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From: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
To: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org, "Ondrej Kozina" <okozina@redhat.com>,
	"Milan Broz" <gmazyland@gmail.com>,
	"Thomas Staudt" <tstaudt@de.ibm.com>,
	"Daniel P . Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	"Kairui Song" <ryncsn@gmail.com>,
	"Jan Pazdziora" <jpazdziora@redhat.com>,
	"Pingfan Liu" <kernelfans@gmail.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 7/7] x86/crash: make the page that stores the dm crypt keys inaccessible
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2024 18:00:44 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZmLaTJA6Vq1a9x5z@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240523050451.788754-8-coxu@redhat.com>

On 05/23/24 at 01:04pm, Coiby Xu wrote:
> This adds an addition layer of protection for the saved copy of dm
> crypt key. Trying to access the saved copy will cause page fault.
> 
> Suggested-by: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
> index b180d8e497c3..fc0a80f4254e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
> @@ -545,13 +545,34 @@ static void kexec_mark_crashkres(bool protect)
>  	kexec_mark_range(control, crashk_res.end, protect);
>  }
>  
> +static void kexec_mark_dm_crypt_keys(bool protect)
> +{
> +	unsigned long start_paddr, end_paddr;
> +	unsigned int nr_pages;
> +
> +	if (kexec_crash_image->dm_crypt_keys_addr) {
> +		start_paddr = kexec_crash_image->dm_crypt_keys_addr;
> +		end_paddr = start_paddr + kexec_crash_image->dm_crypt_keys_sz - 1;
> +		nr_pages = (PAGE_ALIGN(end_paddr) - PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN(start_paddr))/PAGE_SIZE;
> +		if (protect)
> +			set_memory_np((unsigned long)phys_to_virt(start_paddr), nr_pages);
> +		else
> +			__set_memory_prot(
> +				(unsigned long)phys_to_virt(start_paddr),
> +				nr_pages,
> +				__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_NX | _PAGE_RW));
> +	}
> +}
> +
>  void arch_kexec_protect_crashkres(void)
>  {
>  	kexec_mark_crashkres(true);
> +	kexec_mark_dm_crypt_keys(true);

Isn't crashkernel region covering crypt keys' storing region? Do we need
mark it again specifically? Not sure if I miss anything.

>  }
>  
>  void arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void)
>  {
> +	kexec_mark_dm_crypt_keys(false);
>  	kexec_mark_crashkres(false);
>  }
>  #endif
> -- 
> 2.45.0
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2024-06-07 10:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-23  5:04 [PATCH v4 0/7] Support kdump with LUKS encryption by reusing LUKS volume keys Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 1/7] kexec_file: allow to place kexec_buf randomly Coiby Xu
2024-06-04  7:41   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:26     ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 2/7] crash_dump: make dm crypt keys persist for the kdump kernel Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  7:21   ` Greg KH
2024-05-25  7:57     ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-04  8:51   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:27     ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-10  2:00       ` Baoquan He
2024-10-18  1:44         ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-05  8:22   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:27     ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-10  1:18       ` Baoquan He
2024-10-18  1:02         ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-06  3:11   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:26     ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] crash_dump: store dm keys in kdump reserved memory Coiby Xu
2024-05-24  3:17   ` kernel test robot
2024-06-04 13:54     ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:26       ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] crash_dump: reuse saved dm crypt keys for CPU/memory hot-plugging Coiby Xu
2024-06-04 13:52   ` Baoquan He
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] crash_dump: retrieve dm crypt keys in kdump kernel Coiby Xu
2024-06-07  9:50   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:27     ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 6/7] x86/crash: pass dm crypt keys to " Coiby Xu
2024-06-07  9:57   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:27     ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] x86/crash: make the page that stores the dm crypt keys inaccessible Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 10:00   ` Baoquan He [this message]
2024-06-07 12:27     ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 10:06 ` [PATCH v4 0/7] Support kdump with LUKS encryption by reusing LUKS volume keys Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:26   ` Coiby Xu

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