From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
rppt@kernel.org, binbin.wu@linux.intel.com,
rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, john.allen@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 16/21] KVM:x86: Save/Restore GUEST_SSP to/from SMM state save area
Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2023 14:20:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZJoBFegpUDwCTVLS@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <945384ea-8a15-02cb-66b6-4ba4f22df3db@intel.com>
On Mon, Jun 26, 2023, Weijiang Yang wrote:
>
> On 6/24/2023 6:30 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Thu, May 11, 2023, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> > > Save GUEST_SSP to SMM state save area when guest exits to SMM
> > > due to SMI and restore it VMCS field when guest exits SMM.
> > This fails to answer "Why does KVM need to do this?"
>
> How about this:
>
> Guest SMM mode execution is out of guest kernel, to avoid GUEST_SSP
> corruption,
>
> KVM needs to save current normal mode GUEST_SSP to SMRAM area so that it can
> restore original GUEST_SSP at the end of SMM.
The key point I am looking for is a call out that KVM is emulating architectural
behavior, i.e. that smram->ssp is defined in the SDM and that the documented
behavior of Intel CPUs is that the CPU's current SSP is saved on SMI and loaded
on RSM. And I specifically say "loaded" and not "restored", because the field
is writable.
> > > Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
> > > ---
> > > arch/x86/kvm/smm.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
> > > 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
> > > index b42111a24cc2..c54d3eb2b7e4 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
> > > @@ -275,6 +275,16 @@ static void enter_smm_save_state_64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > > enter_smm_save_seg_64(vcpu, &smram->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS);
> > > smram->int_shadow = static_call(kvm_x86_get_interrupt_shadow)(vcpu);
> > > +
> > > + if (kvm_cet_user_supported()) {
> > This is wrong, KVM should not save/restore state that doesn't exist from the guest's
> > perspective, i.e. this needs to check guest_cpuid_has().
>
> Yes, the check missed the case that user space disables SHSTK. Will change
> it, thanks!
>
> >
> > On a related topic, I would love feedback on my series that adds a framework for
> > features like this, where KVM needs to check guest CPUID as well as host support.
> >
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230217231022.816138-1-seanjc@google.com
>
> The framework looks good, will it be merged in kvm_x86?
Yes, I would like to merge it at some point.
> > > @@ -565,6 +575,16 @@ static int rsm_load_state_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
> > > static_call(kvm_x86_set_interrupt_shadow)(vcpu, 0);
> > > ctxt->interruptibility = (u8)smstate->int_shadow;
> > > + if (kvm_cet_user_supported()) {
> > > + struct msr_data msr;
> > > +
> > > + msr.index = MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP;
> > > + msr.host_initiated = true;
> > > + msr.data = smstate->ssp;
> > > + /* Mimic host_initiated access to bypass ssp access check. */
> > No, masquerading as a host access is all kinds of wrong. I have no idea what
> > check you're trying to bypass, but whatever it is, it's wrong. Per the SDM, the
> > SSP field in SMRAM is writable, which means that KVM needs to correctly handle
> > the scenario where SSP holds garbage, e.g. a non-canonical address.
>
> MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP is only accessible to user space, e.g., during LM, it's not
> accessible to VM itself. So in kvm_cet_is_msr_accessible(), I added a check to
> tell whether the access is initiated from user space or not, I tried to bypass
> that check. Yes, I will add necessary checks here.
>
> >
> > Why can't this use kvm_get_msr() and kvm_set_msr()?
>
> If my above assumption is correct, these helpers are passed by
> host_initiated=false and cannot meet the requirments.
Sorry, I don't follow. These writes are NOT initiated from the host, i.e.
kvm_get_msr() and kvm_set_msr() do the right thing, unless I'm missing something.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-26 21:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 99+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-05-11 4:08 [PATCH v3 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 01/21] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 03/21] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 04/21] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 05/21] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 06/21] KVM:x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-05-24 7:06 ` Chao Gao
2023-05-24 8:19 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 07/21] KVM:x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-05-25 6:10 ` Chao Gao
2023-05-30 3:51 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-30 12:08 ` Chao Gao
2023-05-31 1:11 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16 1:58 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-23 23:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 9:24 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 08/21] KVM:x86: Init kvm_caps.supported_xss with supported feature bits Yang Weijiang
2023-06-06 8:38 ` Chao Gao
2023-06-08 5:42 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 09/21] KVM:x86: Load guest FPU state when accessing xsaves-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16 2:02 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 10/21] KVM:x86: Add #CP support in guest exception classification Yang Weijiang
2023-06-06 9:08 ` Chao Gao
2023-06-08 6:01 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16 6:56 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-16 18:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-19 9:28 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 9:34 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 10:27 ` Chao Gao
2023-06-30 12:05 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 15:05 ` Neiger, Gil
2023-06-30 15:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-01 1:58 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-01 1:54 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 15:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-30 15:21 ` Neiger, Gil
2023-07-01 1:57 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 11/21] KVM:VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 12/21] KVM:x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-06-06 11:03 ` Chao Gao
2023-06-08 6:06 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 13/21] KVM:VMX: Emulate reads and writes to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-05-23 8:21 ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-24 2:49 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-23 23:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 14:05 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-26 21:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-27 3:32 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-27 14:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-28 1:42 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-07 9:10 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-07 15:28 ` Neiger, Gil
2023-07-12 16:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 14/21] KVM:VMX: Add a synthetic MSR to allow userspace to access GUEST_SSP Yang Weijiang
2023-05-23 8:57 ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-24 2:55 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 15/21] KVM:x86: Report CET MSRs as to-be-saved if CET is supported Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 16/21] KVM:x86: Save/Restore GUEST_SSP to/from SMM state save area Yang Weijiang
2023-06-23 22:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 8:59 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-26 21:20 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2023-06-27 3:50 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 17/21] KVM:VMX: Pass through user CET MSRs to the guest Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 18/21] KVM:x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-05-24 6:35 ` Chenyi Qiang
2023-05-24 8:07 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 19/21] KVM:nVMX: Enable user CET support for nested VMX Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 20/21] KVM:x86: Enable kernel IBT support for guest Yang Weijiang
2023-06-24 0:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 12:10 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-26 20:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-27 1:53 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 21/21] KVM:x86: Support CET supervisor shadow stack MSR access Yang Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:30 ` [PATCH v3 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16 0:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16 1:00 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-16 8:25 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-16 17:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-19 6:41 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-23 20:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 6:46 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-17 7:44 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-19 19:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-19 20:26 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-20 1:58 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-19 20:36 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-20 5:26 ` Pankaj Gupta
2023-07-20 8:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-20 8:09 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-20 9:14 ` Pankaj Gupta
2023-07-20 10:46 ` Andrew Cooper
2023-07-20 1:55 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-10 0:28 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-10 22:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-11 1:24 ` Yang, Weijiang
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