From: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com>
To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, ztarkhani@microsoft.com,
alison.schofield@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH] lsm: constify 'file' parameter in security_bprm_creds_from_file()
Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2023 12:17:29 +0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZOWyiUTHCmKvsoX8@gmail.com> (raw)
The 'bprm_creds_from_file' hook has implementation registered in
commoncap. Looking at the function implementation we observe that the
'file' parameter is not changing.
Mark the 'file' parameter of LSM hook security_bprm_creds_from_file() as
'const' since it will not be changing in the LSM hook.
Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/fs.h | 2 +-
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 6 +++---
security/commoncap.c | 4 ++--
security/security.c | 2 +-
5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 133f0640fb24..15d58978efea 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2314,7 +2314,7 @@ struct filename {
};
static_assert(offsetof(struct filename, iname) % sizeof(long) == 0);
-static inline struct mnt_idmap *file_mnt_idmap(struct file *file)
+static inline struct mnt_idmap *file_mnt_idmap(const struct file *file)
{
return mnt_idmap(file->f_path.mnt);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 6bb55e61e8e8..1a05d95148e9 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, settime, const struct timespec64 *ts,
const struct timezone *tz)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, vm_enough_memory, struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_creds_for_exec, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_creds_from_file, struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_creds_from_file, struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_check_security, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bprm_committing_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bprm_committed_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index e2734e9e44d5..fbd498046e39 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-extern int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file);
+extern int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file);
int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int cap_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ int security_syslog(int type);
int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file);
+int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file);
int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ static inline int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
}
static inline int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
- struct file *file)
+ const struct file *file)
{
return cap_bprm_creds_from_file(bprm, file);
}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 0b3fc2f3afe7..02a778257e2c 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
* its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
* constructed by execve().
*/
-static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file,
+static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file,
bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
{
int rc = 0;
@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
*
* Return: 0 if successful, -ve on error.
*/
-int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
+int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file)
{
/* Process setpcap binaries and capabilities for uid 0 */
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d5ff7ff45b77..bf7de5211542 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1078,7 +1078,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*
* Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
*/
-int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
+int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file)
{
return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file);
}
--
2.34.1
next reply other threads:[~2023-08-23 7:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-08-23 7:17 Khadija Kamran [this message]
2023-09-13 22:09 ` [PATCH] lsm: constify 'file' parameter in security_bprm_creds_from_file() Paul Moore
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