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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	 Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	 "john.allen@amd.com" <john.allen@amd.com>,
	 "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	 "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"mlevitsk@redhat.com" <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 16:54:51 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZZdSSzCqvd-3sdBL@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a2344e2143ef2b9eca0d153c86091e58e596709d.camel@intel.com>

On Fri, Jan 05, 2024, Rick P Edgecombe wrote:
> On Thu, 2024-01-04 at 16:22 -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > No, the days of KVM making shit up from are done.  IIUC, you're advocating
> > that it's ok for KVM to induce a #CP that architecturally should not
> > happen.  That is not acceptable, full stop.
> 
> Nope, not advocating that at all.

Heh, wrong "you".  That "you" was directed at Weijiang, who I *think* is saying
that clobbering the shadow stack by emulating CALL+RET and thus inducing a bogus
#CP in the guest is ok.

> I'm noticing that in this series KVM has special emulator behavior that
> doesn't match the HW when CET is enabled. That it *skips* emitting #CPs (and
> other CET behaviors SW depends on), and wondering if it is a problem.

Yes, it's a problem.  But IIUC, as is KVM would also induce bogus #CPs (which is
probably less of a problem in practice, but still not acceptable).

> I'm worried that there is some way attackers will induce the host to
> emulate an instruction and skip CET enforcement that the HW would
> normally do.

Yep.  The best behavior for this is likely KVM's existing behavior, i.e. retry
the instruction in the guest, and if that doesn't work, kick out to userspace and
let userspace try to sort things out.

> > For CALL/RET (and presumably any branch instructions with IBT?) other
> > instructions that are directly affected by CET, the simplest thing would
> > probably be to disable those in KVM's emulator if shadow stacks and/or IBT
> > are enabled, and let KVM's failure paths take it from there.
> 
> Right, that is what I was wondering might be the normal solution for
> situations like this.

If KVM can't emulate something, it either retries the instruction (with some
decent logic to guard against infinite retries) or punts to userspace.

Or if the platform owner likes to play with fire and doesn't enable
KVM_CAP_EXIT_ON_EMULATION_FAILURE, KVM will inject a #UD (and still exit to
userspace if the emulation happened at CPL0).  And yes, that #UD is 100% KVM
making shit up, and yes, it has caused problems and confusion. :-)
 
> > Then, *if* a use case comes along where the guest is utilizing CET and
> > "needs" KVM to emulate affected instructions, we can add the necessary
> > support the emulator.
> > 
> > Alternatively, if teaching KVM's emulator to play nice with shadow stacks
> > and IBT is easy-ish, just do that.
> 
> I think it will not be very easy.

Yeah.  As Jim alluded to, I think it's probably time to admit that emulating
instructions for modern CPUs is a fools errand and KVM should simply stop trying.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-01-05  0:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-12-21 14:02 [PATCH v8 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 01/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Always preserve non-user xfeatures/flags in __state_perm Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 02/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Refine CET user xstate bit enabling Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:24   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add CET supervisor mode state support Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 04/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XFEATURE_MASK_KERNEL_DYNAMIC xfeature set Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:25   ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-03  9:10     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 22:26     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-04 22:26   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce fpu_guest_cfg for guest FPU configuration Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:32   ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-03  9:17     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 22:42     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 06/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Create guest fpstate with guest specific config Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:32   ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-03 18:16   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-04  2:16     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 22:47   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05  8:16     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 07/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Warn if kernel dynamic xfeatures detected in normal fpstate Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:33   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 08/26] KVM: x86: Rework cpuid_get_supported_xcr0() to operate on vCPU data Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:33   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 09/26] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_{g,s}et_msr() to menifest emulation operations Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 10/26] KVM: x86: Refine xsave-managed guest register/MSR reset handling Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 11/26] KVM: x86: Add kvm_msr_{read,write}() helpers Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 12/26] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 13/26] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 14/26] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 15/26] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 16/26] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 17/26] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 18/26] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 19/26] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "SHSTK/IBT enabled" Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 20/26] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 21/26] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:34   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 22/26] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:34   ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-15  9:58   ` Yuan Yao
2024-01-17  1:41     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-17  1:58       ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-17  5:31         ` Yuan Yao
2024-01-17  6:16           ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 23/26] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 24/26] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:34   ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-16  7:25   ` Yuan Yao
2024-01-17  1:43     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 25/26] KVM: nVMX: Introduce new VMX_BASIC bit for event error_code delivery to L1 Yang Weijiang
2023-12-21 14:02 ` [PATCH v8 26/26] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest Yang Weijiang
2024-01-02 22:35   ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-01-16  7:22   ` Yuan Yao
2024-01-17  1:53     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-03 18:50 ` [PATCH v8 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-04  7:11   ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 21:10     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05  0:22       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-05  0:34         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05  0:44           ` Jim Mattson
2024-01-05  0:54           ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-01-05  9:28             ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-05 16:21               ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-05 17:52                 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05 18:09                   ` Jim Mattson
2024-01-05 18:51                     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-05 19:34                       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-08 14:17                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-09 15:10                   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-11 14:56                     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-15  1:55                       ` Chao Gao
2024-01-17  0:53                         ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-05  9:04       ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-04 22:29 ` Edgecombe, Rick P

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