From: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
To: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org, "Ondrej Kozina" <okozina@redhat.com>,
"Milan Broz" <gmazyland@gmail.com>,
"Thomas Staudt" <tstaudt@de.ibm.com>,
"Daniel P . Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
"Kairui Song" <ryncsn@gmail.com>,
"Jan Pazdziora" <jpazdziora@redhat.com>,
"Pingfan Liu" <kernelfans@gmail.com>,
"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
"Vivek Goyal" <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 5/7] crash_dump: retrieve dm crypt keys in kdump kernel
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2024 17:50:15 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZmLX15YJIhUG/XP3@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240523050451.788754-6-coxu@redhat.com>
On 05/23/24 at 01:04pm, Coiby Xu wrote:
......
> +ssize_t __weak dm_crypt_keys_read(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos)
> +{
> + struct kvec kvec = { .iov_base = buf, .iov_len = count };
> + struct iov_iter iter;
> +
> + iov_iter_kvec(&iter, READ, &kvec, 1, count);
> + return read_from_oldmem(&iter, count, ppos, false);
Do we need create a x86 specific version to cope with the confidential
computing thing, e.g sme/tdx?
> +}
> +
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-07 9:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-23 5:04 [PATCH v4 0/7] Support kdump with LUKS encryption by reusing LUKS volume keys Coiby Xu
2024-05-23 5:04 ` [PATCH v4 1/7] kexec_file: allow to place kexec_buf randomly Coiby Xu
2024-06-04 7:41 ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:26 ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23 5:04 ` [PATCH v4 2/7] crash_dump: make dm crypt keys persist for the kdump kernel Coiby Xu
2024-05-23 7:21 ` Greg KH
2024-05-25 7:57 ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-04 8:51 ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:27 ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-10 2:00 ` Baoquan He
2024-10-18 1:44 ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-05 8:22 ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:27 ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-10 1:18 ` Baoquan He
2024-10-18 1:02 ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-06 3:11 ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:26 ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23 5:04 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] crash_dump: store dm keys in kdump reserved memory Coiby Xu
2024-05-24 3:17 ` kernel test robot
2024-06-04 13:54 ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:26 ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23 5:04 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] crash_dump: reuse saved dm crypt keys for CPU/memory hot-plugging Coiby Xu
2024-06-04 13:52 ` Baoquan He
2024-05-23 5:04 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] crash_dump: retrieve dm crypt keys in kdump kernel Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 9:50 ` Baoquan He [this message]
2024-06-07 12:27 ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23 5:04 ` [PATCH v4 6/7] x86/crash: pass dm crypt keys to " Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 9:57 ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:27 ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23 5:04 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] x86/crash: make the page that stores the dm crypt keys inaccessible Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 10:00 ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:27 ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 10:06 ` [PATCH v4 0/7] Support kdump with LUKS encryption by reusing LUKS volume keys Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:26 ` Coiby Xu
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