From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
To: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Donald Dutile <ddutile@redhat.com>, Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>,
Pingfan Liu <piliu@redhat.com>, Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com>,
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>, Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] kdump: crashkernel reservation from CMA
Date: Thu, 30 Nov 2023 14:41:12 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZWiQ-II9CvGv8EWK@tiehlicka> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZWiAsJlLookvCI+h@MiWiFi-R3L-srv>
On Thu 30-11-23 20:31:44, Baoquan He wrote:
[...]
> > > which doesn't use the proper pinning API (which would migrate away from
> > > the CMA) then what is the worst case? We will get crash kernel corrupted
> > > potentially and fail to take a proper kernel crash, right? Is this
> > > worrisome? Yes. Is it a real roadblock? I do not think so. The problem
>
> We may fail to take a proper kernel crash, why isn't it a roadblock?
It would be if the threat was practical. So far I only see very
theoretical what-if concerns. And I do not mean to downplay those at
all. As already explained proper CMA users shouldn't ever leak out any
writes across kernel reboot.
> We
> have stable way with a little more memory, why would we take risk to
> take another way, just for saving memory? Usually only high end server
> needs the big memory for crashkernel and the big end server usually have
> huge system ram. The big memory will be a very small percentage relative
> to huge system RAM.
Jiri will likely talk more specific about that but our experience tells
that proper crashkernel memory scaling has turned out a real
maintainability problem because existing setups tend to break with major
kernel version upgrades or non trivial changes.
> > > seems theoretical to me and it is not CMA usage at fault here IMHO. It
> > > is the said theoretical driver that needs fixing anyway.
>
> Now, what we want to make clear is if it's a theoretical possibility, or
> very likely happen. We have met several on-flight DMA stomping into
> kexec kernel's initrd in the past two years because device driver didn't
> provide shutdown() methor properly. For kdump, once it happen, the pain
> is we don't know how to debug. For kexec reboot, customer allows to
> login their system to reproduce and figure out the stomping. For kdump,
> the system corruption rarely happend, and the stomping could rarely
> happen too.
yes, this is understood.
> The code change looks simple and the benefit is very attractive. I
> surely like it if finally people confirm there's no risk. As I said, we
> can't afford to take the risk if it possibly happen. But I don't object
> if other people would rather take risk, we can let it land in kernel.
I think it is fair to be cautious and I wouldn't impose the new method
as a default. Only time can tell how safe this really is. It is hard to
protect agains theoretical issues though. Bugs should be fixed.
I believe this option would allow to configure kdump much easier and
less fragile.
> My personal opinion, thanks for sharing your thought.
Thanks for sharing.
--
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-30 13:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-24 19:54 [PATCH 0/4] kdump: crashkernel reservation from CMA Jiri Bohac
2023-11-24 19:57 ` [PATCH 1/4] kdump: add crashkernel cma suffix Jiri Bohac
2023-11-25 7:24 ` kernel test robot
2023-11-24 19:58 ` [PATCH 2/4] kdump: implement reserve_crashkernel_cma Jiri Bohac
2023-11-24 19:58 ` [PATCH 3/4] kdump, x86: implement crashkernel CMA reservation Jiri Bohac
2023-11-24 19:58 ` [PATCH 4/4] kdump, documentation: describe craskernel " Jiri Bohac
2023-11-25 1:51 ` [PATCH 0/4] kdump: crashkernel reservation from CMA Tao Liu
2023-11-25 21:22 ` Jiri Bohac
2023-11-28 1:12 ` Tao Liu
2023-11-28 2:11 ` Baoquan He
2023-11-28 9:08 ` Michal Hocko
2023-11-29 7:57 ` Baoquan He
2023-11-29 9:25 ` Michal Hocko
2023-11-30 2:42 ` Baoquan He
2023-11-29 10:51 ` Jiri Bohac
2023-11-30 4:01 ` Baoquan He
2023-12-01 12:35 ` Jiri Bohac
2023-11-29 8:10 ` Baoquan He
2023-11-29 15:03 ` Donald Dutile
2023-11-30 3:00 ` Baoquan He
2023-11-30 10:16 ` Michal Hocko
2023-11-30 12:04 ` Baoquan He
2023-11-30 12:31 ` Baoquan He
2023-11-30 13:41 ` Michal Hocko [this message]
2023-12-01 11:33 ` Philipp Rudo
2023-12-01 11:55 ` Michal Hocko
2023-12-01 15:51 ` Philipp Rudo
2023-12-01 16:59 ` Michal Hocko
2023-12-06 11:08 ` Philipp Rudo
2023-12-06 11:23 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-12-06 13:49 ` Michal Hocko
2023-12-06 15:19 ` Michal Hocko
2023-12-07 4:23 ` Baoquan He
2023-12-07 8:55 ` Michal Hocko
2023-12-07 11:13 ` Philipp Rudo
2023-12-07 11:52 ` Michal Hocko
2023-12-08 1:55 ` Baoquan He
2023-12-08 10:04 ` Michal Hocko
2023-12-08 2:10 ` Baoquan He
2023-12-07 11:13 ` Philipp Rudo
2023-11-30 13:29 ` Michal Hocko
2023-11-30 13:33 ` Pingfan Liu
2023-11-30 13:43 ` Michal Hocko
2023-12-01 0:54 ` Pingfan Liu
2023-12-01 10:37 ` Michal Hocko
2023-11-28 2:07 ` Pingfan Liu
2023-11-28 8:58 ` Michal Hocko
2023-12-01 11:34 ` Philipp Rudo
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