:42 ` Huang, Kai
2023-04-16 6:36 ` Zhi Wang
2023-04-13 6:07 ` Zhi Wang
2023-04-12 12:15 ` Huang, Kai
2023-04-12 14:57 ` Sean Christopherson
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