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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	 Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
	 Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	 Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
	 Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	 Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	 Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	 KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>, Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,  Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>,
	 Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/5] cpu/speculation: Fix CPU mitigation defaults for !x86
Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2024 17:09:31 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZiMHu--agdvt4Rl1@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9d3c997264829d0e2b28718222724ae8f9e7d8b4.1713559768.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>

On Fri, Apr 19, 2024, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> CPU speculative execution mitigations were inadvertently disabled on
> non-x86 arches by the following commit:
> 
>  f337a6a21e2f ("x86/cpu: Actually turn off mitigations by default for SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n")
> 
> Fix it by replacing CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS with a new generic
> CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS option and moving the x86-specific mitigations to
> a separate menu which depends on CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS.

Ah drat, I didn't check my mailbox until after Cc'ing Linus my own version[*].

I don't have a strong preference between the two, though I do think it's worth
nothing that this will (obvioulsy) allow disabling mitigations at compile time
on all architectures, which may or may not be desirable.

[*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240420000556.2645001-2-seanjc@google.com

> Fixes: f337a6a21e2f ("x86/cpu: Actually turn off mitigations by default for SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n")
> Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
> Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
> Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
> Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240413115324.53303a68%40canb.auug.org.au
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
> ---
>  arch/Kconfig     | 10 ++++++++++
>  arch/x86/Kconfig | 15 +++------------
>  kernel/cpu.c     |  4 ++--
>  3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
> index 9f066785bb71..5c96849eb957 100644
> --- a/arch/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/Kconfig
> @@ -11,6 +11,16 @@ source "arch/$(SRCARCH)/Kconfig"
>  
>  menu "General architecture-dependent options"
>  
> +config CPU_MITIGATIONS
> +	bool "Mitigations for CPU speculative execution vulnerabilities"
> +	default y
> +	help
> +	  Say Y here to enable mitigations for CPU speculative execution
> +	  vulnerabilities.
> +
> +	  If you say N, all mitigations will be disabled. You really
> +	  should know what you are doing to say so.

  reply	other threads:[~2024-04-20  0:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-19 21:09 [PATCH 0/5] x86/bugs: more BHI fixes Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-19 21:09 ` [PATCH v4 1/5] x86/bugs: Only harden syscalls when needed Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-22  8:09   ` Yujie Liu
2024-05-07  5:17     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-20  5:21       ` Yujie Liu
2024-04-19 21:09 ` [PATCH v4 2/5] cpu/speculation: Fix CPU mitigation defaults for !x86 Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-20  0:09   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-04-23 14:10     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-24  5:35       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-19 21:09 ` [PATCH v4 3/5] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-20 13:58   ` Paul E. McKenney
2024-04-21  5:25     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-21 20:40       ` Paul McKenney
2024-04-21 21:47         ` Paul McKenney
2024-05-02 23:48           ` Paul McKenney
2024-05-03 15:38             ` Paul E. McKenney
2024-05-03 19:56             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-03 20:44               ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-03 23:33                 ` Paul E. McKenney
2024-05-03 23:48                   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-04 16:48                     ` Paul E. McKenney
2024-04-19 21:09 ` [PATCH v4 4/5] x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-19 21:09 ` [PATCH v4 5/5] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-19 21:46   ` Josh Poimboeuf

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