[PATCH v6 00/13] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation

[PATCH v6 00/13] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation

[Breno Leitao]

Currently, the CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is halfway populated,
where some mitigations have entries in Kconfig, and they could be
modified, while others mitigations do not have Kconfig entries, and
could not be controlled at build time.

The fact of having a fine grained control can help in a few ways:

1) Users can choose and pick only mitigations that are important for
their workloads.

2) Users and developers can choose to disable mitigations that mangle
the assembly code generation, making it hard to read.

3) Separate configs for just source code readability,
so that we see *which* butt-ugly piece of crap code is for what
reason.

Important to say, if a mitigation is disabled at compilation time, it
could be enabled at runtime using kernel command line arguments.

Discussion about this approach:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wjTHeQjsqtHcBGvy9TaJQ5uAm5HrCDuOD9v7qA9U1Xr4w@mail.gmail.com/
and
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231011044252.42bplzjsam3qsasz@treble/

In order to get the missing mitigations, some clean up was done.

1) Get a namespace for mitigations, prepending MITIGATION to the Kconfig
entries.

2) Adding the missing mitigations, so, the mitigations have entries in the
Kconfig that could be easily configure by the user.

With this patchset applied, all configs have an individual entry under
CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS, and all of them starts with CONFIG_MITIGATION.

Changelog
---------
V1:
        * Creates a way to mitigate all (or none) hardware bugs
V2:
        * Create KCONFIGs entries only some hardware bugs (MDS, TAA, MMIO)
V3:
        * Expand the mitigations KCONFIGs to all hardware bugs that are
          Linux mitigates.
V4:
        * Patch rebase.
        * Better documentation about the reasons of this decision.
V5:
	* Create a "MITIGATION" Kconfig namespace for the entries mitigating
	  hardware bugs.
	* Add GDS to the set of mitigations that are being covered.
	* Reduce the ifdefs in the code by leveraging conditionals with omitted
	  operands.
V6:
	* Reference documentation RST files from Kconfig entries
	* Fix some grammar mistakes and Kconfig dependencies
	* Now spectre v2 user depends on CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2. See
	  patch "spectre_v2_user default mode depends on Kconfig"

Breno Leitao (13):
  x86/bugs: Rename GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION to MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
  x86/bugs: Rename CPU_IBPB_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
  x86/bugs: Rename CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING to MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
  x86/bugs: Rename PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION to MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
  x86/bugs: Rename RETPOLINE to MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
  x86/bugs: Rename SLS to CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
  x86/bugs: Rename CPU_UNRET_ENTRY to MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
  x86/bugs: Rename CPU_IBRS_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
  x86/bugs: Rename CPU_SRSO to MITIGATION_SRSO
  x86/bugs: Rename RETHUNK to MITIGATION_RETHUNK
  x86/bugs: Create a way to disable GDS mitigation
  x86/bugs: spectre_v2_user default mode depends on Kconfig
  x86/bugs: Add a separate config for missing mitigation

 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst |   8 +-
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |   4 +-
 Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst                |   6 +-
 arch/x86/Kconfig                              | 151 +++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/Makefile                             |   8 +-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c       |   4 +-
 arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig               |   2 +-
 arch/x86/entry/calling.h                      |   8 +-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S                     |   2 +-
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile                  |   4 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/current.h                |   2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h      |  10 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h                |  16 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h          |  30 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h                |   2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h         |   2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h                |  18 +--
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h             |   3 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h        |   2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h                    |   2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h            |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c                 |  14 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c                 |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c                     |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    |  98 +++++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c                   |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c                      |   3 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S                     |   4 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S                     |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c                 |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c                         |   8 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c                 |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S                 |  10 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c                        |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h               |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c                        |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S                    |   4 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                        |   2 +-
 arch/x86/lib/Makefile                         |   2 +-
 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S                      |  26 +--
 arch/x86/mm/Makefile                          |   2 +-
 arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c                |   4 +-
 arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c                 |   4 +-
 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c                         |   4 +-
 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c                             |  10 +-
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c                   |   4 +-
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c                 |   2 +-
 arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile                   |   2 +-
 include/linux/compiler-gcc.h                  |   2 +-
 include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h         |   2 +-
 include/linux/module.h                        |   2 +-
 include/linux/objtool.h                       |   2 +-
 include/linux/pti.h                           |   2 +-
 include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h        |   2 +-
 include/net/tc_wrapper.h                      |   2 +-
 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c                    |   2 +-
 net/netfilter/Makefile                        |   2 +-
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c                |   6 +-
 net/netfilter/nft_ct.c                        |   4 +-
 net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c                    |   2 +-
 net/sched/sch_api.c                           |   2 +-
 scripts/Makefile.lib                          |   8 +-
 scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o                    |   2 +-
 scripts/generate_rust_target.rs               |   2 +-
 scripts/mod/modpost.c                         |   2 +-
 .../arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h  |  10 +-
 66 files changed, 344 insertions(+), 219 deletions(-)

-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v6 01/13] x86/bugs: Rename GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION to MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE

[Breno Leitao]

CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related[1]. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.

The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.

Rename the Kconfig entry from GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION to
MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE.

[1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231011044252.42bplzjsam3qsasz@treble/
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig           | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 3762f41bb092..ddf0d8bc6db9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2590,7 +2590,7 @@ config SLS
 	  against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly
 	  larger.
 
-config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION
+config MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
 	bool "Force GDS Mitigation"
 	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
 	default n
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index bb0ab8466b91..3c7e27b58f0e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ enum gds_mitigations {
 	GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
 };
 
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE)
 static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
 #else
 static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v6 02/13] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_IBPB_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY

[Breno Leitao]

CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.

The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.

Rename the Kconfig entry from CPU_IBPB_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                     |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           | 11 ++++++-----
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index ddf0d8bc6db9..2e16ab138a1c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2557,7 +2557,7 @@ config CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG
 	  Only enable this when you are debugging call thunks as this
 	  creates a noticeable runtime overhead. If unsure say N.
 
-config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY
+config MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
 	bool "Enable IBPB on kernel entry"
 	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64
 	default y
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index f93e9b96927a..0676b077207c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@
  * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
  */
 .macro __UNTRAIN_RET ibpb_feature, call_depth_insns
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)
+#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)
 	VALIDATE_UNRET_END
 	ALTERNATIVE_3 "",						\
 		      CALL_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET,		\
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 3c7e27b58f0e..1de4791091ca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -994,10 +994,10 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
 			pr_err("WARNING: CPU does not support IBPB.\n");
 			goto do_cmd_auto;
-		} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
+		} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
 			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
 		} else {
-			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
+			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
 			goto do_cmd_auto;
 		}
 		break;
@@ -1023,7 +1023,8 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
 		    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
 			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY))
 				retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
-			else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+			else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY) &&
+				 boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
 				retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
 		}
 
@@ -2482,13 +2483,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 		break;
 
 	case SRSO_CMD_IBPB:
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
 			if (has_microcode) {
 				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
 				srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
 			}
 		} else {
-			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
+			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
 		}
 		break;
 
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v6 03/13] x86/bugs: Rename CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING to MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING

[Breno Leitao]

CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.

The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.

Rename the Kconfig entry from CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING to
MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                               |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/current.h                 |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h       |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h           | 10 +++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c                  |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                     |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S                       |  6 +++---
 scripts/Makefile.lib                           |  2 +-
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |  2 +-
 9 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 2e16ab138a1c..3ecfeedaf248 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2526,7 +2526,7 @@ config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
 	help
 	  Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation.
 
-config CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+config MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 	bool "Mitigate RSB underflow with call depth tracking"
 	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && HAVE_CALL_THUNKS
 	select HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_NO_PATCHABLE
@@ -2546,7 +2546,7 @@ config CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 
 config CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG
 	bool "Enable call thunks and call depth tracking debugging"
-	depends on CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+	depends on MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 	select FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_32B
 	default n
 	help
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/current.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/current.h
index a1168e7b69e5..d4ff517cfbd1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/current.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/current.h
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ struct pcpu_hot {
 			struct task_struct	*current_task;
 			int			preempt_count;
 			int			cpu_number;
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 			u64			call_depth;
 #endif
 			unsigned long		top_of_stack;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 702d93fdd10e..c1d3a5795618 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
 # define DISABLE_UNRET		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 # define DISABLE_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING	0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH & 31))
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 0676b077207c..64d9f0e87419 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@
 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CTXSW
 #endif
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) && !defined(COMPILE_OFFSETS)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) && !defined(COMPILE_OFFSETS)
 
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
 
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@
 
 
 .macro CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 	ALTERNATIVE "",							\
 		    __stringify(ASM_INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH
 #endif
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ extern void entry_ibpb(void);
 
 extern void (*x86_return_thunk)(void);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 extern void call_depth_return_thunk(void);
 
 #define CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT					\
@@ -371,12 +371,12 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_ret_count);
 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_stuffs_count);
 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_ctxsw_count);
 #endif
-#else /* !CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
+#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
 
 static inline void call_depth_return_thunk(void) {}
 #define CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT ""
 
-#endif /* CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index 6913b372ccf7..a98020bf31bb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static void __used common(void)
 	OFFSET(TSS_sp2, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp2);
 	OFFSET(X86_top_of_stack, pcpu_hot, top_of_stack);
 	OFFSET(X86_current_task, pcpu_hot, current_task);
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 	OFFSET(X86_call_depth, pcpu_hot, call_depth);
 #endif
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARIA_AESNI_AVX_X86_64)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 1de4791091ca..b906ed4f3091 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1003,15 +1003,15 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
 		break;
 
 	case RETBLEED_CMD_STUFF:
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) &&
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) &&
 		    spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE) {
 			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF;
 
 		} else {
-			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING))
+			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING))
 				pr_err("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n");
 			else
-				pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING.\n");
+				pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING.\n");
 
 			goto do_cmd_auto;
 		}
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index 7b2589877d06..ff46f48a0cc4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array)
 #include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
 #undef GEN
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 .macro CALL_THUNK reg
 	.align RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE
 
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ __EXPORT_THUNK(entry_untrain_ret)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY || CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 
 	.align 64
 SYM_FUNC_START(call_depth_return_thunk)
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(call_depth_return_thunk)
 	int3
 SYM_FUNC_END(call_depth_return_thunk)
 
-#endif /* CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
 
 /*
  * This function name is magical and is used by -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib
index 68d0134bdbf9..cc44c95c49cc 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.lib
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ objtool := $(objtree)/tools/objtool/objtool
 
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_JUMP_LABEL_HACK)		+= --hacks=jump_label
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_NOINSTR_HACK)		+= --hacks=noinstr
-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING)		+= --hacks=skylake
+objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING)	+= --hacks=skylake
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT)			+= --ibt
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_FINEIBT)				+= --cfi
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_USE_OBJTOOL)	+= --mcount
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index fafe9be7a6f4..3d61b2432991 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
 # define DISABLE_UNRET		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 # define DISABLE_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING	0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH & 31))
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v6 04/13] x86/bugs: Rename PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION to MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION

[Breno Leitao]

CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.

The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.

Rename the Kconfig entry from PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION to
MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
 Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst                 |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                               |  2 +-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c        |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/entry/calling.h                       |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S                      |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h       |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h                 |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h          |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h                 | 18 +++++++++---------
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h              |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h         |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h                     |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c                    |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S                      |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S                      |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c                          |  8 ++++----
 arch/x86/mm/Makefile                           |  2 +-
 arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c                 |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c                  |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c                          |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c                              | 10 +++++-----
 include/linux/pti.h                            |  2 +-
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |  2 +-
 23 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst
index 4b858a9bad8d..3241b081f1ad 100644
--- a/Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst
+++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst
@@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ comments in pti.c).
 
 This approach helps to ensure that side-channel attacks leveraging
 the paging structures do not function when PTI is enabled.  It can be
-enabled by setting CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y at compile time.
-Once enabled at compile-time, it can be disabled at boot with the
-'nopti' or 'pti=' kernel parameters (see kernel-parameters.txt).
+enabled by setting CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y at compile
+time.  Once enabled at compile-time, it can be disabled at boot with
+the 'nopti' or 'pti=' kernel parameters (see kernel-parameters.txt).
 
 Page Table Management
 =====================
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 3ecfeedaf248..4398e9ebef8c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2487,7 +2487,7 @@ menuconfig SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS
 
 if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS
 
-config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+config MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
 	default y
 	depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
index 473ba59b82a8..0cbf6a6c3bc3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
  * Copyright (C)      2016  Kees Cook
  */
 
-/* No PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION support needed either: */
-#undef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+/* No MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION support needed either: */
+#undef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 
 #include "error.h"
 #include "misc.h"
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
index f6907627172b..ace89d5c1ddd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
 	.endif
 .endm
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 
 /*
  * PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION PGDs are 8k.  Flip bit 12 to switch between the two
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
 .Lend_\@:
 .endm
 
-#else /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=n: */
+#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=n: */
 
 .macro SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req
 .endm
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index de6469dffe3a..3b4f6243de37 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1085,7 +1085,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(error_return)
  *
  * Registers:
  *	%r14: Used to save/restore the CR3 of the interrupted context
- *	      when PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is in use.  Do not clobber.
+ *	      when MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is in use.  Do not clobber.
  */
 SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi)
 	UNWIND_HINT_IRET_ENTRY
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index c1d3a5795618..fb604ec95a5f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
 # define DISABLE_LA57	(1<<(X86_FEATURE_LA57 & 31))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 # define DISABLE_PTI		0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_PTI		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h
index c7ec5bb88334..dcd836b59beb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static inline void paravirt_release_p4d(unsigned long pfn) {}
  */
 extern gfp_t __userpte_alloc_gfp;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 /*
  * Instead of one PGD, we acquire two PGDs.  Being order-1, it is
  * both 8k in size and 8k-aligned.  That lets us just flip bit 12
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h
index 9e7c0b719c3c..dabafba957ea 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static inline void native_set_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd)
 
 static inline void native_set_pud(pud_t *pudp, pud_t pud)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	pud.p4d.pgd = pti_set_user_pgtbl(&pudp->p4d.pgd, pud.p4d.pgd);
 #endif
 	pxx_xchg64(pud, pudp, native_pud_val(pud));
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 57bab91bbf50..b23d0c162573 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ static inline int is_new_memtype_allowed(u64 paddr, unsigned long size,
 pmd_t *populate_extra_pmd(unsigned long vaddr);
 pte_t *populate_extra_pte(unsigned long vaddr);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 pgd_t __pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd);
 
 /*
@@ -922,12 +922,12 @@ static inline pgd_t pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
 		return pgd;
 	return __pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgdp, pgd);
 }
-#else   /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
+#else   /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
 static inline pgd_t pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
 {
 	return pgd;
 }
-#endif  /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
+#endif  /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
 
 #endif	/* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ static inline int p4d_bad(p4d_t p4d)
 {
 	unsigned long ignore_flags = _KERNPG_TABLE | _PAGE_USER;
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
 		ignore_flags |= _PAGE_NX;
 
 	return (p4d_flags(p4d) & ~ignore_flags) != 0;
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ static inline int pgd_bad(pgd_t pgd)
 	if (!pgtable_l5_enabled())
 		return 0;
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
 		ignore_flags |= _PAGE_NX;
 
 	return (pgd_flags(pgd) & ~ignore_flags) != _KERNPG_TABLE;
@@ -1421,9 +1421,9 @@ static inline bool pgdp_maps_userspace(void *__ptr)
 #define pgd_leaf	pgd_large
 static inline int pgd_large(pgd_t pgd) { return 0; }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 /*
- * All top-level PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION page tables are order-1 pages
+ * All top-level MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION page tables are order-1 pages
  * (8k-aligned and 8k in size).  The kernel one is at the beginning 4k and
  * the user one is in the last 4k.  To switch between them, you
  * just need to flip the 12th bit in their addresses.
@@ -1468,7 +1468,7 @@ static inline p4d_t *user_to_kernel_p4dp(p4d_t *p4dp)
 {
 	return ptr_clear_bit(p4dp, PTI_PGTABLE_SWITCH_BIT);
 }
-#endif /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
 
 /*
  * clone_pgd_range(pgd_t *dst, pgd_t *src, int count);
@@ -1483,7 +1483,7 @@ static inline p4d_t *user_to_kernel_p4dp(p4d_t *p4dp)
 static inline void clone_pgd_range(pgd_t *dst, pgd_t *src, int count)
 {
 	memcpy(dst, src, count * sizeof(pgd_t));
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
 		return;
 	/* Clone the user space pgd as well */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h
index a629b1b9f65a..8108d68d146c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h
@@ -143,7 +143,8 @@ static inline void native_set_p4d(p4d_t *p4dp, p4d_t p4d)
 {
 	pgd_t pgd;
 
-	if (pgtable_l5_enabled() || !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION)) {
+	if (pgtable_l5_enabled() ||
+	    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION)) {
 		WRITE_ONCE(*p4dp, p4d);
 		return;
 	}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
index d8cccadc83a6..e5f204b9b33d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
 #define CR3_NOFLUSH	0
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 # define X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT	11
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h
index 07375b476c4f..ab167c96b9ab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 #define _ASM_X86_PTI_H
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 extern void pti_init(void);
 extern void pti_check_boottime_disable(void);
 extern void pti_finalize(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
index f18ca44c904b..44a91ef5a23b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static void __die_header(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
 	       IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)     ? " SMP"             : "",
 	       debug_pagealloc_enabled()  ? " DEBUG_PAGEALLOC" : "",
 	       IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN)   ? " KASAN"           : "",
-	       IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) ?
+	       IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) ?
 	       (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) ? " PTI" : " NOPTI") : "");
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(__die_header);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
index 487ac57e2c81..b50f3641c4d6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ __REFDATA
 	.align 4
 SYM_DATA(initial_code,		.long i386_start_kernel)
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 #define	PGD_ALIGN	(2 * PAGE_SIZE)
 #define PTI_USER_PGD_FILL	1024
 #else
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ SYM_DATA_START(initial_page_table)
 # endif
 	.align PAGE_SIZE		/* needs to be page-sized too */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	/*
 	 * PTI needs another page so sync_initial_pagetable() works correctly
 	 * and does not scribble over the data which is placed behind the
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 086a2c3aaaa0..e23bc2a541cf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(vc_no_ghcb)
 #define SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(name)			\
 	SYM_START(name, SYM_L_GLOBAL, .balign PAGE_SIZE)
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 /*
  * Each PGD needs to be 8k long and 8k aligned.  We do not
  * ever go out to userspace with these, so we do not
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
index adc67f98819a..7e6de84b9358 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ static struct ldt_struct *alloc_ldt_struct(unsigned int num_entries)
 	return new_ldt;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 
 static void do_sanity_check(struct mm_struct *mm,
 			    bool had_kernel_mapping,
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ static void unmap_ldt_struct(struct mm_struct *mm, struct ldt_struct *ldt)
 	flush_tlb_mm_range(mm, va, va + nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHIFT, false);
 }
 
