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From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>
Cc: will@kernel.org, scott@os.amperecomputing.com, cl@gentwo.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: force write fault for atomic RMW instructions
Date: Tue, 14 May 2024 11:53:37 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZkNCsT0dGwOyap7M@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f1049f13-53e4-470e-89e5-d99d7e171d39@os.amperecomputing.com>

On Mon, May 13, 2024 at 09:19:39PM -0600, Yang Shi wrote:
> > That said, I'm not keen on this kernel workaround. If openjdk decides to
> > improve some security and goes for PROT_EXEC-only mappings of its text
> > sections, the above trick will no longer work.
> 
> I noticed futex does replace insns. IIUC, the below sequence should
> can do the trick for exec-only, right?
> 
> disable privileged
> read insn with ldxr
> enable privileged

Do you mean not using the unprivileged LDTR as in get_user()? You don't
even need an LDXR, just plain LDR but with the extable entry etc.

However, with PIE we got proper execute-only permission (not the kind of
fake one where we disabled the PTE_USER bit while keeping PTE_UXN as 0).
So the futex-style approach won't work unless we changed the PIE_E1
entry for _PAGE_EXECONLY to be PIE_R by the kernel.

-- 
Catalin

  reply	other threads:[~2024-05-14 10:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-07 22:35 [PATCH] arm64: mm: force write fault for atomic RMW instructions Yang Shi
2024-05-08  6:45 ` Anshuman Khandual
2024-05-08 17:15   ` Christoph Lameter (Ampere)
2024-05-09  4:23     ` Anshuman Khandual
2024-05-13 22:39       ` Christoph Lameter (Ampere)
2024-05-08 18:37   ` Yang Shi
2024-05-09  4:31     ` Anshuman Khandual
2024-05-09 21:46       ` Yang Shi
2024-05-10  4:28         ` Anshuman Khandual
2024-05-10 16:37           ` Yang Shi
2024-05-10 12:11 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-05-10 17:13   ` Yang Shi
2024-05-13 22:41     ` Christoph Lameter (Ampere)
2024-05-14 10:39     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-05-14 15:57       ` David Hildenbrand
2024-05-17 16:30       ` Yang Shi
2024-05-17 17:25         ` Catalin Marinas
2024-05-17 17:35           ` Yang Shi
2024-05-14  3:19   ` Yang Shi
2024-05-14 10:53     ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2024-05-17 16:10       ` Yang Shi

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