From: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
To: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
Tycho Andersen <tandersen@netflix.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 1/3] pidfd: allow pidfd_open() on non-thread-group leaders
Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 08:27:17 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZXCS1SMQLhSPtjdp@tycho.pizza> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87ttp3rprd.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com>
On Thu, Nov 30, 2023 at 08:43:18PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Mathieu Desnoyers:
>
> >>> I'd like to offer a userspace API which allows safe stashing of
> >>> unreachable file descriptors on a service thread.
>
> >> By "safe" here do you mean not accessible via pidfd_getfd()?
>
> No, unreachable by close/close_range/dup2/dup3. I expect we can do an
> intra-process transfer using /proc, but I'm hoping for something nicer.
It occurred to me that we could get the seccomp() protected-memory
functionality almost all the way via some combination of
memfd_create(MFD_ALLOW_SEALING), fcntl(F_SEAL_WRITE|F_SEAL_SEAL), and
mmap(PROT_NONE). Some other thread could come along and unmap/remap,
but perhaps with some kind of F_SEAL_NOUNMAP married to one of these
special files we could both get what we want?
I submitted a talk to FOSDEM just for grins, if anyone is planning to
attend that.
Tycho
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-12-06 15:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-30 16:39 [RFC 1/3] pidfd: allow pidfd_open() on non-thread-group leaders Tycho Andersen
2023-11-30 16:39 ` [RFC 2/3] selftests/pidfd: add non-thread-group leader tests Tycho Andersen
2023-11-30 16:39 ` [RFC 3/3] clone: allow CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_PIDFD together Tycho Andersen
2023-11-30 17:39 ` [RFC 1/3] pidfd: allow pidfd_open() on non-thread-group leaders Oleg Nesterov
2023-11-30 17:56 ` Tycho Andersen
2023-12-01 16:31 ` Tycho Andersen
2023-12-07 17:57 ` Christian Brauner
2023-12-07 21:25 ` Christian Brauner
2023-12-08 20:04 ` Tycho Andersen
2023-11-30 18:37 ` Florian Weimer
2023-11-30 18:54 ` Tycho Andersen
2023-11-30 19:00 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2023-11-30 19:17 ` Tycho Andersen
2023-11-30 19:43 ` Florian Weimer
2023-12-06 15:27 ` Tycho Andersen [this message]
2023-12-07 22:58 ` Christian Brauner
2023-12-08 3:16 ` Jens Axboe
2023-12-08 13:15 ` Florian Weimer
2023-12-08 13:48 ` Christian Brauner
2023-12-08 13:58 ` Florian Weimer
2023-12-07 17:21 ` Christian Brauner
2023-12-07 17:52 ` Tycho Andersen
2023-12-08 17:47 ` Jan Kara
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