-#else /* !CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
+#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
 
 static int
 map_ldt_struct(struct mm_struct *mm, struct ldt_struct *ldt, int slot)
@@ -388,11 +388,11 @@ map_ldt_struct(struct mm_struct *mm, struct ldt_struct *ldt, int slot)
 static void unmap_ldt_struct(struct mm_struct *mm, struct ldt_struct *ldt)
 {
 }
-#endif /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
 
 static void free_ldt_pgtables(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	struct mmu_gather tlb;
 	unsigned long start = LDT_BASE_ADDR;
 	unsigned long end = LDT_END_ADDR;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
index c80febc44cd2..031cd10ed17f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA_EMU)		+= numa_emulation.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS)	+= pkeys.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY)			+= kaslr.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION)		+= pti.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION)	+= pti.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT)	+= mem_encrypt.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)	+= mem_encrypt_amd.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c b/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c
index b43301cb2a80..ae5c213a1cb0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static int ptdump_curknl_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 
 DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(ptdump_curknl);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 static int ptdump_curusr_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
 	if (current->mm->pgd)
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static int __init pt_dump_debug_init(void)
 	debugfs_create_file("current_kernel", 0400, dir, NULL,
 			    &ptdump_curknl_fops);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	debugfs_create_file("current_user", 0400, dir, NULL,
 			    &ptdump_curusr_fops);
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
index e1b599ecbbc2..b7b88c1d91ec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs(struct seq_file *m, struct mm_struct *mm,
 				   bool user)
 {
 	pgd_t *pgd = mm->pgd;
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	if (user && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
 		pgd = kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd);
 #endif
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs);
 
 void ptdump_walk_user_pgd_level_checkwx(void)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	pgd_t *pgd = INIT_PGD;
 
 	if (!(__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX) ||
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 0cbc1b8e8e3d..cceb779d882d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static void pgd_mop_up_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgdp)
 	for (i = 0; i < PREALLOCATED_PMDS; i++)
 		mop_up_one_pmd(mm, &pgdp[i]);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
 		return;
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static void pgd_prepopulate_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd, pmd_t *pmds[])
 	}
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 static void pgd_prepopulate_user_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				     pgd_t *k_pgd, pmd_t *pmds[])
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index 453ea95b667d..77f448e55bf8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -89,10 +89,10 @@
 #define CR3_HW_ASID_BITS		12
 
 /*
- * When enabled, PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION consumes a single bit for
+ * When enabled, MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION consumes a single bit for
  * user/kernel switches
  */
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 # define PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS	1
 #else
 # define PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS	0
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static inline u16 kern_pcid(u16 asid)
 {
 	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid > MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	/*
 	 * Make sure that the dynamic ASID space does not conflict with the
 	 * bit we are using to switch between user and kernel ASIDs.
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static inline u16 kern_pcid(u16 asid)
 static inline u16 user_pcid(u16 asid)
 {
 	u16 ret = kern_pcid(asid);
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	ret |= 1 << X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT;
 #endif
 	return ret;
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ static void choose_new_asid(struct mm_struct *next, u64 next_tlb_gen,
 static inline void invalidate_user_asid(u16 asid)
 {
 	/* There is no user ASID if address space separation is off */
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
 		return;
 
 	/*
diff --git a/include/linux/pti.h b/include/linux/pti.h
index 1a941efcaa62..1fbf9d6c20ef 100644
--- a/include/linux/pti.h
+++ b/include/linux/pti.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #ifndef _INCLUDE_PTI_H
 #define _INCLUDE_PTI_H
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 #include <asm/pti.h>
 #else
 static inline void pti_init(void) { }
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 3d61b2432991..aeb3fbbbce46 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
 # define DISABLE_LA57	(1<<(X86_FEATURE_LA57 & 31))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 # define DISABLE_PTI		0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_PTI		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v6 05/13] x86/bugs: Rename RETPOLINE to MITIGATION_RETPOLINE

[Breno Leitao]

CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.

The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.

Rename the Kconfig entry from RETPOLINE to MITIGATION_RETPOLINE.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst   | 8 ++++----
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/Kconfig                                | 6 +++---
 arch/x86/Makefile                               | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile                    | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h        | 2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h                  | 8 ++++----
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h            | 8 ++++----
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c                   | 6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c                        | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c                   | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S                   | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c                          | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h                 | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c                          | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S                      | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                          | 2 +-
 arch/x86/lib/Makefile                           | 2 +-
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c                     | 2 +-
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c                   | 2 +-
 arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile                     | 2 +-
 include/linux/compiler-gcc.h                    | 2 +-
 include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h           | 2 +-
 include/linux/module.h                          | 2 +-
 include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h          | 2 +-
 include/net/tc_wrapper.h                        | 2 +-
 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c                      | 2 +-
 net/netfilter/Makefile                          | 2 +-
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c                  | 6 +++---
 net/netfilter/nft_ct.c                          | 4 ++--
 net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c                      | 2 +-
 net/sched/sch_api.c                             | 2 +-
 scripts/Makefile.lib                            | 2 +-
 scripts/generate_rust_target.rs                 | 2 +-
 scripts/mod/modpost.c                           | 2 +-
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h  | 2 +-
 37 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index 32a8893e5617..cce768afec6b 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -473,8 +473,8 @@ Spectre variant 2
    -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register options.
    If the kernel is compiled with a Clang compiler, the compiler needs
    to support -mretpoline-external-thunk option.  The kernel config
-   CONFIG_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs to run with
-   the latest updated microcode.
+   CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs
+   to run with the latest updated microcode.
 
    On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all,
    cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details.
@@ -609,8 +609,8 @@ kernel command line.
 		Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
 		mitigation method at run time according to the
 		CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
-		CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
-		compiler with which the kernel was built.
+		CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE configuration option,
+		and the compiler with which the kernel was built.
 
 		Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
 		against user space to user space task attacks.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 65731b060e3f..7e071087c8c2 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -6000,8 +6000,8 @@
 			Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
 			mitigation method at run time according to the
 			CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
-			CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
-			compiler with which the kernel was built.
+			CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE configuration option,
+			and the compiler with which the kernel was built.
 
 			Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
 			against user space to user space task attacks.
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 4398e9ebef8c..862be9b3b216 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2460,7 +2460,7 @@ config CALL_PADDING
 
 config FINEIBT
 	def_bool y
-	depends on X86_KERNEL_IBT && CFI_CLANG && RETPOLINE
+	depends on X86_KERNEL_IBT && CFI_CLANG && MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	select CALL_PADDING
 
 config HAVE_CALL_THUNKS
@@ -2498,7 +2498,7 @@ config MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 
 	  See Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst for more details.
 
-config RETPOLINE
+config MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel"
 	select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
 	default y
@@ -2510,7 +2510,7 @@ config RETPOLINE
 
 config RETHUNK
 	bool "Enable return-thunks"
-	depends on RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
+	depends on MITIGATION_RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
 	select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
 	default y if X86_64
 	help
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index 1a068de12a56..b8d23ed059fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-sign-compare
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables
 
 # Avoid indirect branches in kernel to deal with Spectre
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
   KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS)
   # Additionally, avoid generating expensive indirect jumps which
   # are subject to retpolines for small number of switch cases.
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ vdso-install-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION)	+= arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32.so.dbg
 
 archprepare: checkbin
 checkbin:
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 ifeq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),)
 	@echo "You are building kernel with non-retpoline compiler." >&2
 	@echo "Please update your compiler." >&2
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
index b1b8dd1608f7..c4df99aa1615 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ CFL := $(PROFILING) -mcmodel=small -fPIC -O2 -fasynchronous-unwind-tables -m64 \
        -fno-omit-frame-pointer -foptimize-sibling-calls \
        -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING -DBUILD_VDSO
 
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS),)
   CFL += $(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS)
 endif
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += $(call cc-option, -foptimize-sibling-calls)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += -fno-omit-frame-pointer
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
 
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS),)
   KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += $(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS)
 endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index fb604ec95a5f..24e4010c33b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
 # define DISABLE_PTI		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE	0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE	((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
index 571fe4d2d232..c5165204c66f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
@@ -42,25 +42,25 @@
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
 #define RET	jmp __x86_return_thunk
-#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
 #ifdef CONFIG_SLS
 #define RET	ret; int3
 #else
 #define RET	ret
 #endif
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
 
 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
 #define ASM_RET	"jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t"
-#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
 #ifdef CONFIG_SLS
 #define ASM_RET	"ret; int3\n\t"
 #else
 #define ASM_RET	"ret\n\t"
 #endif
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 64d9f0e87419..cab7c937c71b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@
  * instruction irrespective of kCFI.
  */
 .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	__CS_PREFIX \reg
 	jmp	__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
 #else
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@
 .endm
 
 .macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	__CS_PREFIX \reg
 	call	__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
 #else
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static inline void call_depth_return_thunk(void) {}
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 
 #define GEN(reg) \
 	extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg;
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static inline void call_depth_return_thunk(void) {}
 
 /*
  * Inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC
- * which is ensured when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is defined.
+ * which is ensured when CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE is defined.
  */
 # define CALL_NOSPEC						\
 	ALTERNATIVE_2(						\
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 73be3931e4f0..5ec887d065ce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static inline bool is_jcc32(struct insn *insn)
 	return insn->opcode.bytes[0] == 0x0f && (insn->opcode.bytes[1] & 0xf0) == 0x80;
 }
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_OBJTOOL)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_OBJTOOL)
 
 /*
  * CALL/JMP *%\reg
@@ -773,12 +773,12 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end)
 void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
 #endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */
 
-#else /* !CONFIG_RETPOLINE || !CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
+#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE || !CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
 
 void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
 void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
 
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE && CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE && CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index b906ed4f3091..fc46fd6447f9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init =
 static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init =
 	SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
 
 bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
@@ -1416,7 +1416,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC ||
 	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
 	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
-	    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+	    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)) {
 		pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
 		       mitigation_options[i].option);
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
@@ -1470,7 +1470,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 
 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
 {
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)) {
 		pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
 		return SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
 	}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
index 12df54ff0e81..93bc52d4a472 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ union ftrace_op_code_union {
 	} __attribute__((packed));
 };
 
-#define RET_SIZE		(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+#define RET_SIZE	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
 
 static unsigned long
 create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
index 517821b48391..36d6809c6c9e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static int can_optimize(unsigned long paddr)
 		 * However, the kernel built with retpolines or IBT has jump
 		 * tables disabled so the check can be skipped altogether.
 		 */
-		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) &&
+		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) &&
 		    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT) &&
 		    insn_is_indirect_jump(&insn))
 			return 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 54a5596adaa6..985984919d81 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ SECTIONS
 		LOCK_TEXT
 		KPROBES_TEXT
 		SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 		*(.text..__x86.indirect_thunk)
 		*(.text..__x86.return_thunk)
 #endif
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ SECTIONS
 		__parainstructions_end = .;
 	}
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	/*
 	 * List of instructions that call/jmp/jcc to retpoline thunks
 	 * __x86_indirect_thunk_*(). These instructions can be patched along
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index c57e181bba21..2485dbd4cf50 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ static unsigned long get_guest_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 static inline unsigned long kvm_mmu_get_guest_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 						  struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
 {
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && mmu->get_guest_pgd == get_guest_cr3)
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && mmu->get_guest_pgd == get_guest_cr3)
 		return kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
 
 	return mmu->get_guest_pgd(vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
index decc1f153669..bf73a121c5ef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
 	if (!prefetch)
 		vcpu->stat.pf_taken++;
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && fault.is_tdp)
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && fault.is_tdp)
 		r = kvm_tdp_page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
 	else
 		r = vcpu->arch.mmu->page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 712146312358..dc362ec24ba1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -3452,7 +3452,7 @@ int svm_invoke_exit_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 exit_code)
 	if (!svm_check_exit_valid(exit_code))
 		return svm_handle_invalid_exit(vcpu, exit_code);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_MSR)
 		return msr_interception(vcpu);
 	else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_VINTR)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
index ef2ebabb059c..b9e08837ab96 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
 7:	vmload %_ASM_AX
 8:
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
 	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
 #endif
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run)
 	/* Pop @svm to RDI, guest registers have been saved already. */
 	pop %_ASM_DI
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
 	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index be20a60047b1..fbe516148ab6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6544,7 +6544,7 @@ static int __vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
 
 	if (exit_reason.basic >= kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers)
 		goto unexpected_vmexit;
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
 		return kvm_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
 	else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
index ea3a28e7b613..72cc9c90e9f3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_COPY_MC) += copy_mc.o copy_mc_64.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o insn-eval.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION)	+= error-inject.o
-lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o
+lib-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o
 
 obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o
 obj-y += iomem.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index 8c10d9abc239..ef732f323926 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, u8 *ip)
 			emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_indirect_thunk_array[reg], ip);
 	} else {
 		EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg);	/* jmp *%\reg */
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
 			EMIT1(0xCC);		/* int3 */
 	}
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
index 429a89c5468b..efca6bd818a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
@@ -1273,7 +1273,7 @@ static int emit_jmp_edx(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip)
 	u8 *prog = *pprog;
 	int cnt = 0;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	EMIT1_off32(0xE9, (u8 *)__x86_indirect_thunk_edx - (ip + 5));
 #else
 	EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE2);
diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
index 08aa0f25f12a..bc31863c5ee6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
 PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE		+= -fstack-protector-strong
 endif
 
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE		+= $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS)
 endif
 
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
index 2ceba3fe4ec1..d24f29091f4b 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 	(typeof(ptr)) (__ptr + (off));					\
 })
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 #define __noretpoline __attribute__((__indirect_branch__("keep")))
 #endif
 
diff --git a/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h b/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h
index c1c76a70a6ce..fe050dab55a3 100644
--- a/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h
+++ b/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_INDIRECT_CALL_WRAPPER_H
 #define _LINUX_INDIRECT_CALL_WRAPPER_H
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 
 /*
  * INDIRECT_CALL_$NR - wrapper for indirect calls with $NR known builtin
diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
index a98e188cf37b..d45e17fa7f98 100644
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ static inline void module_bug_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
 static inline void module_bug_cleanup(struct module *mod) {}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 extern bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline);
 #else
 static inline bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h
index 780a5f6ad4a6..ff27cb2e1662 100644
--- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h
+++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ extern const struct nft_set_type nft_set_bitmap_type;
 extern const struct nft_set_type nft_set_pipapo_type;
 extern const struct nft_set_type nft_set_pipapo_avx2_type;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 bool nft_rhash_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set,
 		      const u32 *key, const struct nft_set_ext **ext);
 bool nft_rbtree_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set,
diff --git a/include/net/tc_wrapper.h b/include/net/tc_wrapper.h
index a6d481b5bcbc..a13ba0326d5e 100644
--- a/include/net/tc_wrapper.h
+++ b/include/net/tc_wrapper.h
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 #include <net/pkt_cls.h>
 
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)
 
 #include <linux/cpufeature.h>
 #include <linux/static_key.h>
diff --git a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
index 43cc47d7faaf..5c88afbfbdb9 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
@@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ static inline u64 rb_time_stamp(struct trace_buffer *buffer)
 	u64 ts;
 
 	/* Skip retpolines :-( */
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && likely(buffer->clock == trace_clock_local))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && likely(buffer->clock == trace_clock_local))
 		ts = trace_clock_local();
 	else
 		ts = buffer->clock();
diff --git a/net/netfilter/Makefile b/net/netfilter/Makefile
index d4958e7e7631..614815a3ed73 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/Makefile
+++ b/net/netfilter/Makefile
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ endif
 endif
 
 ifdef CONFIG_NFT_CT
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 nf_tables-objs += nft_ct_fast.o
 endif
 endif
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c
index 8b536d7ef6c2..63e9c8b9f144 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 #include <net/netfilter/nf_log.h>
 #include <net/netfilter/nft_meta.h>
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_X86)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_X86)
 
 static struct static_key_false nf_tables_skip_direct_calls;
 
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static void expr_call_ops_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,
 			       struct nft_regs *regs,
 			       struct nft_pktinfo *pkt)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	unsigned long e;
 
 	if (nf_skip_indirect_calls())
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static void expr_call_ops_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,
 	X(e, nft_objref_map_eval);
 #undef  X
 indirect_call:
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
 	expr->ops->eval(expr, regs, pkt);
 }
 
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c
index 86bb9d7797d9..d3e66bcb2a91 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ static bool nft_ct_set_reduce(struct nft_regs_track *track,
 	return false;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 static const struct nft_expr_ops nft_ct_get_fast_ops = {
 	.type		= &nft_ct_type,
 	.size		= NFT_EXPR_SIZE(sizeof(struct nft_ct)),
@@ -796,7 +796,7 @@ nft_ct_select_ops(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	if (tb[NFTA_CT_DREG]) {
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 		u32 k = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_CT_KEY]));
 
 		switch (k) {
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c b/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c
index 870e5b113d13..a0055f510e31 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ struct nft_lookup {
 	struct nft_set_binding		binding;
 };
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 bool nft_set_do_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set,
 		       const u32 *key, const struct nft_set_ext **ext)
 {
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c
index e9eaf637220e..d577c9e1cb42 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
@@ -2353,7 +2353,7 @@ static struct pernet_operations psched_net_ops = {
 	.exit = psched_net_exit,
 };
 
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tc_skip_wrapper);
 #endif
 
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib
index cc44c95c49cc..d6e157938b5f 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.lib
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_USE_OBJTOOL
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_OBJTOOL_NOP_MCOUNT)		+= --mnop
 endif
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC)			+= --orc
-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)			+= --retpoline
+objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)		+= --retpoline
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_RETHUNK)				+= --rethunk
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_SLS)				+= --sls
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION)			+= --stackval
diff --git a/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs b/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs
index 3c6cbe2b278d..eaf524603796 100644
--- a/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs
+++ b/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ fn main() {
             "e-m:e-p270:32:32-p271:32:32-p272:64:64-i64:64-f80:128-n8:16:32:64-S128",
         );
         let mut features = "-3dnow,-3dnowa,-mmx,+soft-float".to_string();
-        if cfg.has("RETPOLINE") {
+        if cfg.has("MITIGATION_RETPOLINE") {
             features += ",+retpoline-external-thunk";
         }
         ts.push("features", features);
diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
index 973b5e5ae2dd..3070aa79aebd 100644
--- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
@@ -1841,7 +1841,7 @@ static void add_header(struct buffer *b, struct module *mod)
 
 	buf_printf(b,
 		   "\n"
-		   "#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE\n"
+		   "#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE\n"
 		   "MODULE_INFO(retpoline, \"Y\");\n"
 		   "#endif\n");
 
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index aeb3fbbbce46..d05158d8fe5f 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
 # define DISABLE_PTI		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE	0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE	((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v6 06/13] x86/bugs: Rename SLS to CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS

[Breno Leitao]

CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.

