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From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	john.allen@amd.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization
Date: Sat, 22 Apr 2023 00:54:11 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZEMGA2uUfpJL4rMH@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230421134615.62539-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com>

Hi,

On Fri, Apr 21, 2023 at 09:45:54AM -0400, Yang Weijiang wrote:
>
> Tests:
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> This series passed basic CET user shadow stack test and kernel IBT test in
> L1 and L2 guest. It also passed CET KUT test which has been merged there.
> 
> Executed all KUT tests and KVM selftests against this series, all test cases
> passes except the vmx test, the failure is due to CR4_CET bit testing in
> test_vmxon_bad_cr(). After add CR4_CET bit to skip list, the test passed.
> I'll send a patch to fix this issue later.
> 
> 
> To run user shadow stack test and kernel IBT test in VM, you need an CET
> capable platform, e.g., Sapphire Rapids server, and follow below steps to
> build host/guest kernel properly:
> 
> 1. Buld host kernel. Patch this series to kernel tree and build kernel
> with CET capable gcc version(e.g., >=8.5.0).
> 
> 2. Build guest kernel. Patch CET native series to kernel tree and opt-in
> CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT and CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK options.
> 
> 3. Launch a VM with QEMU built with CET enabling patches [2].
> 
> Check kernel selftest test_shadow_stack_64 output:
> [INFO]  new_ssp = 7f8c82100ff8, *new_ssp = 7f8c82101001
> [INFO]  changing ssp from 7f8c82900ff0 to 7f8c82100ff8
> [INFO]  ssp is now 7f8c82101000
> [OK]    Shadow stack pivot
> [OK]    Shadow stack faults
> [INFO]  Corrupting shadow stack
> [INFO]  Generated shadow stack violation successfully
> [OK]    Shadow stack violation test
> [INFO]  Gup read -> shstk access success
> [INFO]  Gup write -> shstk access success
> [INFO]  Violation from normal write
> [INFO]  Gup read -> write access success
> [INFO]  Violation from normal write
> [INFO]  Gup write -> write access success
> [INFO]  Cow gup write -> write access success
> [OK]    Shadow gup test
> [INFO]  Violation from shstk access
> [OK]    mprotect() test
> [SKIP]  Userfaultfd unavailable.
> [OK]    32 bit test
> 
> Check kernel IBT with dmesg | grep CET:
> CET detected: Indirect Branch Tracking enabled
> 
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Changes in v2:
> 1. Remove excessive checks on host CET Kconfig options in v1 patchset [3].
> 2. Make CET CPUIDs, MSRs and control flags enabling independent to host CET status.
> 3. Introduce supervisor SHSTK support to make the patch set complete.
> 4. Refactor patches to accommodate above changes.
> 5. Rebase on kvm-x86/next [4].
> 
> 
> [1]: linux-next: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/tree/?h=next-20230420
> [2]: QEMU patch: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230421041227.90915-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com/
> [3]: v1 patchset: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220616084643.19564-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com/
> [4]: Rebase branch: https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux.git, commit: 7b632f72528d (tag: kvm-x86-next-2023.04.14)
 
I played a bit with KVM support for shadow stacks on AMD machines and I
rebased v1 patches along with John's SVM series 

https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20221012203910.204793-1-john.allen@amd.com/

on top of v6.3-rc4 and Rick's series for host shadow stack support. I've
put this at

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rppt/linux.git/log/?h=shstk/kvm

if anybody is interested. With this I could successfully run shadow stack
self test in a guest on an AMD Zen3 machine.

One thing I've noticed while rebasing is that John's patches move
cet_is_msr_accessible() from vmx/ to x86.c and I also had to make such move
for cet_is_ssp_msr_accessible().

Would make sense to have them available for both VMX and SVM from the
start.

