From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Cc: <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<peterz@infradead.org>, <john.allen@amd.com>,
<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>, <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 13/20] KVM:VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs
Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2023 13:16:36 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZMH9tIXfPk0dl7ye@chao-email> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3d5fdd07-563c-6841-a867-88369c4dbb36@intel.com>
>> > + case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
>> > + case MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP:
>> > + case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
>> > + if (kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info))
>> > + return 1;
>> > + if (msr_info->index == MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP)
>> > + msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SSP);
>> > + else if (msr_info->index == MSR_IA32_S_CET)
>> > + msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_S_CET);
>> > + else if (msr_info->index == MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB)
>> > + msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE);
>> > + break;
>> > case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
>> > msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL);
>> > break;
>> > @@ -2402,6 +2417,31 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>> > else
>> > vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2] = data;
>> > break;
>> > +#define VMX_CET_CONTROL_MASK (~GENMASK_ULL(9, 6))
>> bits9-6 are reserved for both intel and amd. Shouldn't this check be
>> done in the common code?
>
>My thinking is, on AMD platform, bit 63:2 is anyway reserved since it doesn't
>support IBT,
You can only say
bits 5:2 and bits 63:10 are reserved since AMD doens't support IBT.
bits 9:6 are reserved regardless of the support of IBT.
>
>so the checks in common code for AMD is enough, when the execution flow comes
>here,
>
>it should be vmx, and need this additional check.
The checks against reserved bits are common for AMD and Intel:
1. if SHSTK is supported, bit1:0 are not reserved.
2. if IBT is supported, bit5:2 and bit63:10 are not reserved
3. bit9:6 are always reserved.
There is nothing specific to Intel.
>
>>
>> > +#define CET_LEG_BITMAP_BASE(data) ((data) >> 12)
>> > +#define CET_EXCLUSIVE_BITS (CET_SUPPRESS | CET_WAIT_ENDBR)
>> > + case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
>> > + return kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
>> this hunk can be dropped as well.
>
>In patch 16, these lines still need to be added back for PL{0,1,2}_SSP, so
>would like keep it
If that's the case, better to move it to patch 16, where the change
can be justified. And PL3_SSP should be removed anyway. and then
"msr_index != MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP" check in the below code snippet in
patch 16 can go away.
+ /*
+ * Write to the base SSP MSRs should happen ahead of toggling
+ * of IA32_S_CET.SH_STK_EN bit.
+ */
+ if (msr_index != MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP && data) {
+ vmx_disable_write_intercept_sss_msr(vcpu);
+ wrmsrl(msr_index, data);
+ }
>
>here.
>
>>
>> > + break;
>> > + case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
>> > + case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
>> > + case MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP:
>> > + case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
>> > + if ((msr_index == MSR_IA32_U_CET ||
>> > + msr_index == MSR_IA32_S_CET) &&
>> > + ((data & ~VMX_CET_CONTROL_MASK) ||
>> > + !IS_ALIGNED(CET_LEG_BITMAP_BASE(data), 4) ||
>> > + (data & CET_EXCLUSIVE_BITS) == CET_EXCLUSIVE_BITS))
>> > + return 1;
>> how about
>>
>> case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
>> case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
>> if ((data & ~VMX_CET_CONTROL_MASK) || ...
>> ...
>>
>> case MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP:
>> case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
>
>Do you mean to use "fallthrough"?
Yes.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-07-27 5:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-07-21 3:03 [PATCH v4 00/20] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 01/20] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 02/20] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 03/20] KVM:x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 04/20] KVM:x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 05/20] KVM:x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 06/20] KVM:x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 07/20] KVM:x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 08/20] KVM:x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 09/20] KVM:x86: Add common code of CET MSR access Yang Weijiang
2023-07-26 7:33 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-26 8:26 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-26 13:46 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-27 6:06 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-27 7:41 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-27 16:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 10/20] KVM:x86: Make guest supervisor states as non-XSAVE managed Yang Weijiang
2023-07-24 8:26 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-24 13:50 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 11/20] KVM:x86: Save and reload GUEST_SSP to/from SMRAM Yang Weijiang
2023-07-24 9:13 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-24 14:16 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-24 14:26 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 12/20] KVM:VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-07-27 5:26 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-27 7:13 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 13/20] KVM:VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-07-26 8:06 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-27 3:19 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-27 5:16 ` Chao Gao [this message]
2023-07-27 7:10 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-27 15:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-28 0:43 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 14/20] KVM:VMX: Set up interception for " Yang Weijiang
2023-07-26 8:30 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-27 3:48 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 15/20] KVM:VMX: Save host MSR_IA32_S_CET to VMCS field Yang Weijiang
2023-07-26 8:47 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-26 14:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-27 7:29 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 16/20] KVM:x86: Optimize CET supervisor SSP save/reload Yang Weijiang
2023-07-27 3:27 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-27 6:23 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 17/20] KVM:x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-07-27 6:32 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-27 7:26 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 18/20] KVM:x86: Enable guest CET supervisor xstate bit support Yang Weijiang
2023-07-27 8:03 ` Chao Gao
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 19/20] KVM:nVMX: Refine error code injection to nested VM Yang Weijiang
2023-07-21 3:03 ` [PATCH v4 20/20] KVM:nVMX: Enable CET support for " Yang Weijiang
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