The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.

Rename the Kconfig entry from SLS to MITIGATION_SLS.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig               | 2 +-
 arch/x86/Makefile              | 2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c  | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c       | 3 ++-
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c    | 4 ++--
 scripts/Makefile.lib           | 2 +-
 7 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 862be9b3b216..fa246de60cdb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2580,7 +2580,7 @@ config CPU_SRSO
 	help
 	  Enable the SRSO mitigation needed on AMD Zen1-4 machines.
 
-config SLS
+config MITIGATION_SLS
 	bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation"
 	depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64
 	select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index b8d23ed059fb..5ce8c30e7701 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
   endif
 endif
 
-ifdef CONFIG_SLS
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
   KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mharden-sls=all
 endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
index c5165204c66f..09e2d026df33 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
 #if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
 #define RET	jmp __x86_return_thunk
 #else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
-#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
 #define RET	ret; int3
 #else
 #define RET	ret
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
 #if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
 #define ASM_RET	"jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t"
 #else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
-#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
 #define ASM_RET	"ret; int3\n\t"
 #else
 #define ASM_RET	"ret\n\t"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 5ec887d065ce..b01d49862497 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -637,8 +637,8 @@ static int patch_retpoline(void *addr, struct insn *insn, u8 *bytes)
 	/*
 	 * The compiler is supposed to EMIT an INT3 after every unconditional
 	 * JMP instruction due to AMD BTC. However, if the compiler is too old
-	 * or SLS isn't enabled, we still need an INT3 after indirect JMPs
-	 * even on Intel.
+	 * or MITIGATION_SLS isn't enabled, we still need an INT3 after
+	 * indirect JMPs even on Intel.
 	 */
 	if (op == JMP32_INSN_OPCODE && i < insn->length)
 		bytes[i++] = INT3_INSN_OPCODE;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
index 93bc52d4a472..70139d9d2e01 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -307,7 +307,8 @@ union ftrace_op_code_union {
 	} __attribute__((packed));
 };
 
-#define RET_SIZE	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+#define RET_SIZE \
+	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS))
 
 static unsigned long
 create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size)
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index ef732f323926..96a63c4386a9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, u8 *ip)
 			emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_indirect_thunk_array[reg], ip);
 	} else {
 		EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg);	/* jmp *%\reg */
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS))
 			EMIT1(0xCC);		/* int3 */
 	}
 
@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ static void emit_return(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip)
 		emit_jump(&prog, x86_return_thunk, ip);
 	} else {
 		EMIT1(0xC3);		/* ret */
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS))
 			EMIT1(0xCC);	/* int3 */
 	}
 
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib
index d6e157938b5f..0d5461276179 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.lib
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ endif
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC)			+= --orc
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)		+= --retpoline
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_RETHUNK)				+= --rethunk
-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_SLS)				+= --sls
+objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS)			+= --sls
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION)			+= --stackval
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE)		+= --static-call
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_UACCESS_VALIDATION)		+= --uaccess
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v6 07/13] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_UNRET_ENTRY to MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY

[Breno Leitao]

CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.

The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.

Rename the Kconfig entry from CPU_UNRET_ENTRY to MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                               |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h       |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h           |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c                      |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                     |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S                  |  2 +-
 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S                       | 10 +++++-----
 include/linux/objtool.h                        |  2 +-
 scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o                     |  2 +-
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |  2 +-
 10 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index fa246de60cdb..fa078d3655ff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2519,7 +2519,7 @@ config RETHUNK
 	  Requires a compiler with -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
 	  support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
 
-config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+config MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
 	bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry"
 	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK && X86_64
 	default y
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 24e4010c33b6..151f0d50e7e0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
 # define DISABLE_RETHUNK	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
 # define DISABLE_UNRET		0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_UNRET		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index cab7c937c71b..e25e98f012a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@
  */
 .macro VALIDATE_UNRET_END
 #if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && \
-	(defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
+	(defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
 	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
 	nop
 #endif
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@
 .Lskip_rsb_\@:
 .endm
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
 #define CALL_UNTRAIN_RET	"call entry_untrain_ret"
 #else
 #define CALL_UNTRAIN_RET	""
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
 static inline void __x86_return_thunk(void) {}
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
 extern void retbleed_return_thunk(void);
 #else
 static inline void retbleed_return_thunk(void) {}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index a7eab05e5f29..8d38299cec83 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
 	u64 value;
 
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index fc46fd6447f9..2580368c32d1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -982,10 +982,10 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
 		return;
 
 	case RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET:
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY)) {
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY)) {
 			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
 		} else {
-			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_UNRET_ENTRY.\n");
+			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY.\n");
 			goto do_cmd_auto;
 		}
 		break;
@@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
 	case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
 		if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
 		    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
-			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY))
+			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY))
 				retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
 			else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY) &&
 				 boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 985984919d81..d7ee79b6756f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_backing_store);
            "fixed_percpu_data is not at start of per-cpu area");
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
 . = ASSERT((retbleed_return_thunk & 0x3f) == 0, "retbleed_return_thunk not cacheline-aligned");
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index ff46f48a0cc4..0ad67ccadd4c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(srso_return_thunk)
 #define JMP_SRSO_ALIAS_UNTRAIN_RET "ud2"
 #endif /* CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
 
 /*
  * Some generic notes on the untraining sequences:
@@ -312,11 +312,11 @@ SYM_CODE_END(retbleed_return_thunk)
 SYM_FUNC_END(retbleed_untrain_ret)
 
 #define JMP_RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_RET "jmp retbleed_untrain_ret"
-#else /* !CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY */
+#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY */
 #define JMP_RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_RET "ud2"
-#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY */
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
 
 SYM_FUNC_START(entry_untrain_ret)
 	ALTERNATIVE_2 JMP_RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_RET,				\
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(entry_untrain_ret)
 SYM_FUNC_END(entry_untrain_ret)
 __EXPORT_THUNK(entry_untrain_ret)
 
-#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY || CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY || CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 
diff --git a/include/linux/objtool.h b/include/linux/objtool.h
index 33212e93f4a6..d030671a4c49 100644
--- a/include/linux/objtool.h
+++ b/include/linux/objtool.h
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
  */
 .macro VALIDATE_UNRET_BEGIN
 #if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && \
-	(defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
+	(defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
 .Lhere_\@:
 	.pushsection .discard.validate_unret
 	.long	.Lhere_\@ - .
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o
index 25b3b587d37c..6277dbd730bb 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ objtool-enabled := $(or $(delay-objtool),$(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION))
 vmlinux-objtool-args-$(delay-objtool)			+= $(objtool-args-y)
 vmlinux-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL)		+= --no-unreachable
 vmlinux-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION)	+= --noinstr \
-							   $(if $(or $(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY),$(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)), --unret)
+							   $(if $(or $(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY),$(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)), --unret)
 
 objtool-args = $(vmlinux-objtool-args-y) --link
 
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index d05158d8fe5f..4b816f55c634 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
 # define DISABLE_RETHUNK	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
 # define DISABLE_UNRET		0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_UNRET		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v6 08/13] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_IBRS_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY

[Breno Leitao]

CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.

The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.

Rename the Kconfig entry from CPU_IBRS_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig           | 2 +-
 arch/x86/entry/calling.h   | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++--
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index fa078d3655ff..392e94fded3d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2564,7 +2564,7 @@ config MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
 	help
 	  Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation.
 
-config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
+config MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
 	bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
 	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
 	default y
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
index ace89d5c1ddd..2afdff42c107 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
  * Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set.
  */
 .macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
 	movl	$MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
 
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
  * regs. Must be called after the last RET.
  */
 .macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
 	movl	$MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 2580368c32d1..e11bacbd8f39 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1439,7 +1439,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 	}
 
-	if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY)) {
+	if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY)) {
 		pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
 		       mitigation_options[i].option);
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
@@ -1565,7 +1565,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 			break;
 		}
 
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY) &&
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY) &&
 		    boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
 		    retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF &&
 		    retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_STUFF &&
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v6 09/13] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_SRSO to MITIGATION_SRSO

[Breno Leitao]

CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.

The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.

Rename the Kconfig entry from CPU_SRSO to MITIGATION_SRSO.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                     |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |  8 ++++----
 arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S        |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S             | 10 +++++-----
 include/linux/objtool.h              |  2 +-
 scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o           |  2 +-
 7 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 392e94fded3d..30c2f880caf9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2573,7 +2573,7 @@ config MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
 	  This mitigates both spectre_v2 and retbleed at great cost to
 	  performance.
 
-config CPU_SRSO
+config MITIGATION_SRSO
 	bool "Mitigate speculative RAS overflow on AMD"
 	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 && RETHUNK
 	default y
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index e25e98f012a3..9ea93a298a43 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@
  */
 .macro VALIDATE_UNRET_END
 #if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && \
-	(defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
+	(defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO))
 	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
 	nop
 #endif
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@
 .Lskip_rsb_\@:
 .endm
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)
 #define CALL_UNTRAIN_RET	"call entry_untrain_ret"
 #else
 #define CALL_UNTRAIN_RET	""
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ extern void retbleed_return_thunk(void);
 static inline void retbleed_return_thunk(void) {}
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
 extern void srso_return_thunk(void);
 extern void srso_alias_return_thunk(void);
 #else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index e11bacbd8f39..f2775417bda2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2458,7 +2458,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 		break;
 
 	case SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET:
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) {
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
 			/*
 			 * Enable the return thunk for generated code
 			 * like ftrace, static_call, etc.
@@ -2478,7 +2478,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 			else
 				srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED;
 		} else {
-			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
+			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
 		}
 		break;
 
@@ -2494,13 +2494,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 		break;
 
 	case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) {
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
 			if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
 				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
 				srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
 			}
 		} else {
-			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
+			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
                 }
 		break;
 	}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index d7ee79b6756f..8d1143ab05b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ SECTIONS
 		*(.text..__x86.rethunk_untrain)
 		ENTRY_TEXT
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
 		/*
 		 * See the comment above srso_alias_untrain_ret()'s
 		 * definition.
@@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_backing_store);
 . = ASSERT((retbleed_return_thunk & 0x3f) == 0, "retbleed_return_thunk not cacheline-aligned");
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
 . = ASSERT((srso_safe_ret & 0x3f) == 0, "srso_safe_ret not cacheline-aligned");
 /*
  * GNU ld cannot do XOR until 2.41.
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index 0ad67ccadd4c..67b52cbec648 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array)
  */
 	.section .text..__x86.return_thunk
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
 
 /*
  * srso_alias_untrain_ret() and srso_alias_safe_ret() are placed at
@@ -225,10 +225,10 @@ SYM_CODE_END(srso_return_thunk)
 
 #define JMP_SRSO_UNTRAIN_RET "jmp srso_untrain_ret"
 #define JMP_SRSO_ALIAS_UNTRAIN_RET "jmp srso_alias_untrain_ret"
-#else /* !CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
+#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO */
 #define JMP_SRSO_UNTRAIN_RET "ud2"
 #define JMP_SRSO_ALIAS_UNTRAIN_RET "ud2"
-#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
 
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(retbleed_untrain_ret)
 #define JMP_RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_RET "ud2"
 #endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY */
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)
 
 SYM_FUNC_START(entry_untrain_ret)
 	ALTERNATIVE_2 JMP_RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_RET,				\
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(entry_untrain_ret)
 SYM_FUNC_END(entry_untrain_ret)
 __EXPORT_THUNK(entry_untrain_ret)
 
-#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY || CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY || CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 
diff --git a/include/linux/objtool.h b/include/linux/objtool.h
index d030671a4c49..b3b8d3dab52d 100644
--- a/include/linux/objtool.h
+++ b/include/linux/objtool.h
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
  */
 .macro VALIDATE_UNRET_BEGIN
 #if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && \
-	(defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
+	(defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO))
 .Lhere_\@:
 	.pushsection .discard.validate_unret
 	.long	.Lhere_\@ - .
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o
index 6277dbd730bb..6de297916ce6 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ objtool-enabled := $(or $(delay-objtool),$(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION))
 vmlinux-objtool-args-$(delay-objtool)			+= $(objtool-args-y)
 vmlinux-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL)		+= --no-unreachable
 vmlinux-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION)	+= --noinstr \
-							   $(if $(or $(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY),$(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)), --unret)
+							   $(if $(or $(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY),$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)), --unret)
 
 objtool-args = $(vmlinux-objtool-args-y) --link
 
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v6 10/13] x86/bugs: Rename RETHUNK to MITIGATION_RETHUNK

[Breno Leitao]

CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.

The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.

Rename the Kconfig entry from RETHUNK to MITIGATION_RETHUNK.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                               | 8 ++++----
 arch/x86/Makefile                              | 2 +-
 arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig                | 2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h       | 2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h                 | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h           | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h             | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c                  | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c                  | 2 +-
 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S                       | 4 ++--
 scripts/Makefile.lib                           | 2 +-
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 2 +-
 12 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 30c2f880caf9..ee939de1bb05 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2465,7 +2465,7 @@ config FINEIBT
 
 config HAVE_CALL_THUNKS
 	def_bool y
-	depends on CC_HAS_ENTRY_PADDING && RETHUNK && OBJTOOL
+	depends on CC_HAS_ENTRY_PADDING && MITIGATION_RETHUNK && OBJTOOL
 
 config CALL_THUNKS
 	def_bool n
@@ -2508,7 +2508,7 @@ config MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	  branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern
 	  support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
 
-config RETHUNK
+config MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 	bool "Enable return-thunks"
 	depends on MITIGATION_RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
 	select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
@@ -2521,7 +2521,7 @@ config RETHUNK
 
 config MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
 	bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry"
-	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK && X86_64
+	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && MITIGATION_RETHUNK && X86_64
 	default y
 	help
 	  Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation.
@@ -2575,7 +2575,7 @@ config MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
 
 config MITIGATION_SRSO
 	bool "Mitigate speculative RAS overflow on AMD"
-	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 && RETHUNK
+	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 && MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 	default y
 	help
 	  Enable the SRSO mitigation needed on AMD Zen1-4 machines.
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index 5ce8c30e7701..ba046afb850e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS	:= -mretpoline
 endif
 RETPOLINE_CFLAGS	+= $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch-cs-prefix)
 
-ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 RETHUNK_CFLAGS		:= -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
 RETPOLINE_CFLAGS	+= $(RETHUNK_CFLAGS)
 endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig b/arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig
index 73abbbdd26f8..91801138b10b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ CONFIG_EFI_STUB=y
 CONFIG_HZ_1000=y
 CONFIG_KEXEC=y
 CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP=y
-# CONFIG_RETHUNK is not set
+# CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK is not set
 CONFIG_HIBERNATION=y
 CONFIG_PM_DEBUG=y
 CONFIG_PM_TRACE_RTC=y
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 151f0d50e7e0..36d0c1e05e60 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
 				 (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 # define DISABLE_RETHUNK	0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_RETHUNK	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
index 09e2d026df33..dc31b13b87a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
 
 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
 #define RET	jmp __x86_return_thunk
 #else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
 #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
 
 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
 #define ASM_RET	"jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t"
 #else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
 #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 9ea93a298a43..33f76848c838 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@
  * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
  */
 .macro __UNTRAIN_RET ibpb_feature, call_depth_insns
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)
 	VALIDATE_UNRET_END
 	ALTERNATIVE_3 "",						\
 		      CALL_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET,		\
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[];
 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_call_thunk_array[];
 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array[];
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
 #else
 static inline void __x86_return_thunk(void) {}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h
index 343b722ccaf2..125c407e2abe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
 #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, func)			\
 	__ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, ".byte 0xe9; .long " #func " - (. + 4)")
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP(name)			\
 	__ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, "jmp __x86_return_thunk")
 #else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index b01d49862497..f7c11bef19bb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end)
 	}
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 
 /*
  * Rewrite the compiler generated return thunk tail-calls.
@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end)
 }
 #else
 void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK */
 
 #else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE || !CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
index 77a9316da435..4eefaac64c6c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ void arch_static_call_transform(void *site, void *tramp, void *func, bool tail)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_static_call_transform);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 /*
  * This is called by apply_returns() to fix up static call trampolines,
  * specifically ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP which is recorded as
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index 67b52cbec648..0045153ba222 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array)
 #undef GEN
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 
 /*
  * Be careful here: that label cannot really be removed because in
@@ -386,4 +386,4 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__x86_return_thunk)
 SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk)
 
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK */
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib
index 0d5461276179..48a4a81edac1 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.lib
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_OBJTOOL_NOP_MCOUNT)		+= --mnop
 endif
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC)			+= --orc
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)		+= --retpoline
-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_RETHUNK)				+= --rethunk
+objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK)		+= --rethunk
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS)			+= --sls
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION)			+= --stackval
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE)		+= --static-call
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 4b816f55c634..bd7071f34f6b 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
 				 (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 # define DISABLE_RETHUNK	0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_RETHUNK	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v6 11/13] x86/bugs: Create a way to disable GDS mitigation

[Breno Leitao]

Currently there is no way to disable GDS mitigation at build time.
The current config option (GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) just enables a more
drastic mitigation.

Create a new kernel config that allows GDS to be completely disabled,
similarly to the "gather_data_sampling=off" or "mitigations=off" kernel
command-line. Move the GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE under this new mitigation.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig           | 18 +++++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |  7 ++++---
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index ee939de1bb05..b1a59e5d6fb6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2590,15 +2590,23 @@ config MITIGATION_SLS
 	  against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly
 	  larger.
 
+config MITIGATION_GDS
+	bool "Mitigate Gather Data Sampling"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for Gather Data Sampling (GDS). GDS is a hardware
+	  vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data
+	  which was previously stored in vector registers. The attacker uses
+	  gather instructions to infer the stale vector register data.
+	  See also
+	  <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst>
+
 config MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
 	bool "Force GDS Mitigation"
-	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	depends on MITIGATION_GDS
 	default n
 	help
-	  Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
-	  unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
-	  vector registers.
-
 	  This option is equivalent to setting gather_data_sampling=force on the
 	  command line. The microcode mitigation is used if present, otherwise
 	  AVX is disabled as a mitigation. On affected systems that are missing
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index f2775417bda2..0172bb0f61fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -671,10 +671,11 @@ enum gds_mitigations {
 	GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
 };
 
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE)
-static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS)
+static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE) ? GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE : GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
 #else
-static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
 #endif
 
 static const char * const gds_strings[] = {
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v6 12/13] x86/bugs: spectre_v2_user default mode depends on Kconfig

[Breno Leitao]

Change the default value of spectre v2 in user mode to respect the
CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 config option.

