From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C968FC7618E for ; Wed, 26 Apr 2023 13:48:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S241158AbjDZNsc (ORCPT ); Wed, 26 Apr 2023 09:48:32 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41134 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S240277AbjDZNs3 (ORCPT ); Wed, 26 Apr 2023 09:48:29 -0400 Received: from jabberwock.ucw.cz (jabberwock.ucw.cz [46.255.230.98]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3644E4EED; Wed, 26 Apr 2023 06:48:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: by jabberwock.ucw.cz (Postfix, from userid 1017) id CDA371C0AAC; Wed, 26 Apr 2023 15:48:24 +0200 (CEST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ucw.cz; s=gen1; t=1682516904; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=vobIZzsu6G/ruKba7Fcr/sNGHFKo94RsPgCWSvtPggw=; b=EnUnI12wJod78pbZUXWy+B2EbuDd+pFb6VuuVRLCVZmzO2x89Z0qyd4gQs+dSGNNPiz3GO NyEJA6fsoybJSVPvUxkrXvOYBxRQx6KNrBa8syfTLTFKzjBwMXSfAS/GSaHjEjsfXPl66m JG3AW6zRt9J+y48qJgu4+Y82HP2wZxA= Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2023 15:47:19 +0200 From: Pavel Machek To: Mario Limonciello Cc: Herbert Xu , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Tom Lendacky , "David S . Miller" , John Allen , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/10] Add dynamic boost control support Message-ID: References: <20230420163140.14940-1-mario.limonciello@amd.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20230420163140.14940-1-mario.limonciello@amd.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi! > Dynamic boost control is a feature of some SoCs that allows > an authenticated entity to send commands to the security processor > to control certain SOC characteristics with the intention to improve > performance. > > This is implemented via a mechanism that a userspace application would > authenticate using a nonce and key exchange over an IOCTL interface. > > After authentication is complete an application can exchange signed > messages with the security processor and both ends can validate the > data transmitted. Why is this acceptable? This precludes cross-platform interfaces, right? Why would application want to validate data from PSP? That precludes virtualization, right? Just put the key in kernel. Users have right to control their own hardware. Pavel --