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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	rppt@kernel.org, binbin.wu@linux.intel.com,
	rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, john.allen@amd.com,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	Gil Neiger <gil.neiger@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 13/21] KVM:VMX: Emulate reads and writes to CET MSRs
Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2023 09:42:57 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZK7YEUE9lxlvagsv@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <30b8d82b-ae2a-7022-2343-6cef9416510a@intel.com>

On Fri, Jul 07, 2023, Weijiang Yang wrote:
> > Side topic, what on earth does the SDM mean by this?!?
> > 
> >    The linear address written must be aligned to 8 bytes and bits 2:0 must be 0
> >    (hardware requires bits 1:0 to be 0).
> > 
> > I know Intel retroactively changed the alignment requirements, but the above
> > is nonsensical.  If ucode prevents writing bits 2:0, who cares what hardware
> > requires?
> 
> Hi, Sean,
> 
> Regarding the alignment check, I got update from Gil:
> 
> ==================================================
> 
> The WRMSR instruction to load IA32_PL[0-3]_SSP will #GP if the value to be
> loaded sets either bit 0 or bit 1.  It does not check bit 2.
> IDT event delivery, when changing to rings 0-2 will load SSP from the MSR
> corresponding to the new ring.  These transitions check that bits 2:0 of the
> new value are all zero and will generate a nested fault if any of those bits
> are set.  (Far CALL using a call gate also checks this if changing CPL.)
> 
> For a VMM that is emulating a WRMSR by a guest OS (because it was
> intercepting writes to that MSR), it suffices to perform the same checks as
> the CPU would (i.e., only bits 1:0):
> •    If the VMM sees bits 1:0 clear, it can perform the write on the part of
> the guest OS.  If the guest OS later encounters a #GP during IDT event
> delivery (because bit 2 is set), it is its own fault.
> •    If the VMM sets either bit 0 or bit 1 set, it should inject a #GP into
> the guest, as that is what the CPU would do in this case.
> 
> For an OS that is writing to the MSRs to set up shadow stacks, it should
> WRMSR the base addresses of those stacks.  Because of the token-based
> architecture used for supervisor shadow stacks (for rings 0-2), the base
> addresses of those stacks should be 8-byte aligned (clearing bits 2:0). 
> Thus, the values that an OS writes to the corresponding MSRs should clear
> bits 2:0.
> 
> (Of course, most OS’s will use only the MSR for ring 0, as most OS’s do not
> use rings 1 and 2.)
> 
> In contrast, the IA32_PL3_SSP MSR holds the current SSP for user software. 
> When a user thread is created, I suppose it may reference the base of the
> user shadow stack.  For a 32-bit app, that needs to be 4-byte aligned (bits
> 1:0 clear); for a 64-bit app, it may be necessary for it to be 8-byte
> aligned (bits 2:0) clear.
> 
> Once the user thread is executing, the CPU will load IA32_PL3_SSP with the
> user’s value of SSP on every exception and interrupt to ring 0.  The value
> at that time may be 4-byte or 8-byte aligned, depending on how the user
> thread is using the shadow stack.  On context switches, the OS should WRMSR
> whatever value was saved (by RDMSR) the last time there was a context switch
> away from the incoming thread.  The OS should not need to inspect or change
> this value.
> 
> ===================================================
> 
> Based on his feedback, I think VMM needs to check bits 1:0 when write the
> SSP MSRs. Is it?

Yep, KVM should only check bits 1:0 when emulating WRMSR.  KVM doesn't emulate
event delivery except for Real Mode, and I don't see that ever changing.  So to
"handle" the #GP during event delivery case, KVM just needs to propagate the "bad"
value into guest context, which KVM needs to do anyways.

Thanks for following up on this!

  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-07-12 16:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 99+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-05-11  4:08 [PATCH v3 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 01/21] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 03/21] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 04/21] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 05/21] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 06/21] KVM:x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-05-24  7:06   ` Chao Gao
2023-05-24  8:19     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 07/21] KVM:x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-05-25  6:10   ` Chao Gao
2023-05-30  3:51     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-30 12:08       ` Chao Gao
2023-05-31  1:11         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:45           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16  1:58             ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-23 23:21               ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26  9:24                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 08/21] KVM:x86: Init kvm_caps.supported_xss with supported feature bits Yang Weijiang
2023-06-06  8:38   ` Chao Gao
2023-06-08  5:42     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 09/21] KVM:x86: Load guest FPU state when accessing xsaves-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:50   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16  2:02     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 10/21] KVM:x86: Add #CP support in guest exception classification Yang Weijiang
2023-06-06  9:08   ` Chao Gao
2023-06-08  6:01     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:58       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16  6:56         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-16 18:57           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-19  9:28             ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30  9:34             ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 10:27               ` Chao Gao
2023-06-30 12:05                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 15:05                   ` Neiger, Gil
2023-06-30 15:15                     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-01  1:58                       ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-01  1:54                     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 15:07               ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-30 15:21                 ` Neiger, Gil
2023-07-01  1:57                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 11/21] KVM:VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 12/21] KVM:x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-06-06 11:03   ` Chao Gao
2023-06-08  6:06     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 13/21] KVM:VMX: Emulate reads and writes to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-05-23  8:21   ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-24  2:49     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-23 23:53   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 14:05     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-26 21:15       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-27  3:32         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-27 14:55           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-28  1:42             ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-07  9:10     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-07 15:28       ` Neiger, Gil
2023-07-12 16:42       ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 14/21] KVM:VMX: Add a synthetic MSR to allow userspace to access GUEST_SSP Yang Weijiang
2023-05-23  8:57   ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-24  2:55     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 15/21] KVM:x86: Report CET MSRs as to-be-saved if CET is supported Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 16/21] KVM:x86: Save/Restore GUEST_SSP to/from SMM state save area Yang Weijiang
2023-06-23 22:30   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26  8:59     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-26 21:20       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-27  3:50         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 17/21] KVM:VMX: Pass through user CET MSRs to the guest Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 18/21] KVM:x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-05-24  6:35   ` Chenyi Qiang
2023-05-24  8:07     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 19/21] KVM:nVMX: Enable user CET support for nested VMX Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 20/21] KVM:x86: Enable kernel IBT support for guest Yang Weijiang
2023-06-24  0:03   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 12:10     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-26 20:50       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-27  1:53         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 21/21] KVM:x86: Support CET supervisor shadow stack MSR access Yang Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:30 ` [PATCH v3 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16  0:00   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16  1:00     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-16  8:25   ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-16 17:56     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-19  6:41       ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-23 20:51         ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26  6:46           ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-17  7:44           ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-19 19:41             ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-19 20:26               ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-20  1:58                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-19 20:36               ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-20  5:26                 ` Pankaj Gupta
2023-07-20  8:03                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-20  8:09                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-20  9:14                       ` Pankaj Gupta
2023-07-20 10:46                     ` Andrew Cooper
2023-07-20  1:55               ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-10  0:28       ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-10 22:18         ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-11  1:24           ` Yang, Weijiang

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