From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] KVM: x86: Track supported ARCH_CAPABILITIES in kvm_caps
Date: Wed, 24 May 2023 16:32:36 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZG3LpLR7itO4dI8U@chao-email> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <fc72da6d-2f70-63c8-dd6b-f8f8df862b89@intel.com>
On Wed, May 24, 2023 at 04:14:10PM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>On 5/24/2023 2:16 PM, Chao Gao wrote:
>> to avoid computing the supported value at runtime every time.
>>
>> Toggle the ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH bit when l1tf_vmx_mitigation
>> is modified to achieve the same result as runtime computing.
>
>It's not the same result.
it is because ...
>
>In kvm_get_arch_capabilities(), host's value is honored. I.e., when host
>supports ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH, l1tf_vmx_mitigation doesn't make any
>difference to the result.
... l1tf_vmx_mitigation should be VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED in this
case. l1tf_vmx_mitigation cannot be VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER.
>
>> Opportunistically, add a comment to document the problem of allowing
>> changing the supported value of ARCH_CAPABILITIES and the reason why
>> we don't fix it.
>>
>> No functional change intended.
>>
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZGZhW%2Fx5OWPmx1qD@google.com/
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZGeU9sYTPxqNGSqI@google.com/
>> Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
>> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 7 ++++---
>> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 1 +
>> 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> index 44fb619803b8..8274ef5e89e5 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> @@ -309,10 +309,31 @@ static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
>> l1tf_vmx_mitigation = l1tf;
>> - if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
>> + /*
>> + * Update static keys and supported arch capabilities according to
>> + * the new mitigation state.
>> + *
>> + * ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH is toggled because if we do cache
>> + * flushes for L1 guests on (nested) vmlaunch/vmresume to L2, L1
>> + * guests can skip the flush and if we don't, then L1 guests need
>> + * to do a flush.
>> + *
>> + * Toggling ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH may present inconsistent
>> + * model to the guest, e.g., if userspace isn't careful, a VM can
>> + * have vCPUs with different values for ARCH_CAPABILITIES. But
>> + * there is almost no chance to fix the issue. Because, to present
>> + * a consistent model, KVM essentially needs to disallow changing
>> + * the module param after VMs/vCPUs have been created, but that
>> + * would prevent userspace from toggling the param while VMs are
>> + * running, e.g., in response to a new vulnerability.
>> + */
>> + if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER) {
>> static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
>> - else
>> + kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap |= ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH;
>> + } else {
>> static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
>> + kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap &= ~ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH;
>> + }
>> if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND)
>> static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> index c0778ca39650..2408b5f554b7 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> @@ -1672,7 +1672,7 @@ static int kvm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
>> {
>> switch (msr->index) {
>> case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
>> - msr->data = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
>> + msr->data = kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap;
>> break;
>> case MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES:
>> msr->data = kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap;
>> @@ -7156,7 +7156,7 @@ static void kvm_probe_msr_to_save(u32 msr_index)
>> return;
>> break;
>> case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
>> - if (!(kvm_get_arch_capabilities() & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
>> + if (!(kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
>> return;
>> break;
>> default:
>> @@ -9532,6 +9532,7 @@ static int __kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
>> kvm_caps.max_guest_tsc_khz = max;
>> }
>> kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio = 1ULL << kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits;
>> + kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
>> kvm_init_msr_lists();
>> return 0;
>> @@ -11895,7 +11896,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> if (r)
>> goto free_guest_fpu;
>> - vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
>> + vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap;
>> vcpu->arch.msr_platform_info = MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULT;
>> kvm_xen_init_vcpu(vcpu);
>> kvm_vcpu_mtrr_init(vcpu);
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
>> index c544602d07a3..d3e524bcc169 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
>> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ struct kvm_caps {
>> u64 supported_xcr0;
>> u64 supported_xss;
>> u64 supported_perf_cap;
>> + u64 supported_arch_cap;
>> };
>> void kvm_spurious_fault(void);
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-24 8:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-05-24 6:16 [PATCH v2 0/3] MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES cleanups Chao Gao
2023-05-24 6:16 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] KVM: x86: Track supported ARCH_CAPABILITIES in kvm_caps Chao Gao
2023-05-24 8:14 ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-05-24 8:32 ` Chao Gao [this message]
2023-05-25 2:17 ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-06-06 16:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-24 6:16 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] KVM: x86: Correct the name for skipping VMENTER l1d flush Chao Gao
2023-05-24 8:25 ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-05-24 6:16 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] x86/cpu, KVM: Use helper function to read MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Chao Gao
2023-05-24 8:19 ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-06-06 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES cleanups Sean Christopherson
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