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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	rppt@kernel.org, binbin.wu@linux.intel.com,
	rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, john.allen@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 16/21] KVM:x86: Save/Restore GUEST_SSP to/from SMM state save area
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2023 15:30:19 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZJYc+4fN3K+h8VhM@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230511040857.6094-17-weijiang.yang@intel.com>

On Thu, May 11, 2023, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> Save GUEST_SSP to SMM state save area when guest exits to SMM
> due to SMI and restore it VMCS field when guest exits SMM.

This fails to answer "Why does KVM need to do this?"

> Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/smm.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
> index b42111a24cc2..c54d3eb2b7e4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
> @@ -275,6 +275,16 @@ static void enter_smm_save_state_64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  	enter_smm_save_seg_64(vcpu, &smram->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS);
>  
>  	smram->int_shadow = static_call(kvm_x86_get_interrupt_shadow)(vcpu);
> +
> +	if (kvm_cet_user_supported()) {

This is wrong, KVM should not save/restore state that doesn't exist from the guest's
perspective, i.e. this needs to check guest_cpuid_has().

On a related topic, I would love feedback on my series that adds a framework for
features like this, where KVM needs to check guest CPUID as well as host support.

https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230217231022.816138-1-seanjc@google.com

> +		struct msr_data msr;
> +
> +		msr.index = MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP;
> +		msr.host_initiated = true;

Huh?

> +		/* GUEST_SSP is stored in VMCS at vm-exit. */

(a) this is not VMX code, i.e. referencing the VMCS is wrong, and (b) how the
guest's SSP is managed is irrelevant, all that matters is that KVM can get the
current guest value.

> +		static_call(kvm_x86_get_msr)(vcpu, &msr);
> +		smram->ssp = msr.data;
> +	}
>  }
>  #endif
>  
> @@ -565,6 +575,16 @@ static int rsm_load_state_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
>  	static_call(kvm_x86_set_interrupt_shadow)(vcpu, 0);
>  	ctxt->interruptibility = (u8)smstate->int_shadow;
>  
> +	if (kvm_cet_user_supported()) {
> +		struct msr_data msr;
> +
> +		msr.index = MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP;
> +		msr.host_initiated = true;
> +		msr.data = smstate->ssp;
> +		/* Mimic host_initiated access to bypass ssp access check. */

No, masquerading as a host access is all kinds of wrong.  I have no idea what
check you're trying to bypass, but whatever it is, it's wrong.  Per the SDM, the
SSP field in SMRAM is writable, which means that KVM needs to correctly handle
the scenario where SSP holds garbage, e.g. a non-canonical address.

Why can't this use kvm_get_msr() and kvm_set_msr()?

  reply	other threads:[~2023-06-23 22:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 99+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-05-11  4:08 [PATCH v3 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 01/21] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 03/21] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 04/21] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 05/21] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 06/21] KVM:x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-05-24  7:06   ` Chao Gao
2023-05-24  8:19     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 07/21] KVM:x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-05-25  6:10   ` Chao Gao
2023-05-30  3:51     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-30 12:08       ` Chao Gao
2023-05-31  1:11         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:45           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16  1:58             ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-23 23:21               ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26  9:24                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 08/21] KVM:x86: Init kvm_caps.supported_xss with supported feature bits Yang Weijiang
2023-06-06  8:38   ` Chao Gao
2023-06-08  5:42     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 09/21] KVM:x86: Load guest FPU state when accessing xsaves-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:50   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16  2:02     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 10/21] KVM:x86: Add #CP support in guest exception classification Yang Weijiang
2023-06-06  9:08   ` Chao Gao
2023-06-08  6:01     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:58       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16  6:56         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-16 18:57           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-19  9:28             ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30  9:34             ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 10:27               ` Chao Gao
2023-06-30 12:05                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 15:05                   ` Neiger, Gil
2023-06-30 15:15                     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-01  1:58                       ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-01  1:54                     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 15:07               ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-30 15:21                 ` Neiger, Gil
2023-07-01  1:57                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 11/21] KVM:VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 12/21] KVM:x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-06-06 11:03   ` Chao Gao
2023-06-08  6:06     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 13/21] KVM:VMX: Emulate reads and writes to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-05-23  8:21   ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-24  2:49     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-23 23:53   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 14:05     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-26 21:15       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-27  3:32         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-27 14:55           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-28  1:42             ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-07  9:10     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-07 15:28       ` Neiger, Gil
2023-07-12 16:42       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 14/21] KVM:VMX: Add a synthetic MSR to allow userspace to access GUEST_SSP Yang Weijiang
2023-05-23  8:57   ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-24  2:55     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 15/21] KVM:x86: Report CET MSRs as to-be-saved if CET is supported Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 16/21] KVM:x86: Save/Restore GUEST_SSP to/from SMM state save area Yang Weijiang
2023-06-23 22:30   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2023-06-26  8:59     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-26 21:20       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-27  3:50         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 17/21] KVM:VMX: Pass through user CET MSRs to the guest Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 18/21] KVM:x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-05-24  6:35   ` Chenyi Qiang
2023-05-24  8:07     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 19/21] KVM:nVMX: Enable user CET support for nested VMX Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 20/21] KVM:x86: Enable kernel IBT support for guest Yang Weijiang
2023-06-24  0:03   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 12:10     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-26 20:50       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-27  1:53         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 21/21] KVM:x86: Support CET supervisor shadow stack MSR access Yang Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:30 ` [PATCH v3 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16  0:00   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16  1:00     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-16  8:25   ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-16 17:56     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-19  6:41       ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-23 20:51         ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26  6:46           ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-17  7:44           ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-19 19:41             ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-19 20:26               ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-20  1:58                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-19 20:36               ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-20  5:26                 ` Pankaj Gupta
2023-07-20  8:03                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-20  8:09                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-20  9:14                       ` Pankaj Gupta
2023-07-20 10:46                     ` Andrew Cooper
2023-07-20  1:55               ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-10  0:28       ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-10 22:18         ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-11  1:24           ` Yang, Weijiang

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