From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>, Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 7/7] x86/bugs: Replace CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 09:48:42 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZheV2ly/LZjpaVTE@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3833812ea63e7fdbe36bf8b932e63f70d18e2a2a.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>
* Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> wrote:
> For consistency with the other CONFIG_MITIGATION_* options, replace the
> CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} options with a single
> CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI option.
>
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
> ---
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 17 +++--------------
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +-
> 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index b63b6767a63d..4474bf32d0a4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -2633,27 +2633,16 @@ config MITIGATION_RFDS
> stored in floating point, vector and integer registers.
> See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst>
>
> -choice
> - prompt "Clear branch history"
> +config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI
> + bool "Mitigate Spectre-BHB (Branch History Injection)"
> depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
> - default SPECTRE_BHI_ON
> + default y
> help
> Enable BHI mitigations. BHI attacks are a form of Spectre V2 attacks
> where the branch history buffer is poisoned to speculatively steer
> indirect branches.
> See <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst>
>
> -config SPECTRE_BHI_ON
> - bool "on"
> - help
> - Equivalent to setting spectre_bhi=on command line parameter.
> -config SPECTRE_BHI_OFF
> - bool "off"
> - help
> - Equivalent to setting spectre_bhi=off command line parameter.
> -
> -endchoice
> -
> endif
>
> config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index 74ade6d7caa3..4c46fa2d08c2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -1628,7 +1628,7 @@ enum bhi_mitigations {
> };
>
> static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init =
> - IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_ON) ? BHI_MITIGATION_ON : BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
> + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI_ON) ? BHI_MITIGATION_ON : BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
Uhm, after this patch there's no CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI_ON anymore,
which is kindof nasty, as IS_ENABLED() doesn't generate a build failure for
non-existent Kconfig variables IIRC ...
So AFAICT this patch turns on BHI unconditionally.
I've fixed as per the patch below, but please double check the end result
in tip:x86/urgent once I've pushed it out..
Thanks,
Ingo
=====================>
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 80d9018da3d2..25111ad388d9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1628,7 +1628,7 @@ enum bhi_mitigations {
};
static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI_ON) ? BHI_MITIGATION_ON : BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI) ? BHI_MITIGATION_ON : BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-11 7:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-11 5:40 [PATCH 0/7] x86/bugs: BHI fixes / improvements Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 5:40 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/bugs: BHI documentation fixes Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 6:21 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11 8:40 ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/bugs: Fix BHI documentation tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 5:40 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86/bugs: Cache the value of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 6:22 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11 7:32 ` [PATCH 2b/7] x86/bugs: Rename various 'ia32_cap' variables to 'x86_arch_cap_msr' Ingo Molnar
2024-04-11 8:40 ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/bugs: Cache the value of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 8:40 ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/bugs: Rename various 'ia32_cap' variables to 'x86_arch_cap_msr' tip-bot2 for Ingo Molnar
2024-04-11 5:40 ` [PATCH 3/7] x86/bugs: Fix BHI handling of RRSBA Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 8:40 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 10:02 ` [PATCH 3/7] " Andrew Cooper
2024-04-11 15:34 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 5:40 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86/bugs: Clarify that syscall hardening isn't a BHI mitigation Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 8:40 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 5:40 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86/bugs: Only harden syscalls when needed Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 6:20 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11 15:08 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 8:40 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 10:06 ` [PATCH 5/7] " Andrew Cooper
2024-04-11 15:38 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:24 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-04-12 0:15 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-12 3:57 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 4:17 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 5:20 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:36 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-04-12 20:24 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 5:27 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-12 10:07 ` Ingo Molnar
2024-04-12 6:28 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-12 6:37 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-11 5:40 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 6:23 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11 8:40 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:12 ` tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 5:40 ` [PATCH 7/7] x86/bugs: Replace CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 7:48 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2024-04-11 8:18 ` Ingo Molnar
2024-04-17 5:35 ` Reinette Chatre
2024-04-11 15:24 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 8:40 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:12 ` tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
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