Currently, user mode spectre v2 is set to auto
(SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO) by default, even if
CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 is disabled.

Set the Spectre_v2 value to auto (SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO) if the
Spectre v2 config (CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2) is enabled, otherwise
set the value to none (SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE).

Important to say the command line argument "spectre_v2_user" overwrites
the default value in both cases.

Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 0172bb0f61fe..a99f8c064682 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1216,8 +1216,11 @@ static __ro_after_init enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd spectre_v2_cmd;
 static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init
 spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
 {
+	int ret, i, mode;
 	char arg[20];
-	int ret, i;
+
+	mode = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2) ?
+		SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO : SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;
 
 	switch (spectre_v2_cmd) {
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
@@ -1231,7 +1234,7 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2_user",
 				  arg, sizeof(arg));
 	if (ret < 0)
-		return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
+		return mode;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(v2_user_options); i++) {
 		if (match_option(arg, ret, v2_user_options[i].option)) {
@@ -1241,8 +1244,8 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
 		}
 	}
 
-	pr_err("Unknown user space protection option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
-	return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
+	pr_err("Unknown user space protection option (%s). Switching to default\n", arg);
+	return mode;
 }
 
 static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v6 13/13] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for missing mitigation

[Breno Leitao]

Currently, the CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is halfway populated,
where some mitigations have entries in Kconfig, and they could be
modified, while others mitigations do not have Kconfig entries, and
could not be controlled at build time.

Create an entry for each CPU mitigation under
CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS. This allow users to enable or disable
them at compilation time.

Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig           | 101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |  39 ++++++++------
 2 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index b1a59e5d6fb6..def8561bc2a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2617,6 +2617,107 @@ config MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
 
 	  If in doubt, say N.
 
+config MITIGATION_MDS
+	bool "Mitigate Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) hardware bug"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS). MDS is
+	  a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access
+	  to data which is available in various CPU internal buffers.
+	  See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst>
+
+config MITIGATION_TAA
+	bool "Mitigate TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA) hardware bug"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA). TAA is a hardware
+	  vulnerability that allows unprivileged speculative access to data
+	  which is available in various CPU internal buffers by using
+	  asynchronous aborts within an Intel TSX transactional region.
+	  See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst>
+
+config MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA
+	bool "Mitigate MMIO Stale Data hardware bug"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for MMIO Stale Data hardware bugs.  Processor MMIO
+	  Stale Data Vulnerabilities are a class of memory-mapped I/O (MMIO)
+	  vulnerabilities that can expose data. The vulnerabilities require the
+	  attacker to have access to MMIO.
+	  See also
+	  <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst>
+
+config MITIGATION_L1TF
+	bool "Mitigate L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF) hardware bug"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default y
+	help
+	  Mitigate L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF) hardware bug. L1 Terminal Fault is a
+	  hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data
+	  available in the Level 1 Data Cache.
+	  See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst>
+
+config MITIGATION_RETBLEED
+	bool "Mitigate RETBleed hardware bug"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL || (CPU_SUP_AMD && MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY)
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for RETBleed (Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution
+	  with Return Instructions) vulnerability.  RETBleed is a speculative
+	  execution attack which takes advantage of microarchitectural behavior
+	  in many modern microprocessors, similar to Spectre v2. An
+	  unprivileged attacker can use these flaws to bypass conventional
+	  memory security restrictions to gain read access to privileged memory
+	  that would otherwise be inaccessible.
+
+config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V1
+	bool "Mitigate SPECTRE V1 hardware bug"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for Spectre V1 (Bounds Check Bypass). Spectre V1 is a
+	  class of side channel attacks that takes advantage of speculative
+	  execution that bypasses conditional branch instructions used for
+	  memory access bounds check.
+	  See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst>
+
+config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2
+	bool "Mitigate SPECTRE V2 hardware bug"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for Spectre V2 (Branch Target Injection). Spectre
+	  V2 is a class of side channel attacks that takes advantage of
+	  indirect branch predictors inside the processor. In Spectre variant 2
+	  attacks, the attacker can steer speculative indirect branches in the
+	  victim to gadget code by poisoning the branch target buffer of a CPU
+	  used for predicting indirect branch addresses.
+	  See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst>
+
+config MITIGATION_SRBDS
+	bool "Mitigate Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) hardware bug"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS).
+	  SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows Microarchitectural Data
+	  Sampling (MDS) techniques to infer values returned from special
+	  register accesses. An unprivileged user can extract values returned
+	  from RDRAND and RDSEED executed on another core or sibling thread
+	  using MDS techniques.
+	  See also
+	  <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst>
+
+config MITIGATION_SSB
+	bool "Mitigate Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) hardware bug"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for Speculative Store Bypass (SSB). SSB is a
+	  hardware security vulnerability and its exploitation takes advantage
+	  of speculative execution in a similar way to the Meltdown and Spectre
+	  security vulnerabilities.
+
 endif
 
 config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index a99f8c064682..4f1da92784c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -232,7 +232,8 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"MDS: " fmt
 
 /* Default mitigation for MDS-affected CPUs */
-static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MDS) ? MDS_MITIGATION_FULL : MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
 static bool mds_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
 
 static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
@@ -292,7 +293,8 @@ enum taa_mitigations {
 };
 
 /* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
-static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_TAA) ? TAA_MITIGATION_VERW : TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
 static bool taa_nosmt __ro_after_init;
 
 static const char * const taa_strings[] = {
@@ -393,7 +395,8 @@ enum mmio_mitigations {
 };
 
 /* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
-static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ? MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW : MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
 static bool mmio_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
 
 static const char * const mmio_strings[] = {
@@ -542,7 +545,8 @@ enum srbds_mitigations {
 	SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
 };
 
-static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRBDS) ? SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL : SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
 
 static const char * const srbds_strings[] = {
 	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF]		= "Vulnerable",
@@ -812,7 +816,8 @@ enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
 };
 
 static enum spectre_v1_mitigation spectre_v1_mitigation __ro_after_init =
-	SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO;
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V1) ?
+		SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO : SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
 
 static const char * const spectre_v1_strings[] = {
 	[SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers",
@@ -927,7 +932,7 @@ static const char * const retbleed_strings[] = {
 static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init =
 	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
 static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init =
-	RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETBLEED) ? RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO : RETBLEED_CMD_OFF;
 
 static int __ro_after_init retbleed_nosmt = false;
 
@@ -1391,17 +1396,18 @@ static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
 
 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 {
-	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd;
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
+	cmd = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2) ?  SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO : SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
 	    cpu_mitigations_off())
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
 	if (ret < 0)
-		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+		return cmd;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
 		if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
@@ -1411,8 +1417,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	}
 
 	if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
-		pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
-		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+		pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to default mode\n", arg);
+		return cmd;
 	}
 
 	if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
@@ -1885,10 +1891,12 @@ static const struct {
 
 static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
 {
-	enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+	enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
+	cmd = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SSB) ?
+		SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO : SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
 	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
 	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
@@ -1896,7 +1904,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
 		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
 					  arg, sizeof(arg));
 		if (ret < 0)
-			return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+			return cmd;
 
 		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) {
 			if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option))
@@ -1907,8 +1915,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
 		}
 
 		if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options)) {
-			pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
-			return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+			pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to default mode\n", arg);
+			return cmd;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -2235,7 +2243,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation);
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"L1TF: " fmt
 
 /* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
-enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_L1TF) ? L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH : L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
 #endif
-- 
2.34.1

Re: [PATCH v6 10/13] x86/bugs: Rename RETHUNK to MITIGATION_RETHUNK

[Andrew Cooper]

On 21/11/2023 4:07 pm, Breno Leitao wrote:
> CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
> related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
> having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
> namespace.
>
> The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
> MITIGATION.
>
> Rename the Kconfig entry from RETHUNK to MITIGATION_RETHUNK.
>
> Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>

(I'm CC'd on only this single patch so I can't see what's going on, but)

Really?  Rethunk[sic] isn't a mitigation.  It's just a compiler
transformation for return instructions upon which various mitigations
depend.

~Andrew

Re: [PATCH v6 05/13] x86/bugs: Rename RETPOLINE to MITIGATION_RETPOLINE

[Ariel Miculas]

On 23/11/21 08:07AM, Breno Leitao wrote:
> CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
> related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
> having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
> namespace.
> 
> The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
> MITIGATION.
> 
> Rename the Kconfig entry from RETPOLINE to MITIGATION_RETPOLINE.
> 
> Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Ariel Miculas <amiculas@cisco.com>
> ---
>  Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst   | 8 ++++----
>  Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 ++--
>  arch/x86/Kconfig                                | 6 +++---
>  arch/x86/Makefile                               | 4 ++--
>  arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile                    | 4 ++--
>  arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h        | 2 +-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h                  | 8 ++++----
>  arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h            | 8 ++++----
>  arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c                   | 6 +++---
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 6 +++---
>  arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c                        | 2 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c                   | 2 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S                   | 4 ++--
>  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c                          | 2 +-
>  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h                 | 2 +-
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c                          | 2 +-
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S                      | 4 ++--
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                          | 2 +-
>  arch/x86/lib/Makefile                           | 2 +-
>  arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c                     | 2 +-
>  arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c                   | 2 +-
>  arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile                     | 2 +-
>  include/linux/compiler-gcc.h                    | 2 +-
>  include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h           | 2 +-
>  include/linux/module.h                          | 2 +-
>  include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h          | 2 +-
>  include/net/tc_wrapper.h                        | 2 +-
>  kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c                      | 2 +-
>  net/netfilter/Makefile                          | 2 +-
>  net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c                  | 6 +++---
>  net/netfilter/nft_ct.c                          | 4 ++--
>  net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c                      | 2 +-
>  net/sched/sch_api.c                             | 2 +-
>  scripts/Makefile.lib                            | 2 +-
>  scripts/generate_rust_target.rs                 | 2 +-
>  scripts/mod/modpost.c                           | 2 +-
>  tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h  | 2 +-
>  37 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
> index 32a8893e5617..cce768afec6b 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
> @@ -473,8 +473,8 @@ Spectre variant 2
>     -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register options.
>     If the kernel is compiled with a Clang compiler, the compiler needs
>     to support -mretpoline-external-thunk option.  The kernel config
> -   CONFIG_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs to run with
> -   the latest updated microcode.
> +   CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs
> +   to run with the latest updated microcode.
>  
>     On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all,
>     cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details.
> @@ -609,8 +609,8 @@ kernel command line.
>  		Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
>  		mitigation method at run time according to the
>  		CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
> -		CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
> -		compiler with which the kernel was built.
> +		CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE configuration option,
> +		and the compiler with which the kernel was built.
>  
>  		Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
>  		against user space to user space task attacks.
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index 65731b060e3f..7e071087c8c2 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -6000,8 +6000,8 @@
>  			Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
>  			mitigation method at run time according to the
>  			CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
> -			CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
> -			compiler with which the kernel was built.
> +			CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE configuration option,
> +			and the compiler with which the kernel was built.
>  
>  			Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
>  			against user space to user space task attacks.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index 4398e9ebef8c..862be9b3b216 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -2460,7 +2460,7 @@ config CALL_PADDING
>  
>  config FINEIBT
>  	def_bool y
> -	depends on X86_KERNEL_IBT && CFI_CLANG && RETPOLINE
> +	depends on X86_KERNEL_IBT && CFI_CLANG && MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  	select CALL_PADDING
>  
>  config HAVE_CALL_THUNKS
> @@ -2498,7 +2498,7 @@ config MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
>  
>  	  See Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst for more details.
>  
> -config RETPOLINE
> +config MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  	bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel"
>  	select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
>  	default y
> @@ -2510,7 +2510,7 @@ config RETPOLINE
>  
>  config RETHUNK
>  	bool "Enable return-thunks"
> -	depends on RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
> +	depends on MITIGATION_RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
>  	select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
>  	default y if X86_64
>  	help
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
> index 1a068de12a56..b8d23ed059fb 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
> @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-sign-compare
>  KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables
>  
>  # Avoid indirect branches in kernel to deal with Spectre
> -ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>    KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS)
>    # Additionally, avoid generating expensive indirect jumps which
>    # are subject to retpolines for small number of switch cases.
> @@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ vdso-install-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION)	+= arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32.so.dbg
>  
>  archprepare: checkbin
>  checkbin:
> -ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  ifeq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),)
>  	@echo "You are building kernel with non-retpoline compiler." >&2
>  	@echo "Please update your compiler." >&2
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
> index b1b8dd1608f7..c4df99aa1615 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
> @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ CFL := $(PROFILING) -mcmodel=small -fPIC -O2 -fasynchronous-unwind-tables -m64 \
>         -fno-omit-frame-pointer -foptimize-sibling-calls \
>         -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING -DBUILD_VDSO
>  
> -ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS),)
>    CFL += $(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS)
>  endif
> @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += $(call cc-option, -foptimize-sibling-calls)
>  KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += -fno-omit-frame-pointer
>  KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
>  
> -ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS),)
>    KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += $(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS)
>  endif
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> index fb604ec95a5f..24e4010c33b6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
>  # define DISABLE_PTI		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
>  #endif
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE	0
>  #else
>  # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE	((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
> index 571fe4d2d232..c5165204c66f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
> @@ -42,25 +42,25 @@
>  
>  #if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
>  #define RET	jmp __x86_return_thunk
> -#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
> +#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SLS
>  #define RET	ret; int3
>  #else
>  #define RET	ret
>  #endif
> -#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
> +#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
>  
>  #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
>  
>  #if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
>  #define ASM_RET	"jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t"
> -#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
> +#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SLS
>  #define ASM_RET	"ret; int3\n\t"
>  #else
>  #define ASM_RET	"ret\n\t"
>  #endif
> -#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
> +#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
>  
>  #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> index 64d9f0e87419..cab7c937c71b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@
>   * instruction irrespective of kCFI.
>   */
>  .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  	__CS_PREFIX \reg
>  	jmp	__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
>  #else
> @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@
>  .endm
>  
>  .macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  	__CS_PREFIX \reg
>  	call	__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
>  #else
> @@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static inline void call_depth_return_thunk(void) {}
>  
>  #endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  
>  #define GEN(reg) \
>  	extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg;
> @@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static inline void call_depth_return_thunk(void) {}
>  
>  /*
>   * Inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC
> - * which is ensured when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is defined.
> + * which is ensured when CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE is defined.
>   */
>  # define CALL_NOSPEC						\
>  	ALTERNATIVE_2(						\
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> index 73be3931e4f0..5ec887d065ce 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> @@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static inline bool is_jcc32(struct insn *insn)
>  	return insn->opcode.bytes[0] == 0x0f && (insn->opcode.bytes[1] & 0xf0) == 0x80;
>  }
>  
> -#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_OBJTOOL)
> +#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_OBJTOOL)
>  
>  /*
>   * CALL/JMP *%\reg
> @@ -773,12 +773,12 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end)
>  void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
>  #endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */
>  
> -#else /* !CONFIG_RETPOLINE || !CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
> +#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE || !CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
>  
>  void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
>  void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
>  
> -#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE && CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
> +#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE && CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index b906ed4f3091..fc46fd6447f9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init =
>  static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init =
>  	SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
>  
>  bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
> @@ -1416,7 +1416,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
>  	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC ||
>  	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
>  	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
> -	    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
> +	    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)) {
>  		pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
>  		       mitigation_options[i].option);
>  		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
> @@ -1470,7 +1470,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
>  
>  static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
>  {
> -	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
> +	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)) {
>  		pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
>  		return SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
>  	}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
> index 12df54ff0e81..93bc52d4a472 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
> @@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ union ftrace_op_code_union {
>  	} __attribute__((packed));
>  };
>  
> -#define RET_SIZE		(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
> +#define RET_SIZE	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
>  
>  static unsigned long
>  create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
> index 517821b48391..36d6809c6c9e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
> @@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static int can_optimize(unsigned long paddr)
>  		 * However, the kernel built with retpolines or IBT has jump
>  		 * tables disabled so the check can be skipped altogether.
>  		 */
> -		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) &&
> +		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) &&
>  		    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT) &&
>  		    insn_is_indirect_jump(&insn))
>  			return 0;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> index 54a5596adaa6..985984919d81 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ SECTIONS
>  		LOCK_TEXT
>  		KPROBES_TEXT
>  		SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  		*(.text..__x86.indirect_thunk)
>  		*(.text..__x86.return_thunk)
>  #endif
> @@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ SECTIONS
>  		__parainstructions_end = .;
>  	}
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  	/*
>  	 * List of instructions that call/jmp/jcc to retpoline thunks
>  	 * __x86_indirect_thunk_*(). These instructions can be patched along
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> index c57e181bba21..2485dbd4cf50 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ static unsigned long get_guest_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  static inline unsigned long kvm_mmu_get_guest_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  						  struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
>  {
> -	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && mmu->get_guest_pgd == get_guest_cr3)
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && mmu->get_guest_pgd == get_guest_cr3)
>  		return kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
>  
>  	return mmu->get_guest_pgd(vcpu);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
> index decc1f153669..bf73a121c5ef 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
> @@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
>  	if (!prefetch)
>  		vcpu->stat.pf_taken++;
>  
> -	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && fault.is_tdp)
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && fault.is_tdp)
>  		r = kvm_tdp_page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
>  	else
>  		r = vcpu->arch.mmu->page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 712146312358..dc362ec24ba1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -3452,7 +3452,7 @@ int svm_invoke_exit_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 exit_code)
>  	if (!svm_check_exit_valid(exit_code))
>  		return svm_handle_invalid_exit(vcpu, exit_code);
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  	if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_MSR)
>  		return msr_interception(vcpu);
>  	else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_VINTR)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
> index ef2ebabb059c..b9e08837ab96 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
> @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
>  7:	vmload %_ASM_AX
>  8:
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  	/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
>  	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
>  #endif
> @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run)
>  	/* Pop @svm to RDI, guest registers have been saved already. */
>  	pop %_ASM_DI
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  	/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
>  	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
>  #endif
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index be20a60047b1..fbe516148ab6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -6544,7 +6544,7 @@ static int __vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
>  
>  	if (exit_reason.basic >= kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers)
>  		goto unexpected_vmexit;
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  	if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
>  		return kvm_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
>  	else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
> index ea3a28e7b613..72cc9c90e9f3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
> @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_COPY_MC) += copy_mc.o copy_mc_64.o
>  lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o insn-eval.o
>  lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o
>  lib-$(CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION)	+= error-inject.o
> -lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o
> +lib-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o
>  
>  obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o
>  obj-y += iomem.o
> diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> index 8c10d9abc239..ef732f323926 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> @@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, u8 *ip)
>  			emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_indirect_thunk_array[reg], ip);
>  	} else {
>  		EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg);	/* jmp *%\reg */
> -		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
> +		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
>  			EMIT1(0xCC);		/* int3 */
>  	}
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
> index 429a89c5468b..efca6bd818a3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
> @@ -1273,7 +1273,7 @@ static int emit_jmp_edx(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip)
>  	u8 *prog = *pprog;
>  	int cnt = 0;
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  	EMIT1_off32(0xE9, (u8 *)__x86_indirect_thunk_edx - (ip + 5));
>  #else
>  	EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE2);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
> index 08aa0f25f12a..bc31863c5ee6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
> @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
>  PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE		+= -fstack-protector-strong
>  endif
>  
> -ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE		+= $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS)
>  endif
>  
> diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
> index 2ceba3fe4ec1..d24f29091f4b 100644
> --- a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
> +++ b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
> @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
>  	(typeof(ptr)) (__ptr + (off));					\
>  })
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  #define __noretpoline __attribute__((__indirect_branch__("keep")))
>  #endif
>  
> diff --git a/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h b/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h
> index c1c76a70a6ce..fe050dab55a3 100644
> --- a/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h
> +++ b/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h
> @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
>  #ifndef _LINUX_INDIRECT_CALL_WRAPPER_H
>  #define _LINUX_INDIRECT_CALL_WRAPPER_H
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  
>  /*
>   * INDIRECT_CALL_$NR - wrapper for indirect calls with $NR known builtin
> diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
> index a98e188cf37b..d45e17fa7f98 100644
> --- a/include/linux/module.h
> +++ b/include/linux/module.h
> @@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ static inline void module_bug_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
>  static inline void module_bug_cleanup(struct module *mod) {}
>  #endif	/* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  extern bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline);
>  #else
>  static inline bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
> diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h
> index 780a5f6ad4a6..ff27cb2e1662 100644
> --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h
> +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h
> @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ extern const struct nft_set_type nft_set_bitmap_type;
>  extern const struct nft_set_type nft_set_pipapo_type;
>  extern const struct nft_set_type nft_set_pipapo_avx2_type;
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  bool nft_rhash_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set,
>  		      const u32 *key, const struct nft_set_ext **ext);
>  bool nft_rbtree_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set,
> diff --git a/include/net/tc_wrapper.h b/include/net/tc_wrapper.h
> index a6d481b5bcbc..a13ba0326d5e 100644
> --- a/include/net/tc_wrapper.h
> +++ b/include/net/tc_wrapper.h
> @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
>  
>  #include <net/pkt_cls.h>
>  
> -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)
>  
>  #include <linux/cpufeature.h>
>  #include <linux/static_key.h>
> diff --git a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
> index 43cc47d7faaf..5c88afbfbdb9 100644
> --- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
> +++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
> @@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ static inline u64 rb_time_stamp(struct trace_buffer *buffer)
>  	u64 ts;
>  
>  	/* Skip retpolines :-( */
> -	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && likely(buffer->clock == trace_clock_local))
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && likely(buffer->clock == trace_clock_local))
>  		ts = trace_clock_local();
>  	else
>  		ts = buffer->clock();
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/Makefile b/net/netfilter/Makefile
> index d4958e7e7631..614815a3ed73 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/Makefile
> +++ b/net/netfilter/Makefile
> @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ endif
>  endif
>  
>  ifdef CONFIG_NFT_CT
> -ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  nf_tables-objs += nft_ct_fast.o
>  endif
>  endif
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c
> index 8b536d7ef6c2..63e9c8b9f144 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c
> @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
>  #include <net/netfilter/nf_log.h>
>  #include <net/netfilter/nft_meta.h>
>  
> -#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_X86)
> +#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_X86)
>  
>  static struct static_key_false nf_tables_skip_direct_calls;
>  
> @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static void expr_call_ops_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,
>  			       struct nft_regs *regs,
>  			       struct nft_pktinfo *pkt)
>  {
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  	unsigned long e;
>  
>  	if (nf_skip_indirect_calls())
> @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static void expr_call_ops_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,
>  	X(e, nft_objref_map_eval);
>  #undef  X
>  indirect_call:
> -#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
> +#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
>  	expr->ops->eval(expr, regs, pkt);
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c
> index 86bb9d7797d9..d3e66bcb2a91 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c
> @@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ static bool nft_ct_set_reduce(struct nft_regs_track *track,
>  	return false;
>  }
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  static const struct nft_expr_ops nft_ct_get_fast_ops = {
>  	.type		= &nft_ct_type,
>  	.size		= NFT_EXPR_SIZE(sizeof(struct nft_ct)),
> @@ -796,7 +796,7 @@ nft_ct_select_ops(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>  
>  	if (tb[NFTA_CT_DREG]) {
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  		u32 k = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_CT_KEY]));
>  
>  		switch (k) {
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c b/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c
> index 870e5b113d13..a0055f510e31 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c
> @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ struct nft_lookup {
>  	struct nft_set_binding		binding;
>  };
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  bool nft_set_do_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set,
>  		       const u32 *key, const struct nft_set_ext **ext)
>  {
> diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c
> index e9eaf637220e..d577c9e1cb42 100644
> --- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
> +++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
> @@ -2353,7 +2353,7 @@ static struct pernet_operations psched_net_ops = {
>  	.exit = psched_net_exit,
>  };
>  
> -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)
>  DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tc_skip_wrapper);
>  #endif
>  
> diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib
> index cc44c95c49cc..d6e157938b5f 100644
> --- a/scripts/Makefile.lib
> +++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib
> @@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_USE_OBJTOOL
>  objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_OBJTOOL_NOP_MCOUNT)		+= --mnop
>  endif
>  objtool-args-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC)			+= --orc
> -objtool-args-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)			+= --retpoline
> +objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)		+= --retpoline
>  objtool-args-$(CONFIG_RETHUNK)				+= --rethunk
>  objtool-args-$(CONFIG_SLS)				+= --sls
>  objtool-args-$(CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION)			+= --stackval
> diff --git a/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs b/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs
> index 3c6cbe2b278d..eaf524603796 100644
> --- a/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs
> +++ b/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs
> @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ fn main() {
>              "e-m:e-p270:32:32-p271:32:32-p272:64:64-i64:64-f80:128-n8:16:32:64-S128",
>          );
>          let mut features = "-3dnow,-3dnowa,-mmx,+soft-float".to_string();
> -        if cfg.has("RETPOLINE") {
> +        if cfg.has("MITIGATION_RETPOLINE") {
>              features += ",+retpoline-external-thunk";
>          }
>          ts.push("features", features);
> diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
> index 973b5e5ae2dd..3070aa79aebd 100644
> --- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
> +++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
> @@ -1841,7 +1841,7 @@ static void add_header(struct buffer *b, struct module *mod)
>  
>  	buf_printf(b,
>  		   "\n"
> -		   "#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE\n"
> +		   "#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE\n"
>  		   "MODULE_INFO(retpoline, \"Y\");\n"
>  		   "#endif\n");
>  
> diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> index aeb3fbbbce46..d05158d8fe5f 100644
> --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
>  # define DISABLE_PTI		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
>  #endif
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
>  # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE	0
>  #else
>  # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE	((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \
> -- 
> 2.34.1
> 

