public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
To: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Cc: cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: CVE-2024-35802: x86/sev: Fix position dependent variable references in startup code
Date: Tue, 28 May 2024 10:51:52 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZlWbKDZh18KHTsgX@tiehlicka> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b3a6ea47-8628-4edc-aee5-e5051955124a@suse.com>

On Thu 23-05-24 14:14:57, Nikolay Borisov wrote:
[...]
> I'd like to dispute this CVE since it doesn't constitute a security related
> bug. Sure, it might crash a SEV guest during boot but it doesn't constitute
> a security issue per-se.

Let me add analysis by Joerg here:
: This is not a security issue. The patch works around clangs compiler behavior
: where it inserts absolute references to kernel addresses. This breaks kernel
: boot because at the time this code runs the kernel still runs direct-mapped and
: needs to rely on RIP-relative addressing only.
: 
: Any breakage there would be detected at early boot of the kernel by a fatal
: crash, which can not be exploited. Also, our kernels are not compiled with
: clang, so from that perspective this is also not an issue for us either.

So this is a functional fix for clang builds.
-- 
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-05-28  8:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <2024051738-CVE-2024-35802-959d@gregkh>
2024-05-23 11:14 ` CVE-2024-35802: x86/sev: Fix position dependent variable references in startup code Nikolay Borisov
2024-05-23 11:21   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-05-23 12:01     ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-05-23 12:17       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-05-23 12:21         ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-05-23 12:38           ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-05-28  8:51   ` Michal Hocko [this message]
2024-05-28 19:08     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=ZlWbKDZh18KHTsgX@tiehlicka \
    --to=mhocko@suse.com \
    --cc=cve@kernel.org \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=nik.borisov@suse.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox