From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] x86/mm: Don't disable INVLPG if the kernel is running on a hypervisor
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2024 16:21:37 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Zh8IAcT0fQoyes_1@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <af4c78c1-ccd5-4c4d-92de-564a44fa815b@intel.com>
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 4/11/24 09:22, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > In other words, simply checking HYPERVISOR *might* be safe, but it might not.
> > If we wanted to be paranoid, this could also check X86_FEATURE_VMX, which also
> > doesn't guarantee VMX non-root mode and would unnecessarily restrict PCID usage
> > to setups that allow nested VMX, but AFAIK there aren't any hypervisors which
> > fully emulate VMX.
>
> X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR is most commonly used for vulnerabilities to see
> if the data coming out of CPUID is likely to be garbage or not. I think
> that's the most important thing to focus on.
>
> It's arguable that x86_match_cpu() itself should just have a:
>
> /*
> * Don't even waste our time when running under a hypervisor.
> * They lie.
> */
> if (boot_cpu_bas(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
> return NULL;
>
> (well, it should probably actually be in the for() loop because folks
> might be looking for an X86_FEATURE_* that is set by software or derived
> from actually agreed-upon host<->guest ABI, but you get my point...)
>
> If the hypervisor is duplicitous enough to keep X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR
> from getting set, then the hypervisor gets to clean up the mess. The
> kernel can just wash its hands of the whole thing.
>
> So, there are two broad cases and a few sub-cases:
>
> 1. "Nice" hypervisor. Kernel sees X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR and knows that
> x86_match_cpu() and invlpg_miss_ids[] are irrelevant because:
> 1a. It is running in VMX non-root mode and is not vulnerable, or
> 1b. CPUID is a lie and x86_match_cpu() is meaningless, or
> 1c. The kernel is in ring3 and can't execute INVLPG anyway. Whatever
> is running in ring0 will have to deal with it.
> 2. X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR is unset.
> 2a. "Mean" hypervisor. All bets are off anyway.
> 2b. Actual bare metal. Actually look for the bug.
>
> I _think_ I'm OK with skipping the mitigation in all of the #1 cases and
> applying it in both of the #2 cases. I don't think that checking for
> VMX makes it much better.
>
> Am I missing anything?
I'm a-ok with just checking HYPERVISOR, I agree that the hypervisor is fully
responsible for correctly emulating PCID and INVLPG stuff for (1c).
My reaction was really just to the changelog equating HYPERVSIOR to VMX non-root.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-16 23:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-11 14:43 [PATCH v7 1/2] x86/mm: Don't disable INVLPG if "incomplete Global INVLPG flushes" is fixed by microcode Xi Ruoyao
2024-04-11 14:43 ` [PATCH v7 2/2] x86/mm: Don't disable INVLPG if the kernel is running on a hypervisor Xi Ruoyao
2024-04-11 16:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-11 17:13 ` Dave Hansen
2024-04-16 23:21 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-04-11 16:11 ` [PATCH v7 1/2] x86/mm: Don't disable INVLPG if "incomplete Global INVLPG flushes" is fixed by microcode Sean Christopherson
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