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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Adam Dunlap <acdunlap@google.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>, Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
	Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	Dionna Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>,
	Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Khalid ElMously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>,
	Jacob Xu <jacobhxu@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/sev-es: Allow copy_from_kernel_nofault in earlier boot
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2023 13:37:40 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZQtYFAA9vD7gJM1t@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230912002703.3924521-2-acdunlap@google.com>

On Mon, Sep 11, 2023, Adam Dunlap wrote:
> Previously, if copy_from_kernel_nofault was called before
> boot_cpu_data.x86_virt_bits was set up, then it would trigger undefined
> behavior due to a shift by 64. This ended up causing boot failures in
> the latest version of ubuntu2204 in the gcp project when using SEV-SNP.
> Specifically, this function is called during an early #VC handler which
> is triggered by a cpuid to check if nx is implemented.

Why not stuff boot_cpu_data.x86_virt_bits to a "default" value that is guaranteed
to be accurate (or at least safe) for the purposes of the early boot code.  I.e.
set it to 48 for 64-bit kernels.

That'd avoid the extra conditional, and would avoid laying whack-a-mole with
anything else that consumes x86_virt_bits.

> Fixes: 1aa9aa8ee517 ("x86/sev-es: Setup GHCB-based boot #VC handler")
> Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Adam Dunlap <acdunlap@google.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/mm/maccess.c | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
>  1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c b/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c
> index 5a53c2cc169c..6993f026adec 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c
> @@ -9,12 +9,21 @@ bool copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(const void *unsafe_src, size_t size)
>  	unsigned long vaddr = (unsigned long)unsafe_src;
>  
>  	/*
> -	 * Range covering the highest possible canonical userspace address
> -	 * as well as non-canonical address range. For the canonical range
> -	 * we also need to include the userspace guard page.
> +	 * Do not allow userspace addresses.  This disallows
> +	 * normal userspace and the userspace guard page:
>  	 */
> -	return vaddr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX + PAGE_SIZE &&
> -	       __is_canonical_address(vaddr, boot_cpu_data.x86_virt_bits);
> +	if (vaddr < TASK_SIZE_MAX + PAGE_SIZE)
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Allow everything during early boot before 'x86_virt_bits'
> +	 * is initialized.  Needed for instruction decoding in early
> +	 * exception handlers.
> +	 */
> +	if (!boot_cpu_data.x86_virt_bits)
> +		return true;
> +
> +	return __is_canonical_address(vaddr, boot_cpu_data.x86_virt_bits);
>  }
>  #else
>  bool copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(const void *unsafe_src, size_t size)
> -- 
> 2.42.0.283.g2d96d420d3-goog
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2023-09-20 20:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-09-12  0:27 [PATCH v2 0/2] x86/sev-es: Resolve early #VC handler UB Adam Dunlap
2023-09-12  0:27 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/sev-es: Allow copy_from_kernel_nofault in earlier boot Adam Dunlap
2023-09-20 20:37   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2023-09-20 22:54     ` Dave Hansen
2023-09-28 21:11   ` [tip: x86/mm] x86/sev-es: Allow copy_from_kernel_nofault() " tip-bot2 for Adam Dunlap
2023-09-12  0:27 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/sev-es: Only set x86_virt_bits to correct value Adam Dunlap
2023-09-28 21:11   ` [tip: x86/mm] x86/sev-es: Set x86_virt_bits to the correct value straight away, instead of a two-phase approach tip-bot2 for Adam Dunlap
2023-10-02 20:04   ` [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/sev-es: Only set x86_virt_bits to correct value Nathan Chancellor
2023-10-02 21:41     ` Dave Hansen
2023-10-02 21:46       ` Adam Dunlap
2023-10-02 22:00     ` [PATCH] x86/boot: Move x86_cache_alignment initialization to correct spot Dave Hansen
2023-10-02 22:24       ` Nathan Chancellor
2023-10-03  7:28         ` Ingo Molnar
2023-10-03  7:38       ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Dave Hansen
2023-09-28 20:51 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] x86/sev-es: Resolve early #VC handler UB Ingo Molnar

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