From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mgamail.intel.com (mgamail.intel.com [198.175.65.9]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0672E3C0A; Wed, 10 Jan 2024 02:23:38 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux.intel.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=intel.com header.i=@intel.com header.b="LTw6xGZv" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1704853419; x=1736389419; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references: mime-version:in-reply-to; bh=bASmGQhqR/eGJTY1mguNWhZ2LGaJ9Vq7snRNdlQhktA=; b=LTw6xGZvGpBH3HZzZdh27/nL4eOV6XIabN+O/oCu0mNgLe2oRB9pT43a mpdT0FumI6qP4LJnLqdWs8YbEof8VUFQFbMSc0rQXT9WWIu8G12Nqgf4s ip95EhrtbGzyGbri+Thiw6c3CzQXs96p6VbPPkv3YCLosEOS/rpq1EIsu eKlH7CekUvFkIKRkKy/E/aar5EhSf3qNiCSHWTNVjhC15cu4th84d/r96 p8rNJohqyGOQ1MfB8Mp+rXg7cC51xIf0Pf8PGy8JrK3ogCxx/AueUaTFG XW7zHbMrkuSWLHdd1DiCxzURqOiE1kPyzvVZ1JjogbFC69UAD+QEvdkpC A==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10947"; a="16974895" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.04,184,1695711600"; d="scan'208";a="16974895" Received: from fmviesa002.fm.intel.com ([10.60.135.142]) by orvoesa101.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 09 Jan 2024 18:23:38 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.04,184,1695711600"; d="scan'208";a="16475396" Received: from linux.bj.intel.com ([10.238.157.71]) by fmviesa002-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 09 Jan 2024 18:23:35 -0800 Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 10:20:32 +0800 From: Tao Su To: Sean Christopherson Cc: Paolo Bonzini , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Yi Lai , Xudong Hao Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/cpu: Add a VMX flag to enumerate 5-level EPT support to userspace Message-ID: References: <20240110002340.485595-1-seanjc@google.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20240110002340.485595-1-seanjc@google.com> On Tue, Jan 09, 2024 at 04:23:40PM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote: > Add a VMX flag in /proc/cpuinfo, ept_5level, so that userspace can query > whether or not the CPU supports 5-level EPT paging. EPT capabilities are > enumerated via MSR, i.e. aren't accessible to userspace without help from > the kernel, and knowing whether or not 5-level EPT is supported is sadly > necessary for userspace to correctly configure KVM VMs. > > When EPT is enabled, bits 51:49 of guest physical addresses are consumed nit: s/49/48 Thanks, Tao > if and only if 5-level EPT is enabled. For CPUs with MAXPHYADDR > 48, KVM > *can't* map all legal guest memory if 5-level EPT is unsupported, e.g. > creating a VM with RAM (or anything that gets stuffed into KVM's memslots) > above bit 48 will be completely broken. > > Having KVM enumerate guest.MAXPHYADDR=48 in this scenario doesn't work > either, as architecturally guest accesses to illegal addresses generate > RSVD #PF, i.e. advertising guest.MAXPHYADDR < host.MAXPHYADDR when EPT is > enabled would also result in broken guests. KVM does provide a knob, > allow_smaller_maxphyaddr, to let userspace opt-in to such setups, but > that support is firmly best-effort, i.e. not something KVM wants to force > upon userspace. > > While it's decidedly odd for a CPU to support a 52-bit MAXPHYADDR but not > 5-level EPT, the combination is architecturally legal and such CPUs do > exist (and can easily be "created" with nested virtualization). > > Reported-by: Yi Lai > Cc: Tao Su > Cc: Xudong Hao > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson > --- > > tip-tree folks, this is obviously not technically KVM code, but I'd like to > take this through the KVM tree so that we can use the information to fix > KVM selftests (hopefully this cycle). > > arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h | 1 + > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 2 ++ > 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h > index c6a7eed03914..266daf5b5b84 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h > @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ > #define VMX_FEATURE_EPT_EXECUTE_ONLY ( 0*32+ 17) /* "ept_x_only" EPT entries can be execute only */ > #define VMX_FEATURE_EPT_AD ( 0*32+ 18) /* EPT Accessed/Dirty bits */ > #define VMX_FEATURE_EPT_1GB ( 0*32+ 19) /* 1GB EPT pages */ > +#define VMX_FEATURE_EPT_5LEVEL ( 0*32+ 20) /* 5-level EPT paging */ > > /* Aggregated APIC features 24-27 */ > #define VMX_FEATURE_FLEXPRIORITY ( 0*32+ 24) /* TPR shadow + virt APIC */ > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c > index 03851240c3e3..1640ae76548f 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c > @@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ static void init_vmx_capabilities(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) > c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] |= VMX_F(EPT_AD); > if (ept & VMX_EPT_1GB_PAGE_BIT) > c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] |= VMX_F(EPT_1GB); > + if (ept & VMX_EPT_PAGE_WALK_5_BIT) > + c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] |= VMX_F(EPT_5LEVEL); > > /* Synthetic APIC features that are aggregates of multiple features. */ > if ((c->vmx_capability[PRIMARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(VIRTUAL_TPR)) && > > base-commit: 1c6d984f523f67ecfad1083bb04c55d91977bb15 > -- > 2.43.0.472.g3155946c3a-goog >