Re: [PATCH v6 10/13] x86/bugs: Rename RETHUNK to MITIGATION_RETHUNK

[Breno Leitao]

Hello Andrew,

On Tue, Nov 21, 2023 at 09:39:47PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 21/11/2023 4:07 pm, Breno Leitao wrote:
> > CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
> > related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
> > having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
> > namespace.
> >
> > The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
> > MITIGATION.
> >
> > Rename the Kconfig entry from RETHUNK to MITIGATION_RETHUNK.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
> 
> (I'm CC'd on only this single patch so I can't see what's going on, but)
> 
> Really?  Rethunk[sic] isn't a mitigation.  It's just a compiler
> transformation for return instructions upon which various mitigations
> depend.

The MITIGATION namespace is not only for mitigation, but, for "features"
that are available with the only purpose of mitigating speculative
hardware vulnerability. The original suggested namespace was "MITIGATE",
and then it would make no sense for RETHUNK, since, we are not
mitigating RETHUNK per se. Please check the discussion here:

 https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231011044252.42bplzjsam3qsasz@treble/

That said, the way the x86 Kconfig is organized today, CONFIG_RETHUNK is
very focused in solving a mitigations problem, thus, the MITIGATION_
namespace has been added to it.

For instance, CONFIG_RETHUNK is inside the SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS,
thus, it is only enabled if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is set.

  menuconfig SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS
  bool "Mitigations for speculative execution vulnerabilities"

	config RETHUNK
		bool "Enable return-thunks"
		depends on MITIGATION_RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
		help
		  Compile the kernel with the return-thunks compiler option to guard
		  against kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding return speculation.
		  Requires a compiler with -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
		  support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.

  endif

Thanks for the feedback.

Re: [PATCH v6 00/13] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation

[Josh Poimboeuf]

On Tue, Nov 21, 2023 at 08:07:27AM -0800, Breno Leitao wrote:
> Currently, the CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is halfway populated,
> where some mitigations have entries in Kconfig, and they could be
> modified, while others mitigations do not have Kconfig entries, and
> could not be controlled at build time.

All looks good to me, thanks!

Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>

-- 
Josh

Re: [PATCH v6 00/13] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation

[Ingo Molnar]

* Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> wrote:

> Currently, the CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is halfway populated,
> where some mitigations have entries in Kconfig, and they could be
> modified, while others mitigations do not have Kconfig entries, and
> could not be controlled at build time.
> 
> The fact of having a fine grained control can help in a few ways:
> 
> 1) Users can choose and pick only mitigations that are important for
> their workloads.
> 
> 2) Users and developers can choose to disable mitigations that mangle
> the assembly code generation, making it hard to read.
> 
> 3) Separate configs for just source code readability,
> so that we see *which* butt-ugly piece of crap code is for what
> reason.
> 
> Important to say, if a mitigation is disabled at compilation time, it
> could be enabled at runtime using kernel command line arguments.
> 
> Discussion about this approach:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wjTHeQjsqtHcBGvy9TaJQ5uAm5HrCDuOD9v7qA9U1Xr4w@mail.gmail.com/
> and
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231011044252.42bplzjsam3qsasz@treble/
> 
> In order to get the missing mitigations, some clean up was done.
> 
> 1) Get a namespace for mitigations, prepending MITIGATION to the Kconfig
> entries.
> 
> 2) Adding the missing mitigations, so, the mitigations have entries in the
> Kconfig that could be easily configure by the user.
> 
> With this patchset applied, all configs have an individual entry under
> CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS, and all of them starts with CONFIG_MITIGATION.

Yeah, so:

 - I took this older series and updated it to current upstream, and made
   sure all renames were fully done: there were two new Kconfig option
   uses, which I integrated into the series. (Sorry about the delay, holiday & stuff.)

 - I also widened the renames to comments and messages, which were not
   always covered.

 - Then I took this cover letter and combined it with a more high level
   description of the reasoning behind this series I wrote up, and added it
   to patch #1. (see it below.)

 - Then I removed the changelog repetition from the other patches and just
   referred them back to patch #1.

 - Then I stuck the resulting updated series into tip:x86/bugs, without the 
   last 3 patches that modify behavior.

 - You might notice the somewhat weird extra whitespaces in the titles - 
   I've done that so that it all looks tidy in the shortlog:

   Breno Leitao (10):
      x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION => CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
      x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY       => CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
      x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING  => CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
      x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION => CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
      x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_RETPOLINE            => CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
      x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_SLS                  => CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
      x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY      => CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
      x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY       => CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
      x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_SRSO             => CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
      x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_RETHUNK              => CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK

I think the resulting tree is all mostly good, but still I'd like to see 
just the 10 pure low-risk renames done in this first step, to not carry too 
much of this around unnecessarily - maybe even send it Linuswards in this 
cycle if it's problem-free - without any real regression risk to upstream.

Thanks,

	Ingo

=============================>
commit be83e809ca67bca98fde97ad6b9344237963220b
Author: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Date:   Tue Nov 21 08:07:28 2023 -0800

    x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION => CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
    
    So the CPU mitigations Kconfig entries - there's 10 meanwhile - are named
    in a historically idiosyncratic and hence rather inconsistent fashion
    and have become hard to relate with each other over the years:
    
       https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231011044252.42bplzjsam3qsasz@treble/
    
    When they were introduced we never expected that we'd eventually have
    about a dozen of them, and that more organization would be useful,
    especially for Linux distributions that want to enable them in an
    informed fashion, and want to make sure all mitigations are configured
    as expected.
    
    For example, the current CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS namespace is only
    halfway populated, where some mitigations have entries in Kconfig, and
    they could be modified, while others mitigations do not have Kconfig entries,
    and can not be controlled at build time.
    
    Fine-grained control over these Kconfig entries can help in a number of ways:
    
      1) Users can choose and pick only mitigations that are important for
         their workloads.
    
      2) Users and developers can choose to disable mitigations that mangle
         the assembly code generation, making it hard to read.
    
      3) Separate Kconfigs for just source code readability,
         so that we see *which* butt-ugly piece of crap code is for what
         reason...
    
    In most cases, if a mitigation is disabled at compilation time, it
    can still be enabled at runtime using kernel command line arguments.
    
    This is the first patch of an initial series that renames various
    mitigation related Kconfig options, unifying them under a single
    CONFIG_MITIGATION_* namespace:
    
        CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION => CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
        CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY       => CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
        CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING  => CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
        CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION => CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
        CONFIG_RETPOLINE            => CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
        CONFIG_SLS                  => CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
        CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY      => CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
        CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY       => CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
        CONFIG_CPU_SRSO             => CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
        CONFIG_RETHUNK              => CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
    
    Implement step 1/10 of the namespace unification of CPU mitigations related
    Kconfig options and rename CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION to
    CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE.
    
    [ mingo: Rewrote changelog for clarity. ]
    
    Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
    Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
    Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
    Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
    Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121160740.1249350-2-leitao@debian.org

[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_RETHUNK => CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK

[tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao]

The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     0911b8c52c4d68c57d02f172daa55a42bce703f0
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/0911b8c52c4d68c57d02f172daa55a42bce703f0
Author:        Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
AuthorDate:    Tue, 21 Nov 2023 08:07:37 -08:00
Committer:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitterDate: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 10:52:29 +01:00

x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_RETHUNK              => CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK

Step 10/10 of the namespace unification of CPU mitigations related Kconfig options.

[ mingo: Added one more case. ]

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121160740.1249350-11-leitao@debian.org
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                               | 8 ++++----
 arch/x86/Makefile                              | 2 +-
 arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig                | 2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h       | 2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h                 | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h           | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h             | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c                  | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c                  | 2 +-
 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S                       | 4 ++--
 scripts/Makefile.lib                           | 2 +-
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 2 +-
 tools/objtool/check.c                          | 2 +-
 13 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index a2743b7..0a9fea3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2462,7 +2462,7 @@ config FINEIBT
 
 config HAVE_CALL_THUNKS
 	def_bool y
-	depends on CC_HAS_ENTRY_PADDING && RETHUNK && OBJTOOL
+	depends on CC_HAS_ENTRY_PADDING && MITIGATION_RETHUNK && OBJTOOL
 
 config CALL_THUNKS
 	def_bool n
@@ -2505,7 +2505,7 @@ config MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	  branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern
 	  support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
 
-config RETHUNK
+config MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 	bool "Enable return-thunks"
 	depends on MITIGATION_RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
 	select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
@@ -2518,7 +2518,7 @@ config RETHUNK
 
 config MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
 	bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry"
-	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK && X86_64
+	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && MITIGATION_RETHUNK && X86_64
 	default y
 	help
 	  Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation.
@@ -2572,7 +2572,7 @@ config MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
 
 config MITIGATION_SRSO
 	bool "Mitigate speculative RAS overflow on AMD"
-	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 && RETHUNK
+	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 && MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 	default y
 	help
 	  Enable the SRSO mitigation needed on AMD Zen1-4 machines.
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index 5ce8c30..ba046af 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS	:= -mretpoline
 endif
 RETPOLINE_CFLAGS	+= $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch-cs-prefix)
 
-ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 RETHUNK_CFLAGS		:= -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
 RETPOLINE_CFLAGS	+= $(RETHUNK_CFLAGS)
 endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig b/arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig
index 73abbbd..9180113 100644
--- a/arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ CONFIG_EFI_STUB=y
 CONFIG_HZ_1000=y
 CONFIG_KEXEC=y
 CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP=y
-# CONFIG_RETHUNK is not set
+# CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK is not set
 CONFIG_HIBERNATION=y
 CONFIG_PM_DEBUG=y
 CONFIG_PM_TRACE_RTC=y
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 151f0d5..36d0c1e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
 				 (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 # define DISABLE_RETHUNK	0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_RETHUNK	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
index 09e2d02..dc31b13 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
 
 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
 #define RET	jmp __x86_return_thunk
 #else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
 #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
 
 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
 #define ASM_RET	"jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t"
 #else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
 #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 94c7083..2c0679e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@
  * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
  */
 .macro __UNTRAIN_RET ibpb_feature, call_depth_insns
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)
 	VALIDATE_UNRET_END
 	ALTERNATIVE_3 "",						\
 		      CALL_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET,		\
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[];
 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_call_thunk_array[];
 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array[];
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
 #else
 static inline void __x86_return_thunk(void) {}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h
index 343b722..125c407 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
 #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, func)			\
 	__ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, ".byte 0xe9; .long " #func " - (. + 4)")
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP(name)			\
 	__ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, "jmp __x86_return_thunk")
 #else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index f5442d0..df91abe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -769,7 +769,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end)
 	}
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 
 /*
  * Rewrite the compiler generated return thunk tail-calls.
@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end)
 }
 #else
 void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK */
 
 #else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE || !CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
index 77a9316..4eefaac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ void arch_static_call_transform(void *site, void *tramp, void *func, bool tail)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_static_call_transform);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 /*
  * This is called by apply_returns() to fix up static call trampolines,
  * specifically ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP which is recorded as
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index 67b52cb..0045153 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array)
 #undef GEN
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 
 /*
  * Be careful here: that label cannot really be removed because in
@@ -386,4 +386,4 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__x86_return_thunk)
 SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk)
 
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK */
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib
index b272ca6..c3f4cac 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.lib
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_OBJTOOL_NOP_MCOUNT)		+= --mnop
 endif
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC)			+= --orc
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)		+= --retpoline
-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_RETHUNK)				+= --rethunk
+objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK)		+= --rethunk
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS)			+= --sls
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION)			+= --stackval
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE)		+= --static-call
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 151f0d5..36d0c1e 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
 				 (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
 # define DISABLE_RETHUNK	0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_RETHUNK	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))
diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
index 84067f0..8440b7b 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -3980,7 +3980,7 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct objtool_file *file)
 
 		if (insn->type == INSN_RETURN) {
 			if (opts.rethunk) {
-				WARN_INSN(insn, "'naked' return found in RETHUNK build");
+				WARN_INSN(insn, "'naked' return found in MITIGATION_RETHUNK build");
 			} else
 				continue;
 		} else {

[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_SRSO => CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO

[tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao]

The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     a033eec9a06ce25388e71fa1e888792a718b9c17
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/a033eec9a06ce25388e71fa1e888792a718b9c17
Author:        Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
AuthorDate:    Tue, 21 Nov 2023 08:07:36 -08:00
Committer:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitterDate: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 10:52:29 +01:00

x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_SRSO             => CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO

Step 9/10 of the namespace unification of CPU mitigations related Kconfig options.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121160740.1249350-10-leitao@debian.org
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                     |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |  8 ++++----
 arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S        |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S             | 10 +++++-----
 include/linux/objtool.h              |  2 +-
 scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o           |  2 +-
 7 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 60d38df..a2743b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2570,7 +2570,7 @@ config MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
 	  This mitigates both spectre_v2 and retbleed at great cost to
 	  performance.
 