> Rick Edgecombe (5):
>   x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack
>   x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks
>   x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack
>   x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
>   x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate
> 
> Sean Christopherson (2):
>   KVM:x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features
>   KVM:x86: Load guest FPU state when accessing xsaves-managed MSRs
> 
> Yang Weijiang (14):
>   KVM:x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS
>   KVM:x86: Init kvm_caps.supported_xss with supported feature bits
>   KVM:x86: Add #CP support in guest exception classification
>   KVM:VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits
>   KVM:x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting
>   KVM:VMX: Emulate reads and writes to CET MSRs
>   KVM:VMX: Add a synthetic MSR to allow userspace VMM to access
>     GUEST_SSP
>   KVM:x86: Report CET MSRs as to-be-saved if CET is supported
>   KVM:x86: Save/Restore GUEST_SSP to/from SMM state save area
>   KVM:VMX: Pass through user CET MSRs to the guest
>   KVM:x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace
>   KVM:nVMX: Enable user CET support for nested VMX
>   KVM:x86: Enable supervisor IBT support for guest
>   KVM:x86: Support CET supervisor shadow stack MSR access
> 
>  arch/x86/Kconfig                         |  24 ++++
>  arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler               |   5 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h       |   2 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |   8 +-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h           |   9 ++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h         |  16 ++-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h        |   6 +-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h          |   3 +-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h               |   8 ++
>  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h          |   1 +
>  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h     |   1 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c             |  35 ++++--
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c         |   1 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c               |  19 +++
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c             |  90 +++++++-------
>  arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c                     |  23 +++-
>  arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h                     |   6 +
>  arch/x86/kvm/smm.c                       |  20 +++
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h          |   4 +
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c                |  29 ++++-
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c                |   6 +
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h                |  14 ++-
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                   | 150 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h                   |   6 +-
>  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                       |  79 ++++++++++--
>  arch/x86/kvm/x86.h                       |  46 ++++++-
>  26 files changed, 528 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-)
> 
> 
> base-commit: 7b632f72528d5fa3f0265358a393f534da47d9dd
> -- 
> 2.27.0
> 

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-04-21 21:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-04-21 13:45 [PATCH v2 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:45 ` [PATCH v2 01/21] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:45 ` [PATCH v2 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:45 ` [PATCH v2 03/21] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:45 ` [PATCH v2 04/21] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:45 ` [PATCH v2 05/21] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 06/21] KVM:x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 07/21] KVM:x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-04-24  1:38   ` Binbin Wu
2023-04-24  6:15     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 08/21] KVM:x86: Init kvm_caps.supported_xss with supported feature bits Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 09/21] KVM:x86: Load guest FPU state when accessing xsaves-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-04-27  3:46   ` Binbin Wu
2023-04-27 15:57     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 10/21] KVM:x86: Add #CP support in guest exception classification Yang Weijiang
2023-04-28  6:09   ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-04  3:41     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-04  5:36       ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-04  6:59         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 11/21] KVM:VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-05-05  2:18   ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-05  2:22   ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-05  7:07     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 12/21] KVM:x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-05-05  5:01   ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-05  7:24     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 13/21] KVM:VMX: Emulate reads and writes to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 14/21] KVM:VMX: Add a synthetic MSR to allow userspace VMM to access GUEST_SSP Yang Weijiang
2023-05-03 17:08   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-04  1:30     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 15/21] KVM:x86: Report CET MSRs as to-be-saved if CET is supported Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 16/21] KVM:x86: Save/Restore GUEST_SSP to/from SMM state save area Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 17/21] KVM:VMX: Pass through user CET MSRs to the guest Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 18/21] KVM:x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 19/21] KVM:nVMX: Enable user CET support for nested VMX Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 20/21] KVM:x86: Enable supervisor IBT support for guest Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 21/21] KVM:x86: Support CET supervisor shadow stack MSR access Yang Weijiang
2023-05-03 17:06   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-04  1:11     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-03 17:07   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-04  1:20     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-04  4:17       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-04  6:51         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 21:54 ` Mike Rapoport [this message]
2023-04-23  5:37   ` [PATCH v2 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-24 18:22   ` John Allen
2023-04-22 13:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-04-23  6:12   ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-23  8:30 ` Binbin Wu
2023-04-24  6:12   ` Yang, Weijiang

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