From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Adam Dunlap <acdunlap@google.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>, Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
Dionna Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>,
Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Khalid ElMously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>,
Jacob Xu <jacobhxu@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/sev-es: Allow copy_from_kernel_nofault in earlier boot
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2023 13:37:40 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZQtYFAA9vD7gJM1t@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230912002703.3924521-2-acdunlap@google.com>
On Mon, Sep 11, 2023, Adam Dunlap wrote:
> Previously, if copy_from_kernel_nofault was called before
> boot_cpu_data.x86_virt_bits was set up, then it would trigger undefined
> behavior due to a shift by 64. This ended up causing boot failures in
> the latest version of ubuntu2204 in the gcp project when using SEV-SNP.
> Specifically, this function is called during an early #VC handler which
> is triggered by a cpuid to check if nx is implemented.
Why not stuff boot_cpu_data.x86_virt_bits to a "default" value that is guaranteed
to be accurate (or at least safe) for the purposes of the early boot code. I.e.
set it to 48 for 64-bit kernels.
That'd avoid the extra conditional, and would avoid laying whack-a-mole with
anything else that consumes x86_virt_bits.
> Fixes: 1aa9aa8ee517 ("x86/sev-es: Setup GHCB-based boot #VC handler")
> Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Adam Dunlap <acdunlap@google.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/mm/maccess.c | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
> 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c b/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c
> index 5a53c2cc169c..6993f026adec 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c
> @@ -9,12 +9,21 @@ bool copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(const void *unsafe_src, size_t size)
> unsigned long vaddr = (unsigned long)unsafe_src;
>
> /*
> - * Range covering the highest possible canonical userspace address
> - * as well as non-canonical address range. For the canonical range
> - * we also need to include the userspace guard page.
> + * Do not allow userspace addresses. This disallows
> + * normal userspace and the userspace guard page:
> */
> - return vaddr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX + PAGE_SIZE &&
> - __is_canonical_address(vaddr, boot_cpu_data.x86_virt_bits);
> + if (vaddr < TASK_SIZE_MAX + PAGE_SIZE)
> + return false;
> +
> + /*
> + * Allow everything during early boot before 'x86_virt_bits'
> + * is initialized. Needed for instruction decoding in early
> + * exception handlers.
> + */
> + if (!boot_cpu_data.x86_virt_bits)
> + return true;
> +
> + return __is_canonical_address(vaddr, boot_cpu_data.x86_virt_bits);
> }
> #else
> bool copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(const void *unsafe_src, size_t size)
> --
> 2.42.0.283.g2d96d420d3-goog
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-09-20 20:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-09-12 0:27 [PATCH v2 0/2] x86/sev-es: Resolve early #VC handler UB Adam Dunlap
2023-09-12 0:27 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/sev-es: Allow copy_from_kernel_nofault in earlier boot Adam Dunlap
2023-09-20 20:37 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2023-09-20 22:54 ` Dave Hansen
2023-09-28 21:11 ` [tip: x86/mm] x86/sev-es: Allow copy_from_kernel_nofault() " tip-bot2 for Adam Dunlap
2023-09-12 0:27 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/sev-es: Only set x86_virt_bits to correct value Adam Dunlap
2023-09-28 21:11 ` [tip: x86/mm] x86/sev-es: Set x86_virt_bits to the correct value straight away, instead of a two-phase approach tip-bot2 for Adam Dunlap
2023-10-02 20:04 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/sev-es: Only set x86_virt_bits to correct value Nathan Chancellor
2023-10-02 21:41 ` Dave Hansen
2023-10-02 21:46 ` Adam Dunlap
2023-10-02 22:00 ` [PATCH] x86/boot: Move x86_cache_alignment initialization to correct spot Dave Hansen
2023-10-02 22:24 ` Nathan Chancellor
2023-10-03 7:28 ` Ingo Molnar
2023-10-03 7:38 ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Dave Hansen
2023-09-28 20:51 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] x86/sev-es: Resolve early #VC handler UB Ingo Molnar
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