-config CPU_SRSO
+config MITIGATION_SRSO
 	bool "Mitigate speculative RAS overflow on AMD"
 	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 && RETHUNK
 	default y
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 9747869..94c7083 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@
  */
 .macro VALIDATE_UNRET_END
 #if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && \
-	(defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
+	(defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO))
 	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
 	nop
 #endif
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@
 .Lskip_rsb_\@:
 .endm
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)
 #define CALL_UNTRAIN_RET	"call entry_untrain_ret"
 #else
 #define CALL_UNTRAIN_RET	""
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ extern void retbleed_return_thunk(void);
 static inline void retbleed_return_thunk(void) {}
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
 extern void srso_return_thunk(void);
 extern void srso_alias_return_thunk(void);
 #else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index e11bacb..f277541 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2458,7 +2458,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 		break;
 
 	case SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET:
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) {
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
 			/*
 			 * Enable the return thunk for generated code
 			 * like ftrace, static_call, etc.
@@ -2478,7 +2478,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 			else
 				srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED;
 		} else {
-			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
+			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
 		}
 		break;
 
@@ -2494,13 +2494,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 		break;
 
 	case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) {
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
 			if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
 				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
 				srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
 			}
 		} else {
-			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
+			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
                 }
 		break;
 	}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 9c5cca5..6716fcc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ SECTIONS
 		*(.text..__x86.rethunk_untrain)
 		ENTRY_TEXT
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
 		/*
 		 * See the comment above srso_alias_untrain_ret()'s
 		 * definition.
@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_backing_store);
 . = ASSERT((retbleed_return_thunk & 0x3f) == 0, "retbleed_return_thunk not cacheline-aligned");
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
 . = ASSERT((srso_safe_ret & 0x3f) == 0, "srso_safe_ret not cacheline-aligned");
 /*
  * GNU ld cannot do XOR until 2.41.
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index 0ad67cc..67b52cb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array)
  */
 	.section .text..__x86.return_thunk
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
 
 /*
  * srso_alias_untrain_ret() and srso_alias_safe_ret() are placed at
@@ -225,10 +225,10 @@ SYM_CODE_END(srso_return_thunk)
 
 #define JMP_SRSO_UNTRAIN_RET "jmp srso_untrain_ret"
 #define JMP_SRSO_ALIAS_UNTRAIN_RET "jmp srso_alias_untrain_ret"
-#else /* !CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
+#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO */
 #define JMP_SRSO_UNTRAIN_RET "ud2"
 #define JMP_SRSO_ALIAS_UNTRAIN_RET "ud2"
-#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
 
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(retbleed_untrain_ret)
 #define JMP_RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_RET "ud2"
 #endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY */
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)
 
 SYM_FUNC_START(entry_untrain_ret)
 	ALTERNATIVE_2 JMP_RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_RET,				\
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(entry_untrain_ret)
 SYM_FUNC_END(entry_untrain_ret)
 __EXPORT_THUNK(entry_untrain_ret)
 
-#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY || CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY || CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 
diff --git a/include/linux/objtool.h b/include/linux/objtool.h
index d030671..b3b8d3d 100644
--- a/include/linux/objtool.h
+++ b/include/linux/objtool.h
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
  */
 .macro VALIDATE_UNRET_BEGIN
 #if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && \
-	(defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
+	(defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO))
 .Lhere_\@:
 	.pushsection .discard.validate_unret
 	.long	.Lhere_\@ - .
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o
index 6277dbd..6de2979 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ objtool-enabled := $(or $(delay-objtool),$(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION))
 vmlinux-objtool-args-$(delay-objtool)			+= $(objtool-args-y)
 vmlinux-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL)		+= --no-unreachable
 vmlinux-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION)	+= --noinstr \
-							   $(if $(or $(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY),$(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)), --unret)
+							   $(if $(or $(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY),$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)), --unret)
 
 objtool-args = $(vmlinux-objtool-args-y) --link
 

[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY => CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY

[tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao]

The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     1da8d2172ce5175118929363fe568e41f24ad3d6
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/1da8d2172ce5175118929363fe568e41f24ad3d6
Author:        Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
AuthorDate:    Tue, 21 Nov 2023 08:07:35 -08:00
Committer:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitterDate: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 10:52:29 +01:00

x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY       => CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY

Step 8/10 of the namespace unification of CPU mitigations related Kconfig options.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121160740.1249350-9-leitao@debian.org
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig           | 2 +-
 arch/x86/entry/calling.h   | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++--
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 77b8769..60d38df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2561,7 +2561,7 @@ config MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
 	help
 	  Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation.
 
-config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
+config MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
 	bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
 	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
 	default y
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
index 7ac2d6f..39e069b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
  * Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set.
  */
 .macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
 	movl	$MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
 
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
  * regs. Must be called after the last RET.
  */
 .macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
 	movl	$MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 2580368..e11bacb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1439,7 +1439,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 	}
 
-	if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY)) {
+	if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY)) {
 		pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
 		       mitigation_options[i].option);
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
@@ -1565,7 +1565,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 			break;
 		}
 
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY) &&
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY) &&
 		    boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
 		    retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF &&
 		    retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_STUFF &&

[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY => CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY

[tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao]

The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     ac61d43983a4fe8e3ee600eee44c40868c14340a
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/ac61d43983a4fe8e3ee600eee44c40868c14340a
Author:        Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
AuthorDate:    Tue, 21 Nov 2023 08:07:34 -08:00
Committer:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitterDate: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 10:52:28 +01:00

x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY      => CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY

Step 7/10 of the namespace unification of CPU mitigations related Kconfig options.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121160740.1249350-8-leitao@debian.org
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                               |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h       |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h           |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c                      |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                     |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S                  |  2 +-
 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S                       | 10 +++++-----
 include/linux/objtool.h                        |  2 +-
 scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o                     |  2 +-
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |  2 +-
 10 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index ba45465..77b8769 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2516,7 +2516,7 @@ config RETHUNK
 	  Requires a compiler with -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
 	  support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
 
-config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+config MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
 	bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry"
 	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK && X86_64
 	default y
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 24e4010..151f0d5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
 # define DISABLE_RETHUNK	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
 # define DISABLE_UNRET		0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_UNRET		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 32680cb..9747869 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@
  */
 .macro VALIDATE_UNRET_END
 #if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && \
-	(defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
+	(defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
 	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
 	nop
 #endif
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@
 .Lskip_rsb_\@:
 .endm
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
 #define CALL_UNTRAIN_RET	"call entry_untrain_ret"
 #else
 #define CALL_UNTRAIN_RET	""
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
 static inline void __x86_return_thunk(void) {}
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
 extern void retbleed_return_thunk(void);
 #else
 static inline void retbleed_return_thunk(void) {}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 9f42d1c..6c7db2e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ static void fix_erratum_1386(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
 	u64 value;
 
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index fc46fd6..2580368 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -982,10 +982,10 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
 		return;
 
 	case RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET:
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY)) {
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY)) {
 			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
 		} else {
-			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_UNRET_ENTRY.\n");
+			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY.\n");
 			goto do_cmd_auto;
 		}
 		break;
@@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@ do_cmd_auto:
 	case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
 		if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
 		    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
-			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY))
+			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY))
 				retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
 			else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY) &&
 				 boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index bb2ec03..9c5cca5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_backing_store);
            "fixed_percpu_data is not at start of per-cpu area");
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
 . = ASSERT((retbleed_return_thunk & 0x3f) == 0, "retbleed_return_thunk not cacheline-aligned");
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index ff46f48..0ad67cc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(srso_return_thunk)
 #define JMP_SRSO_ALIAS_UNTRAIN_RET "ud2"
 #endif /* CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
 
 /*
  * Some generic notes on the untraining sequences:
@@ -312,11 +312,11 @@ SYM_CODE_END(retbleed_return_thunk)
 SYM_FUNC_END(retbleed_untrain_ret)
 
 #define JMP_RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_RET "jmp retbleed_untrain_ret"
-#else /* !CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY */
+#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY */
 #define JMP_RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_RET "ud2"
-#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY */
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
 
 SYM_FUNC_START(entry_untrain_ret)
 	ALTERNATIVE_2 JMP_RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_RET,				\
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(entry_untrain_ret)
 SYM_FUNC_END(entry_untrain_ret)
 __EXPORT_THUNK(entry_untrain_ret)
 
-#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY || CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY || CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 
diff --git a/include/linux/objtool.h b/include/linux/objtool.h
index 33212e9..d030671 100644
--- a/include/linux/objtool.h
+++ b/include/linux/objtool.h
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
  */
 .macro VALIDATE_UNRET_BEGIN
 #if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && \
-	(defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
+	(defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
 .Lhere_\@:
 	.pushsection .discard.validate_unret
 	.long	.Lhere_\@ - .
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o
index 25b3b58..6277dbd 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ objtool-enabled := $(or $(delay-objtool),$(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION))
 vmlinux-objtool-args-$(delay-objtool)			+= $(objtool-args-y)
 vmlinux-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL)		+= --no-unreachable
 vmlinux-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION)	+= --noinstr \
-							   $(if $(or $(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY),$(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)), --unret)
+							   $(if $(or $(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY),$(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)), --unret)
 
 objtool-args = $(vmlinux-objtool-args-y) --link
 
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 24e4010..151f0d5 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
 # define DISABLE_RETHUNK	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
 # define DISABLE_UNRET		0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_UNRET		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))

[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_SLS => CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS

[tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao]

The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     7b75782ffd8243288d0661750b2dcc2596d676cb
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/7b75782ffd8243288d0661750b2dcc2596d676cb
Author:        Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
AuthorDate:    Tue, 21 Nov 2023 08:07:33 -08:00
Committer:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitterDate: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 10:52:28 +01:00

x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_SLS                  => CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS

Step 6/10 of the namespace unification of CPU mitigations related Kconfig options.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121160740.1249350-7-leitao@debian.org
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig               | 2 +-
 arch/x86/Makefile              | 2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c  | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c       | 3 ++-
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c    | 4 ++--
 scripts/Makefile.lib           | 2 +-
 7 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 2a3ebd6..ba45465 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2577,7 +2577,7 @@ config CPU_SRSO
 	help
 	  Enable the SRSO mitigation needed on AMD Zen1-4 machines.
 
-config SLS
+config MITIGATION_SLS
 	bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation"
 	depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64
 	select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index b8d23ed..5ce8c30 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
   endif
 endif
 
-ifdef CONFIG_SLS
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
   KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mharden-sls=all
 endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
index c516520..09e2d02 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
 #if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
 #define RET	jmp __x86_return_thunk
 #else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
-#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
 #define RET	ret; int3
 #else
 #define RET	ret
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
 #if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
 #define ASM_RET	"jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t"
 #else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
-#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
 #define ASM_RET	"ret; int3\n\t"
 #else
 #define ASM_RET	"ret\n\t"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 08c182f..f5442d0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -708,8 +708,8 @@ static int patch_retpoline(void *addr, struct insn *insn, u8 *bytes)
 	/*
 	 * The compiler is supposed to EMIT an INT3 after every unconditional
 	 * JMP instruction due to AMD BTC. However, if the compiler is too old
-	 * or SLS isn't enabled, we still need an INT3 after indirect JMPs
-	 * even on Intel.
+	 * or MITIGATION_SLS isn't enabled, we still need an INT3 after
+	 * indirect JMPs even on Intel.
 	 */
 	if (op == JMP32_INSN_OPCODE && i < insn->length)
 		bytes[i++] = INT3_INSN_OPCODE;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
index 93bc52d..70139d9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -307,7 +307,8 @@ union ftrace_op_code_union {
 	} __attribute__((packed));
 };
 
-#define RET_SIZE	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+#define RET_SIZE \
+	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS))
 
 static unsigned long
 create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size)
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index ad1396b..63b7aa4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, u8 *ip)
 			emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_indirect_thunk_array[reg], ip);
 	} else {
 		EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg);	/* jmp *%\reg */
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS))
 			EMIT1(0xCC);		/* int3 */
 	}
 
@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ static void emit_return(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip)
 		emit_jump(&prog, x86_return_thunk, ip);
 	} else {
 		EMIT1(0xC3);		/* ret */
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS))
 			EMIT1(0xCC);	/* int3 */
 	}
 
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib
index 615f261..b272ca6 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.lib
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ endif
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC)			+= --orc
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)		+= --retpoline
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_RETHUNK)				+= --rethunk
-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_SLS)				+= --sls
+objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS)			+= --sls
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION)			+= --stackval
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE)		+= --static-call
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_UACCESS_VALIDATION)		+= --uaccess

[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_RETPOLINE => CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE

[tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao]

The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     aefb2f2e619b6c334bcb31de830aa00ba0b11129
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/aefb2f2e619b6c334bcb31de830aa00ba0b11129
Author:        Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
AuthorDate:    Tue, 21 Nov 2023 08:07:32 -08:00
Committer:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitterDate: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 10:52:28 +01:00

x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_RETPOLINE            => CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE

Step 5/10 of the namespace unification of CPU mitigations related Kconfig options.

[ mingo: Converted a few more uses in comments/messages as well. ]

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ariel Miculas <amiculas@cisco.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121160740.1249350-6-leitao@debian.org
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst   | 8 ++++----
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/Kconfig                                | 6 +++---
 arch/x86/Makefile                               | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile                    | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h        | 2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h                  | 8 ++++----
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h            | 8 ++++----
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c                   | 6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c                        | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c                   | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S                   | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c                          | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h                 | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c                          | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S                      | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                          | 2 +-
 arch/x86/lib/Makefile                           | 2 +-
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c                     | 2 +-
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c                   | 2 +-
 arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile                     | 2 +-
 include/linux/compiler-gcc.h                    | 2 +-
 include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h           | 2 +-
 include/linux/module.h                          | 2 +-
 include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h          | 2 +-
 include/net/tc_wrapper.h                        | 2 +-
 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c                      | 2 +-
 net/netfilter/Makefile                          | 2 +-
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c                  | 6 +++---
 net/netfilter/nft_ct.c                          | 4 ++--
 net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c                      | 2 +-
 net/sched/sch_api.c                             | 2 +-
 scripts/Makefile.lib                            | 2 +-
 scripts/generate_rust_target.rs                 | 2 +-
 scripts/mod/modpost.c                           | 2 +-
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h  | 2 +-
 tools/objtool/arch/x86/special.c                | 2 +-
 tools/objtool/check.c                           | 2 +-
 39 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index 32a8893..cce768a 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -473,8 +473,8 @@ Spectre variant 2
    -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register options.
    If the kernel is compiled with a Clang compiler, the compiler needs
    to support -mretpoline-external-thunk option.  The kernel config
-   CONFIG_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs to run with
-   the latest updated microcode.
+   CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs
+   to run with the latest updated microcode.
 
    On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all,
    cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details.
@@ -609,8 +609,8 @@ kernel command line.
 		Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
 		mitigation method at run time according to the
 		CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
-		CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
-		compiler with which the kernel was built.
+		CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE configuration option,
+		and the compiler with which the kernel was built.
 
 		Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
 		against user space to user space task attacks.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index e0891ac..d93f403 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -6007,8 +6007,8 @@
 			Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
 			mitigation method at run time according to the
 			CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
-			CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
-			compiler with which the kernel was built.
+			CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE configuration option,
+			and the compiler with which the kernel was built.
 
 			Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
 			against user space to user space task attacks.
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index a1c0470..2a3ebd6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2457,7 +2457,7 @@ config CALL_PADDING
 
 config FINEIBT
 	def_bool y
-	depends on X86_KERNEL_IBT && CFI_CLANG && RETPOLINE
+	depends on X86_KERNEL_IBT && CFI_CLANG && MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	select CALL_PADDING
 
 config HAVE_CALL_THUNKS
@@ -2495,7 +2495,7 @@ config MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 
 	  See Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst for more details.
 
