From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
To: cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: CVE-2023-52734: net: sched: sch: Bounds check priority
Date: Tue, 28 May 2024 09:53:12 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZlWNaIMC3NCkIFxv@tiehlicka> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2024052100-CVE-2023-52734-c8c2@gregkh>
Is this really soemthing that should be getting a CVE assigned?
First the fix is incomplete - 9cec2aaffe96 ("net: sched: sch: Fix off by one in htb_activate_prios()")
Second is this even real problem? https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y9V3mBmLUcrEdrTV@pop-os.localdomain/
suggests it is not.
And third, WARN_ONs are considered a real deal by CVE team because
somebody might be running with panic_on_warn. This patch adds one!
On Tue 21-05-24 17:23:11, Greg KH wrote:
> Description
> ===========
>
> In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
>
> net: sched: sch: Bounds check priority
>
> Nothing was explicitly bounds checking the priority index used to access
> clpriop[]. WARN and bail out early if it's pathological. Seen with GCC 13:
>
> ../net/sched/sch_htb.c: In function 'htb_activate_prios':
> ../net/sched/sch_htb.c:437:44: warning: array subscript [0, 31] is outside array bounds of 'struct htb_prio[8]' [-Warray-bounds=]
> 437 | if (p->inner.clprio[prio].feed.rb_node)
> | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~
> ../net/sched/sch_htb.c:131:41: note: while referencing 'clprio'
> 131 | struct htb_prio clprio[TC_HTB_NUMPRIO];
> | ^~~~~~
>
> The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2023-52734 to this issue.
>
>
> Affected and fixed versions
> ===========================
>
> Fixed in 5.4.232 with commit fbe71c5dacaa
> Fixed in 5.10.169 with commit 90fcf55d83b2
> Fixed in 5.15.95 with commit 99875ea9b5b4
> Fixed in 6.1.13 with commit f6415c9c9a0b
> Fixed in 6.2 with commit de5ca4c3852f
>
> Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
> kernel versions by the kernel community.
>
> Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
> older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
> https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2023-52734
> will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
> up to date information about this issue.
>
>
> Affected files
> ==============
>
> The file(s) affected by this issue are:
> net/sched/sch_htb.c
>
>
> Mitigation
> ==========
>
> The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
> stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
> changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
> release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
> supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
> the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
> issue can be found at these commits:
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fbe71c5dacaa5a9960323215f118958174c81aa0
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/90fcf55d83b20da1091f926a291af05fb74f61c6
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99875ea9b5b47995bfb3c684d21eb17feb4b7e6a
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6415c9c9a0b3881543d38528a58b54af4351522
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de5ca4c3852f896cacac2bf259597aab5e17d9e3
--
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs
next parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-28 7:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <2024052100-CVE-2023-52734-c8c2@gregkh>
2024-05-28 7:53 ` Michal Hocko [this message]
2024-05-28 19:06 ` CVE-2023-52734: net: sched: sch: Bounds check priority Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-05-29 7:30 ` Michal Hocko
2024-05-29 9:51 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-06-06 7:24 ` Michal Hocko
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