-config RETPOLINE
+config MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel"
 	select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
 	default y
@@ -2507,7 +2507,7 @@ config RETPOLINE
 
 config RETHUNK
 	bool "Enable return-thunks"
-	depends on RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
+	depends on MITIGATION_RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
 	select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
 	default y if X86_64
 	help
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index 1a068de..b8d23ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-sign-compare
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables
 
 # Avoid indirect branches in kernel to deal with Spectre
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
   KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS)
   # Additionally, avoid generating expensive indirect jumps which
   # are subject to retpolines for small number of switch cases.
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ vdso-install-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION)	+= arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32.so.dbg
 
 archprepare: checkbin
 checkbin:
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 ifeq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),)
 	@echo "You are building kernel with non-retpoline compiler." >&2
 	@echo "Please update your compiler." >&2
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
index b1b8dd1..c4df99a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ CFL := $(PROFILING) -mcmodel=small -fPIC -O2 -fasynchronous-unwind-tables -m64 \
        -fno-omit-frame-pointer -foptimize-sibling-calls \
        -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING -DBUILD_VDSO
 
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS),)
   CFL += $(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS)
 endif
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += $(call cc-option, -foptimize-sibling-calls)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += -fno-omit-frame-pointer
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
 
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS),)
   KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += $(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS)
 endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index fb604ec..24e4010 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
 # define DISABLE_PTI		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE	0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE	((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
index 571fe4d..c516520 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
@@ -42,25 +42,25 @@
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
 #define RET	jmp __x86_return_thunk
-#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
 #ifdef CONFIG_SLS
 #define RET	ret; int3
 #else
 #define RET	ret
 #endif
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
 
 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
 #define ASM_RET	"jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t"
-#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
 #ifdef CONFIG_SLS
 #define ASM_RET	"ret; int3\n\t"
 #else
 #define ASM_RET	"ret\n\t"
 #endif
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 5981023..32680cb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@
  * instruction irrespective of kCFI.
  */
 .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	__CS_PREFIX \reg
 	jmp	__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
 #else
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@
 .endm
 
 .macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	__CS_PREFIX \reg
 	call	__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
 #else
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static inline void call_depth_return_thunk(void) {}
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 
 #define GEN(reg) \
 	extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg;
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static inline void call_depth_return_thunk(void) {}
 
 /*
  * Inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC
- * which is ensured when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is defined.
+ * which is ensured when CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE is defined.
  */
 # define CALL_NOSPEC						\
 	ALTERNATIVE_2(						\
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 55e205b..08c182f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ static inline bool is_jcc32(struct insn *insn)
 	return insn->opcode.bytes[0] == 0x0f && (insn->opcode.bytes[1] & 0xf0) == 0x80;
 }
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_OBJTOOL)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_OBJTOOL)
 
 /*
  * CALL/JMP *%\reg
@@ -844,12 +844,12 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end)
 void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
 #endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */
 
-#else /* !CONFIG_RETPOLINE || !CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
+#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE || !CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
 
 void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
 void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
 
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE && CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE && CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index b906ed4..fc46fd6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init =
 static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init =
 	SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
 
 bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
@@ -1416,7 +1416,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC ||
 	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
 	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
-	    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+	    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)) {
 		pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
 		       mitigation_options[i].option);
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
@@ -1470,7 +1470,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 
 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
 {
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)) {
 		pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
 		return SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
 	}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
index 12df54f..93bc52d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ union ftrace_op_code_union {
 	} __attribute__((packed));
 };
 
-#define RET_SIZE		(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+#define RET_SIZE	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
 
 static unsigned long
 create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
index 517821b..36d6809 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static int can_optimize(unsigned long paddr)
 		 * However, the kernel built with retpolines or IBT has jump
 		 * tables disabled so the check can be skipped altogether.
 		 */
-		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) &&
+		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) &&
 		    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT) &&
 		    insn_is_indirect_jump(&insn))
 			return 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index a349dbf..bb2ec03 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ SECTIONS
 		LOCK_TEXT
 		KPROBES_TEXT
 		SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 		*(.text..__x86.indirect_thunk)
 		*(.text..__x86.return_thunk)
 #endif
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ SECTIONS
 	}
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	/*
 	 * List of instructions that call/jmp/jcc to retpoline thunks
 	 * __x86_indirect_thunk_*(). These instructions can be patched along
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 0b1f991..6fdc1cf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ static unsigned long get_guest_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 static inline unsigned long kvm_mmu_get_guest_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 						  struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
 {
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && mmu->get_guest_pgd == get_guest_cr3)
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && mmu->get_guest_pgd == get_guest_cr3)
 		return kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
 
 	return mmu->get_guest_pgd(vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
index decc1f1..bf73a12 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
 	if (!prefetch)
 		vcpu->stat.pf_taken++;
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && fault.is_tdp)
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && fault.is_tdp)
 		r = kvm_tdp_page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
 	else
 		r = vcpu->arch.mmu->page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 7fb5142..b2751b9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -3455,7 +3455,7 @@ int svm_invoke_exit_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 exit_code)
 	if (!svm_check_exit_valid(exit_code))
 		return svm_handle_invalid_exit(vcpu, exit_code);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_MSR)
 		return msr_interception(vcpu);
 	else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_VINTR)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
index ef2ebab..b9e0883 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
 7:	vmload %_ASM_AX
 8:
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
 	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
 #endif
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run)
 	/* Pop @svm to RDI, guest registers have been saved already. */
 	pop %_ASM_DI
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
 	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index e0f86f1..4e1003b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6544,7 +6544,7 @@ static int __vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
 
 	if (exit_reason.basic >= kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers)
 		goto unexpected_vmexit;
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
 		return kvm_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
 	else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
index ea3a28e..72cc9c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_COPY_MC) += copy_mc.o copy_mc_64.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o insn-eval.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION)	+= error-inject.o
-lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o
+lib-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o
 
 obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o
 obj-y += iomem.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index 144a583..ad1396b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, u8 *ip)
 			emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_indirect_thunk_array[reg], ip);
 	} else {
 		EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg);	/* jmp *%\reg */
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
 			EMIT1(0xCC);		/* int3 */
 	}
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
index b18ce19..c10083a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
@@ -1273,7 +1273,7 @@ static int emit_jmp_edx(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip)
 	u8 *prog = *pprog;
 	int cnt = 0;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	EMIT1_off32(0xE9, (u8 *)__x86_indirect_thunk_edx - (ip + 5));
 #else
 	EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE2);
diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
index 08aa0f2..bc31863 100644
--- a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
 PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE		+= -fstack-protector-strong
 endif
 
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE		+= $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS)
 endif
 
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
index 2ceba3f..d24f290 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 	(typeof(ptr)) (__ptr + (off));					\
 })
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 #define __noretpoline __attribute__((__indirect_branch__("keep")))
 #endif
 
diff --git a/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h b/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h
index c1c76a7..fe050da 100644
--- a/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h
+++ b/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_INDIRECT_CALL_WRAPPER_H
 #define _LINUX_INDIRECT_CALL_WRAPPER_H
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 
 /*
  * INDIRECT_CALL_$NR - wrapper for indirect calls with $NR known builtin
diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
index 9cd0009..087b369 100644
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ static inline void module_bug_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
 static inline void module_bug_cleanup(struct module *mod) {}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 extern bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline);
 #else
 static inline bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h
index 780a5f6..ff27cb2 100644
--- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h
+++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ extern const struct nft_set_type nft_set_bitmap_type;
 extern const struct nft_set_type nft_set_pipapo_type;
 extern const struct nft_set_type nft_set_pipapo_avx2_type;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 bool nft_rhash_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set,
 		      const u32 *key, const struct nft_set_ext **ext);
 bool nft_rbtree_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set,
diff --git a/include/net/tc_wrapper.h b/include/net/tc_wrapper.h
index a6d481b..a13ba03 100644
--- a/include/net/tc_wrapper.h
+++ b/include/net/tc_wrapper.h
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 #include <net/pkt_cls.h>
 
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)
 
 #include <linux/cpufeature.h>
 #include <linux/static_key.h>
diff --git a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
index 9286f88..9cb6933 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
@@ -1156,7 +1156,7 @@ static inline u64 rb_time_stamp(struct trace_buffer *buffer)
 	u64 ts;
 
 	/* Skip retpolines :-( */
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && likely(buffer->clock == trace_clock_local))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && likely(buffer->clock == trace_clock_local))
 		ts = trace_clock_local();
 	else
 		ts = buffer->clock();
diff --git a/net/netfilter/Makefile b/net/netfilter/Makefile
index d4958e7..614815a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/Makefile
+++ b/net/netfilter/Makefile
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ endif
 endif
 
 ifdef CONFIG_NFT_CT
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 nf_tables-objs += nft_ct_fast.o
 endif
 endif
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c
index c3e6353..a48d5f0 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 #include <net/netfilter/nf_log.h>
 #include <net/netfilter/nft_meta.h>
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_X86)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_X86)
 
 static struct static_key_false nf_tables_skip_direct_calls;
 
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static void expr_call_ops_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,
 			       struct nft_regs *regs,
 			       struct nft_pktinfo *pkt)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	unsigned long e;
 
 	if (nf_skip_indirect_calls())
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static void expr_call_ops_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,
 	X(e, nft_objref_map_eval);
 #undef  X
 indirect_call:
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
 	expr->ops->eval(expr, regs, pkt);
 }
 
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c
index 86bb9d7..d3e66bc 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ static bool nft_ct_set_reduce(struct nft_regs_track *track,
 	return false;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 static const struct nft_expr_ops nft_ct_get_fast_ops = {
 	.type		= &nft_ct_type,
 	.size		= NFT_EXPR_SIZE(sizeof(struct nft_ct)),
@@ -796,7 +796,7 @@ nft_ct_select_ops(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	if (tb[NFTA_CT_DREG]) {
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 		u32 k = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_CT_KEY]));
 
 		switch (k) {
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c b/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c
index 870e5b1..a0055f5 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ struct nft_lookup {
 	struct nft_set_binding		binding;
 };
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 bool nft_set_do_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set,
 		       const u32 *key, const struct nft_set_ext **ext)
 {
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c
index e9eaf63..d577c9e 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
@@ -2353,7 +2353,7 @@ static struct pernet_operations psched_net_ops = {
 	.exit = psched_net_exit,
 };
 
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tc_skip_wrapper);
 #endif
 
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib
index ee233ef..615f261 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.lib
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_USE_OBJTOOL
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_OBJTOOL_NOP_MCOUNT)		+= --mnop
 endif
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC)			+= --orc
-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)			+= --retpoline
+objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)		+= --retpoline
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_RETHUNK)				+= --rethunk
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_SLS)				+= --sls
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION)			+= --stackval
diff --git a/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs b/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs
index 3c6cbe2..eaf5246 100644
--- a/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs
+++ b/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ fn main() {
             "e-m:e-p270:32:32-p271:32:32-p272:64:64-i64:64-f80:128-n8:16:32:64-S128",
         );
         let mut features = "-3dnow,-3dnowa,-mmx,+soft-float".to_string();
-        if cfg.has("RETPOLINE") {
+        if cfg.has("MITIGATION_RETPOLINE") {
             features += ",+retpoline-external-thunk";
         }
         ts.push("features", features);
diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
index cb6406f..72fead5 100644
--- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
@@ -1843,7 +1843,7 @@ static void add_header(struct buffer *b, struct module *mod)
 
 	buf_printf(b,
 		   "\n"
-		   "#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE\n"
+		   "#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE\n"
 		   "MODULE_INFO(retpoline, \"Y\");\n"
 		   "#endif\n");
 
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index fb604ec..24e4010 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
 # define DISABLE_PTI		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE	0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE	((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \
diff --git a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/special.c b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/special.c
index 29e9495..4134d27 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/special.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/special.c
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ bool arch_support_alt_relocation(struct special_alt *special_alt,
  *    TODO: Once we have DWARF CFI and smarter instruction decoding logic,
  *    ensure the same register is used in the mov and jump instructions.
  *
- *    NOTE: RETPOLINE made it harder still to decode dynamic jumps.
+ *    NOTE: MITIGATION_RETPOLINE made it harder still to decode dynamic jumps.
  */
 struct reloc *arch_find_switch_table(struct objtool_file *file,
 				    struct instruction *insn)
diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
index 548ec3c..84067f0 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -3984,7 +3984,7 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct objtool_file *file)
 			} else
 				continue;
 		} else {
-			WARN_INSN(insn, "indirect %s found in RETPOLINE build",
+			WARN_INSN(insn, "indirect %s found in MITIGATION_RETPOLINE build",
 				  insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC ? "jump" : "call");
 		}
 

[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION => CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION

[tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao]

The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     ea4654e0885348f0faa47f6d7b44a08d75ad16e9
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/ea4654e0885348f0faa47f6d7b44a08d75ad16e9
Author:        Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
AuthorDate:    Tue, 21 Nov 2023 08:07:31 -08:00
Committer:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitterDate: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 10:52:28 +01:00

x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION => CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION

Step 4/10 of the namespace unification of CPU mitigations related Kconfig options.

[ mingo: Converted new uses that got added since the series was posted. ]

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121160740.1249350-5-leitao@debian.org
---
 Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst                 |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                               |  2 +-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c        |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/entry/calling.h                       |  8 ++++----
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S                      |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h       |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h                 |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h          |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h                 | 18 ++++++++---------
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h              |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h         |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h                     |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c                    |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S                      |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S                      |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c                          |  8 ++++----
 arch/x86/mm/Makefile                           |  2 +-
 arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c                 |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c                  |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c                          |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c                              | 10 ++++-----
 include/linux/pti.h                            |  2 +-
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |  2 +-
 23 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst
index e08d351..57e8392 100644
--- a/Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst
+++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst
@@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ comments in pti.c).
 
 This approach helps to ensure that side-channel attacks leveraging
 the paging structures do not function when PTI is enabled.  It can be
-enabled by setting CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y at compile time.
-Once enabled at compile-time, it can be disabled at boot with the
-'nopti' or 'pti=' kernel parameters (see kernel-parameters.txt).
+enabled by setting CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y at compile
+time.  Once enabled at compile-time, it can be disabled at boot with
+the 'nopti' or 'pti=' kernel parameters (see kernel-parameters.txt).
 
 Page Table Management
 =====================
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index b4a703d..a1c0470 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2484,7 +2484,7 @@ menuconfig SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS
 
 if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS
 
-config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+config MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
 	default y
 	depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
index d040080..ff09ca6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
  * Copyright (C)      2016  Kees Cook
  */
 
-/* No PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION support needed either: */
-#undef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+/* No MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION support needed either: */
+#undef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 
 #include "error.h"
 #include "misc.h"
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
index 9f1d947..7ac2d6f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -142,10 +142,10 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
 	.endif
 .endm
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 
 /*
- * PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION PGDs are 8k.  Flip bit 12 to switch between the two
+ * MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION PGDs are 8k.  Flip bit 12 to switch between the two
  * halves:
  */
 #define PTI_USER_PGTABLE_BIT		PAGE_SHIFT
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
 
 .macro ADJUST_KERNEL_CR3 reg:req
 	ALTERNATIVE "", "SET_NOFLUSH_BIT \reg", X86_FEATURE_PCID
-	/* Clear PCID and "PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION bit", point CR3 at kernel pagetables: */
+	/* Clear PCID and "MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION bit", point CR3 at kernel pagetables: */
 	andq    $(~PTI_USER_PGTABLE_AND_PCID_MASK), \reg
 .endm
 
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
 .Lend_\@:
 .endm
 
-#else /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=n: */
+#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=n: */
 
 .macro SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req
 .endm
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index c40f89a..d08cb38 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
 	ALTERNATIVE "", "jmp xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	ALTERNATIVE "", "jmp .Lpti_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", X86_FEATURE_PTI
 #endif
 
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	jnz	.Lnative_iret
 	ud2
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 .Lpti_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode:
 	POP_REGS pop_rdi=0
 
@@ -1096,7 +1096,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(error_return)
  *
  * Registers:
  *	%r14: Used to save/restore the CR3 of the interrupted context
- *	      when PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is in use.  Do not clobber.
+ *	      when MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is in use.  Do not clobber.
  */
 SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi)
 	UNWIND_HINT_IRET_ENTRY
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index c1d3a57..fb604ec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
 # define DISABLE_LA57	(1<<(X86_FEATURE_LA57 & 31))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 # define DISABLE_PTI		0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_PTI		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h
index c7ec5bb..dcd836b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static inline void paravirt_release_p4d(unsigned long pfn) {}
  */
 extern gfp_t __userpte_alloc_gfp;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 /*
  * Instead of one PGD, we acquire two PGDs.  Being order-1, it is
  * both 8k in size and 8k-aligned.  That lets us just flip bit 12
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h
index 9e7c0b7..dabafba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static inline void native_set_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd)
 
 static inline void native_set_pud(pud_t *pudp, pud_t pud)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	pud.p4d.pgd = pti_set_user_pgtbl(&pudp->p4d.pgd, pud.p4d.pgd);
 #endif
 	pxx_xchg64(pud, pudp, native_pud_val(pud));
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 9d077bc..df0f7d4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -909,7 +909,7 @@ static inline int is_new_memtype_allowed(u64 paddr, unsigned long size,
 pmd_t *populate_extra_pmd(unsigned long vaddr);
 pte_t *populate_extra_pte(unsigned long vaddr);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 pgd_t __pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd);
 
 /*
@@ -923,12 +923,12 @@ static inline pgd_t pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
 		return pgd;
 	return __pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgdp, pgd);
 }
-#else   /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
+#else   /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
 static inline pgd_t pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
 {
 	return pgd;
 }
-#endif  /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
+#endif  /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
 
 #endif	/* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ static inline int p4d_bad(p4d_t p4d)
 {
 	unsigned long ignore_flags = _KERNPG_TABLE | _PAGE_USER;
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
 		ignore_flags |= _PAGE_NX;
 
 	return (p4d_flags(p4d) & ~ignore_flags) != 0;
@@ -1177,7 +1177,7 @@ static inline int pgd_bad(pgd_t pgd)
 	if (!pgtable_l5_enabled())
 		return 0;
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
 		ignore_flags |= _PAGE_NX;
 
 	return (pgd_flags(pgd) & ~ignore_flags) != _KERNPG_TABLE;
@@ -1422,9 +1422,9 @@ static inline bool pgdp_maps_userspace(void *__ptr)
 #define pgd_leaf	pgd_large
 static inline int pgd_large(pgd_t pgd) { return 0; }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 /*
- * All top-level PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION page tables are order-1 pages
+ * All top-level MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION page tables are order-1 pages
  * (8k-aligned and 8k in size).  The kernel one is at the beginning 4k and
  * the user one is in the last 4k.  To switch between them, you
  * just need to flip the 12th bit in their addresses.
@@ -1469,7 +1469,7 @@ static inline p4d_t *user_to_kernel_p4dp(p4d_t *p4dp)
 {
 	return ptr_clear_bit(p4dp, PTI_PGTABLE_SWITCH_BIT);
 }
-#endif /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
 
 /*
  * clone_pgd_range(pgd_t *dst, pgd_t *src, int count);
@@ -1484,7 +1484,7 @@ static inline p4d_t *user_to_kernel_p4dp(p4d_t *p4dp)
 static inline void clone_pgd_range(pgd_t *dst, pgd_t *src, int count)
 {
 	memcpy(dst, src, count * sizeof(pgd_t));
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
 		return;
 	/* Clone the user space pgd as well */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h
index 24af25b..7e9db77 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h
@@ -143,7 +143,8 @@ static inline void native_set_p4d(p4d_t *p4dp, p4d_t p4d)
 {
 	pgd_t pgd;
 
-	if (pgtable_l5_enabled() || !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION)) {
+	if (pgtable_l5_enabled() ||
+	    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION)) {
 		WRITE_ONCE(*p4dp, p4d);
 		return;
 	}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
index d8cccad..e5f204b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
 #define CR3_NOFLUSH	0
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 # define X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT	11
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h
index 07375b4..ab167c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 #define _ASM_X86_PTI_H
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 extern void pti_init(void);
 extern void pti_check_boottime_disable(void);
 extern void pti_finalize(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
index f18ca44..44a91ef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static void __die_header(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
 	       IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)     ? " SMP"             : "",
 	       debug_pagealloc_enabled()  ? " DEBUG_PAGEALLOC" : "",
 	       IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN)   ? " KASAN"           : "",
-	       IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) ?
+	       IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) ?
 	       (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) ? " PTI" : " NOPTI") : "");
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(__die_header);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
index 487ac57..b50f364 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ __REFDATA
 	.align 4
 SYM_DATA(initial_code,		.long i386_start_kernel)
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 #define	PGD_ALIGN	(2 * PAGE_SIZE)
 #define PTI_USER_PGD_FILL	1024
 #else
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ SYM_DATA_START(initial_page_table)
 # endif
 	.align PAGE_SIZE		/* needs to be page-sized too */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	/*
 	 * PTI needs another page so sync_initial_pagetable() works correctly
 	 * and does not scribble over the data which is placed behind the
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index d4918d0..cd54313 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(vc_no_ghcb)
 #define SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(name)			\
 	SYM_START(name, SYM_L_GLOBAL, .balign PAGE_SIZE)
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 /*
  * Each PGD needs to be 8k long and 8k aligned.  We do not
  * ever go out to userspace with these, so we do not
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
index 7a814b4..0f19ef3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ static struct ldt_struct *alloc_ldt_struct(unsigned int num_entries)
 	return new_ldt;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 
 static void do_sanity_check(struct mm_struct *mm,
 			    bool had_kernel_mapping,
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ static void unmap_ldt_struct(struct mm_struct *mm, struct ldt_struct *ldt)
 	flush_tlb_mm_range(mm, va, va + nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHIFT, false);
 }
 
-#else /* !CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
+#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
 
 static int
 map_ldt_struct(struct mm_struct *mm, struct ldt_struct *ldt, int slot)
@@ -388,11 +388,11 @@ map_ldt_struct(struct mm_struct *mm, struct ldt_struct *ldt, int slot)
 static void unmap_ldt_struct(struct mm_struct *mm, struct ldt_struct *ldt)
 {
 }
-#endif /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
 
 static void free_ldt_pgtables(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	struct mmu_gather tlb;
 	unsigned long start = LDT_BASE_ADDR;
 	unsigned long end = LDT_END_ADDR;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
index c80febc..031cd10 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA_EMU)		+= numa_emulation.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS)	+= pkeys.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY)			+= kaslr.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION)		+= pti.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION)	+= pti.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT)	+= mem_encrypt.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)	+= mem_encrypt_amd.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c b/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c
index b43301c..ae5c213 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static int ptdump_curknl_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 
 DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(ptdump_curknl);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 static int ptdump_curusr_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
 	if (current->mm->pgd)
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static int __init pt_dump_debug_init(void)
 	debugfs_create_file("current_kernel", 0400, dir, NULL,
 			    &ptdump_curknl_fops);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	debugfs_create_file("current_user", 0400, dir, NULL,
 			    &ptdump_curusr_fops);
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
index e1b599e..b7b88c1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs(struct seq_file *m, struct mm_struct *mm,
 				   bool user)
 {
 	pgd_t *pgd = mm->pgd;
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	if (user && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
 		pgd = kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd);
 #endif
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs);
 
 void ptdump_walk_user_pgd_level_checkwx(void)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	pgd_t *pgd = INIT_PGD;
 
 	if (!(__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX) ||
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 0cbc1b8..cceb779 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static void pgd_mop_up_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgdp)
 	for (i = 0; i < PREALLOCATED_PMDS; i++)
 		mop_up_one_pmd(mm, &pgdp[i]);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
 		return;
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static void pgd_prepopulate_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd, pmd_t *pmds[])
 	}
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 static void pgd_prepopulate_user_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				     pgd_t *k_pgd, pmd_t *pmds[])
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index 5768d38..4af9309 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -89,10 +89,10 @@
 #define CR3_HW_ASID_BITS		12
 
 /*
- * When enabled, PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION consumes a single bit for
+ * When enabled, MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION consumes a single bit for
  * user/kernel switches
  */
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 # define PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS	1
 #else
 # define PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS	0
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static inline u16 kern_pcid(u16 asid)
 {
 	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid > MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	/*
 	 * Make sure that the dynamic ASID space does not conflict with the
 	 * bit we are using to switch between user and kernel ASIDs.
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static inline u16 kern_pcid(u16 asid)
 static inline u16 user_pcid(u16 asid)
 {
 	u16 ret = kern_pcid(asid);
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	ret |= 1 << X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT;
 #endif
 	return ret;
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ static void choose_new_asid(struct mm_struct *next, u64 next_tlb_gen,
 static inline void invalidate_user_asid(u16 asid)
 {
 	/* There is no user ASID if address space separation is off */
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
 		return;
 
 	/*
diff --git a/include/linux/pti.h b/include/linux/pti.h
index 1a941ef..1fbf9d6 100644
--- a/include/linux/pti.h
+++ b/include/linux/pti.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #ifndef _INCLUDE_PTI_H
 #define _INCLUDE_PTI_H
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 #include <asm/pti.h>
 #else
 static inline void pti_init(void) { }
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index c1d3a57..fb604ec 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
 # define DISABLE_LA57	(1<<(X86_FEATURE_LA57 & 31))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 # define DISABLE_PTI		0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_PTI		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))

[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING => CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING

[tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao]

The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     5fa31af31e726c7f5a8f84800153054ca499338a
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/5fa31af31e726c7f5a8f84800153054ca499338a
Author:        Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
AuthorDate:    Tue, 21 Nov 2023 08:07:30 -08:00
Committer:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitterDate: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 10:52:28 +01:00

x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING  => CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING

Step 3/10 of the namespace unification of CPU mitigations related Kconfig options.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121160740.1249350-4-leitao@debian.org
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                               |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/current.h                 |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h       |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h           | 10 +++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c                  |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                     |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S                       |  6 +++---
 scripts/Makefile.lib                           |  2 +-
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |  2 +-
 9 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index c4e04b6..b4a703d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2523,7 +2523,7 @@ config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
 	help
 	  Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation.
 
-config CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+config MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 	bool "Mitigate RSB underflow with call depth tracking"
 	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && HAVE_CALL_THUNKS
 	select HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_NO_PATCHABLE
@@ -2543,7 +2543,7 @@ config CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 
 config CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG
 	bool "Enable call thunks and call depth tracking debugging"
-	depends on CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+	depends on MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 	select FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_32B
 	default n
 	help
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/current.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/current.h
index a1168e7..d4ff517 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/current.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/current.h
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ struct pcpu_hot {
 			struct task_struct	*current_task;
 			int			preempt_count;
 			int			cpu_number;
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 			u64			call_depth;
 #endif
 			unsigned long		top_of_stack;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 702d93f..c1d3a57 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
 # define DISABLE_UNRET		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 # define DISABLE_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING	0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH & 31))
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 7341fd9..5981023 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@
 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CTXSW
 #endif
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) && !defined(COMPILE_OFFSETS)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) && !defined(COMPILE_OFFSETS)
 
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
 
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@
 
 
 .macro CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 	ALTERNATIVE "",							\
 		    __stringify(ASM_INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH
 #endif
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ extern void entry_ibpb(void);
 
 extern void (*x86_return_thunk)(void);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 extern void call_depth_return_thunk(void);
 
 #define CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT					\
@@ -371,12 +371,12 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_ret_count);
 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_stuffs_count);
 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_ctxsw_count);
 #endif
-#else /* !CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
+#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
 
 static inline void call_depth_return_thunk(void) {}
 #define CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT ""
 
-#endif /* CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index 6913b37..a98020b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static void __used common(void)
 	OFFSET(TSS_sp2, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp2);
 	OFFSET(X86_top_of_stack, pcpu_hot, top_of_stack);
 	OFFSET(X86_current_task, pcpu_hot, current_task);
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 	OFFSET(X86_call_depth, pcpu_hot, call_depth);
 #endif
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARIA_AESNI_AVX_X86_64)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 1de4791..b906ed4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1003,15 +1003,15 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
 		break;
 
 	case RETBLEED_CMD_STUFF:
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) &&
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) &&
 		    spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE) {
 			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF;
 
 		} else {
-			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING))
+			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING))
 				pr_err("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n");
 			else
-				pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING.\n");
+				pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING.\n");
 
 			goto do_cmd_auto;
 		}
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index 7b25898..ff46f48 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array)
 #include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
 #undef GEN
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 .macro CALL_THUNK reg
 	.align RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE
 
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ __EXPORT_THUNK(entry_untrain_ret)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY || CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 
 	.align 64
 SYM_FUNC_START(call_depth_return_thunk)
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(call_depth_return_thunk)
 	int3
 SYM_FUNC_END(call_depth_return_thunk)
 
-#endif /* CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
 
 /*
  * This function name is magical and is used by -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib
index 1a965fe..ee233ef 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.lib
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ objtool := $(objtree)/tools/objtool/objtool
 
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_JUMP_LABEL_HACK)		+= --hacks=jump_label
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_NOINSTR_HACK)		+= --hacks=noinstr
-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING)		+= --hacks=skylake
+objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING)	+= --hacks=skylake
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT)			+= --ibt
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_FINEIBT)				+= --cfi
 objtool-args-$(CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_USE_OBJTOOL)	+= --mcount
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 702d93f..c1d3a57 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
 # define DISABLE_UNRET		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 # define DISABLE_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING	0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH & 31))

[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY => CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY

[tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao]

The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     e0b8fcfa3cfac171d589ad6085a00c584d571f08
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/e0b8fcfa3cfac171d589ad6085a00c584d571f08
Author:        Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
AuthorDate:    Tue, 21 Nov 2023 08:07:29 -08:00
Committer:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitterDate: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 10:52:28 +01:00

x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY       => CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY

Step 2/10 of the namespace unification of CPU mitigations related Kconfig options.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121160740.1249350-3-leitao@debian.org
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                     |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           | 11 ++++++-----
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 1dba33a..c4e04b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2554,7 +2554,7 @@ config CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG
 	  Only enable this when you are debugging call thunks as this
 	  creates a noticeable runtime overhead. If unsure say N.
 
-config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY
+config MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
 	bool "Enable IBPB on kernel entry"
 	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64
 	default y
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 262e655..7341fd9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@
  * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
  */
 .macro __UNTRAIN_RET ibpb_feature, call_depth_insns
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)
+#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)
 	VALIDATE_UNRET_END
 	ALTERNATIVE_3 "",						\
 		      CALL_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET,		\
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 3c7e27b..1de4791 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -994,10 +994,10 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
 			pr_err("WARNING: CPU does not support IBPB.\n");
 			goto do_cmd_auto;
-		} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
+		} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
 			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
 		} else {
-			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
+			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
 			goto do_cmd_auto;
 		}
 		break;
@@ -1023,7 +1023,8 @@ do_cmd_auto:
 		    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
 			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY))
 				retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
-			else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+			else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY) &&
+				 boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
 				retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
 		}
 
@@ -2482,13 +2483,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 		break;
 
 	case SRSO_CMD_IBPB:
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
 			if (has_microcode) {
 				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
 				srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
 			}
 		} else {
-			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
+			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
 		}
 		break;
 

[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION => CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE

[tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao]

The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     be83e809ca67bca98fde97ad6b9344237963220b
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/be83e809ca67bca98fde97ad6b9344237963220b
Author:        Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
AuthorDate:    Tue, 21 Nov 2023 08:07:28 -08:00
Committer:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitterDate: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 10:43:14 +01:00

x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION => CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE

So the CPU mitigations Kconfig entries - there's 10 meanwhile - are named
in a historically idiosyncratic and hence rather inconsistent fashion
and have become hard to relate with each other over the years:

   https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231011044252.42bplzjsam3qsasz@treble/

When they were introduced we never expected that we'd eventually have
about a dozen of them, and that more organization would be useful,
especially for Linux distributions that want to enable them in an
informed fashion, and want to make sure all mitigations are configured
as expected.

For example, the current CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS namespace is only
halfway populated, where some mitigations have entries in Kconfig, and
they could be modified, while others mitigations do not have Kconfig entries,
and can not be controlled at build time.

Fine-grained control over these Kconfig entries can help in a number of ways:

  1) Users can choose and pick only mitigations that are important for
     their workloads.

  2) Users and developers can choose to disable mitigations that mangle
     the assembly code generation, making it hard to read.

  3) Separate Kconfigs for just source code readability,
     so that we see *which* butt-ugly piece of crap code is for what
     reason...

In most cases, if a mitigation is disabled at compilation time, it
can still be enabled at runtime using kernel command line arguments.

This is the first patch of an initial series that renames various
mitigation related Kconfig options, unifying them under a single
CONFIG_MITIGATION_* namespace:

    CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION => CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
    CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY       => CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
    CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING  => CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
    CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION => CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
    CONFIG_RETPOLINE            => CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
    CONFIG_SLS                  => CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
    CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY      => CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
    CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY       => CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
    CONFIG_CPU_SRSO             => CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
    CONFIG_RETHUNK              => CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK

Implement step 1/10 of the namespace unification of CPU mitigations related
Kconfig options and rename CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION to
CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE.

[ mingo: Rewrote changelog for clarity. ]

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121160740.1249350-2-leitao@debian.org
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig           | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 53f2e77..1dba33a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2587,7 +2587,7 @@ config SLS
 	  against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly
 	  larger.
 
-config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION
+config MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
 	bool "Force GDS Mitigation"
 	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
 	default n
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index bb0ab84..3c7e27b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ enum gds_mitigations {
 	GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
 };
 
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE)
 static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
 #else
 static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;

Re: [PATCH v6 00/13] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation

[Breno Leitao]

On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 10:56:46AM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> 
> * Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> wrote:
> 
> > Currently, the CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is halfway populated,
> > where some mitigations have entries in Kconfig, and they could be
> > modified, while others mitigations do not have Kconfig entries, and
> > could not be controlled at build time.
> > 
> > The fact of having a fine grained control can help in a few ways:
> > 
> > 1) Users can choose and pick only mitigations that are important for
> > their workloads.
> > 
> > 2) Users and developers can choose to disable mitigations that mangle
> > the assembly code generation, making it hard to read.
> > 
> > 3) Separate configs for just source code readability,
> > so that we see *which* butt-ugly piece of crap code is for what
> > reason.
> > 
> > Important to say, if a mitigation is disabled at compilation time, it
> > could be enabled at runtime using kernel command line arguments.
> > 
> > Discussion about this approach:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wjTHeQjsqtHcBGvy9TaJQ5uAm5HrCDuOD9v7qA9U1Xr4w@mail.gmail.com/
> > and
> > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231011044252.42bplzjsam3qsasz@treble/
> > 
> > In order to get the missing mitigations, some clean up was done.
> > 
> > 1) Get a namespace for mitigations, prepending MITIGATION to the Kconfig
> > entries.
> > 
> > 2) Adding the missing mitigations, so, the mitigations have entries in the
> > Kconfig that could be easily configure by the user.
> > 
> > With this patchset applied, all configs have an individual entry under
> > CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS, and all of them starts with CONFIG_MITIGATION.
> 
> Yeah, so:
> 
>  - I took this older series and updated it to current upstream, and made
>    sure all renames were fully done: there were two new Kconfig option
>    uses, which I integrated into the series. (Sorry about the delay, holiday & stuff.)
> 
>  - I also widened the renames to comments and messages, which were not
>    always covered.
> 
>  - Then I took this cover letter and combined it with a more high level
>    description of the reasoning behind this series I wrote up, and added it
>    to patch #1. (see it below.)
> 
>  - Then I removed the changelog repetition from the other patches and just
>    referred them back to patch #1.
> 
>  - Then I stuck the resulting updated series into tip:x86/bugs, without the 
>    last 3 patches that modify behavior.

Thanks for your work. I am currently reviwing the tip branch and the
merge seems go so far.

Regarding the last 3 patches, what are the next steps?

Thank you!
Breno

Re: [PATCH v6 00/13] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation

[Ingo Molnar]

* Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> wrote:

> > Yeah, so:
> > 
> >  - I took this older series and updated it to current upstream, and made
> >    sure all renames were fully done: there were two new Kconfig option
> >    uses, which I integrated into the series. (Sorry about the delay, holiday & stuff.)
> > 
> >  - I also widened the renames to comments and messages, which were not
> >    always covered.
> > 
> >  - Then I took this cover letter and combined it with a more high level
> >    description of the reasoning behind this series I wrote up, and added it
> >    to patch #1. (see it below.)
> > 
> >  - Then I removed the changelog repetition from the other patches and just
> >    referred them back to patch #1.
> > 
> >  - Then I stuck the resulting updated series into tip:x86/bugs, without the 
> >    last 3 patches that modify behavior.
> 
> Thanks for your work. I am currently reviwing the tip branch and the
> merge seems go so far.
> 
> Regarding the last 3 patches, what are the next steps?

Please resubmit them in a few days (with Josh's Acked-by added and any 
fixes/enhancements done along the way), on top of tip:x86/bugs.

Thanks,

	Ingo

Re: [PATCH v6 00/13] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation

[Breno Leitao]

Hello Ingo,

On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 07:07:48PM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> 
> * Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> wrote:
> 
> > > Yeah, so:
> > > 
> > >  - I took this older series and updated it to current upstream, and made
> > >    sure all renames were fully done: there were two new Kconfig option
> > >    uses, which I integrated into the series. (Sorry about the delay, holiday & stuff.)
> > > 
> > >  - I also widened the renames to comments and messages, which were not
> > >    always covered.
> > > 
> > >  - Then I took this cover letter and combined it with a more high level
> > >    description of the reasoning behind this series I wrote up, and added it
> > >    to patch #1. (see it below.)
> > > 
> > >  - Then I removed the changelog repetition from the other patches and just
> > >    referred them back to patch #1.
> > > 
> > >  - Then I stuck the resulting updated series into tip:x86/bugs, without the 
> > >    last 3 patches that modify behavior.
> > 
> > Thanks for your work. I am currently reviwing the tip branch and the
> > merge seems go so far.
> > 
> > Regarding the last 3 patches, what are the next steps?
> 
> Please resubmit them in a few days (with Josh's Acked-by added and any 
> fixes/enhancements done along the way), on top of tip:x86/bugs.

I've sent the commits on top of the latest mitigations. Have you had a
chance to see them?

	https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240422165830.2142904-1-leitao@debian.org/

PS: I took the opportunity to break them down, one per mitigation, so, it
could simplify the patch management.

Thanks