From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>,
Ackerly Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Trigger unprotect logic only on write-protection page faults
Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2024 07:21:06 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Zry9Us0HVEDmhCB4@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240814114230.hgzrh3cal6k6x2dn@yy-desk-7060>
On Wed, Aug 14, 2024, Yuan Yao wrote:
> > @@ -5960,6 +5961,41 @@ void kvm_mmu_track_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, const u8 *new,
> > write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
> > }
> >
> > +static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
> > + u64 error_code, int *emulation_type)
> > +{
> > + bool direct = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Before emulating the instruction, check if the error code
> > + * was due to a RO violation while translating the guest page.
> > + * This can occur when using nested virtualization with nested
> > + * paging in both guests. If true, we simply unprotect the page
> > + * and resume the guest.
> > + */
> > + if (direct &&
> > + (error_code & PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE) == PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE) {
> > + kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(cr2_or_gpa));
> > + return RET_PF_FIXED;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * The gfn is write-protected, but if emulation fails we can still
> > + * optimistically try to just unprotect the page and let the processor
> > + * re-execute the instruction that caused the page fault. Do not allow
> > + * retrying MMIO emulation, as it's not only pointless but could also
> > + * cause us to enter an infinite loop because the processor will keep
> > + * faulting on the non-existent MMIO address. Retrying an instruction
> > + * from a nested guest is also pointless and dangerous as we are only
> > + * explicitly shadowing L1's page tables, i.e. unprotecting something
> > + * for L1 isn't going to magically fix whatever issue cause L2 to fail.
> > + */
> > + if (!mmio_info_in_cache(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, direct) && !is_guest_mode(vcpu))
>
> Looks the mmio_info_in_cache() checking can be removed,
> emulation should not come here with RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED
> introduced, may WARN_ON_ONCE() it.
Yeah, that was my instinct as well. I kept it mostly because I liked having the
comment, but also because I was thinking the cache could theoretically get a hit.
But that's not true. KVM should return RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED if and only if
there is a memslot, and creating a memslot is supposed to invalidate the MMIO
cache by virtue of changing the memslot generation.
Unless someone feels strongly that the mmio_info_in_cache() call should be
deleted entirely, I'll tack on this patch. The cache lookup is cheap, and IMO
it's helpful to explicitly document that it should be impossible to reach this
point with what appears to be MMIO.
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 50695eb2ee22..7f3f57237f23 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -5997,6 +5997,18 @@ static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip = 0;
vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr = 0;
+ /*
+ * It should be impossible to reach this point with an MMIO cache hit,
+ * as RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED is returned if and only if there's a valid,
+ * writable memslot, and creating a memslot should invalidate the MMIO
+ * cache by way of changing the memslot generation. WARN and disallow
+ * retry if MMIO is detect, as retrying MMIO emulation is pointless and
+ * could put the vCPU into an infinite loop because the processor will
+ * keep faulting on the non-existent MMIO address.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(mmio_info_in_cache(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, direct)))
+ return RET_PF_EMULATE;
+
/*
* Before emulating the instruction, check to see if the access may be
* due to L1 accessing nested NPT/EPT entries used for L2, i.e. if the
@@ -6029,17 +6041,15 @@ static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
return RET_PF_FIXED;
/*
- * The gfn is write-protected, but if emulation fails we can still
- * optimistically try to just unprotect the page and let the processor
+ * The gfn is write-protected, but if KVM detects its emulating an
+ * instruction that is unlikely to be used to modify page tables, or if
+ * emulation fails, KVM can try to unprotect the gfn and let the CPU
* re-execute the instruction that caused the page fault. Do not allow
- * retrying MMIO emulation, as it's not only pointless but could also
- * cause us to enter an infinite loop because the processor will keep
- * faulting on the non-existent MMIO address. Retrying an instruction
- * from a nested guest is also pointless and dangerous as we are only
- * explicitly shadowing L1's page tables, i.e. unprotecting something
- * for L1 isn't going to magically fix whatever issue cause L2 to fail.
+ * retrying an instruction from a nested guest as KVM is only explicitly
+ * shadowing L1's page tables, i.e. unprotecting something for L1 isn't
+ * going to magically fix whatever issue cause L2 to fail.
*/
- if (!mmio_info_in_cache(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, direct) && !is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+ if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
*emulation_type |= EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF;
return RET_PF_EMULATE;
base-commit: 7d33880356496eb0640c6c825cc60898063c4902
--
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-14 14:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-09 19:02 [PATCH 00/22] KVM: x86: Fix multiple #PF RO infinite loop bugs Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:02 ` [PATCH 01/22] KVM: x86: Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP (and TDX) Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 16:31 ` Paolo Bonzini
2025-12-03 13:04 ` Naveen N Rao
2025-12-23 16:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:02 ` [PATCH 02/22] KVM: VMX: Set PFERR_GUEST_{FINAL,PAGE}_MASK if and only if the GVA is valid Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 11:11 ` Yuan Yao
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 03/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Trigger unprotect logic only on write-protection page faults Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 11:42 ` Yuan Yao
2024-08-14 14:21 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-08-15 8:30 ` Yuan Yao
2024-08-14 16:40 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-14 19:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 04/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Skip emulation on page fault iff 1+ SPs were unprotected Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 14:22 ` Yuan Yao
2024-08-15 23:31 ` Yao Yuan
2024-08-23 0:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-23 23:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-26 20:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 16:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 05/22] KVM: x86: Retry to-be-emulated insn in "slow" unprotect path iff sp is zapped Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 06/22] KVM: x86: Get RIP from vCPU state when storing it to last_retry_eip Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 17:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 07/22] KVM: x86: Store gpa as gpa_t, not unsigned long, when unprotecting for retry Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 08/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Apply retry protection to "fast nTDP unprotect" path Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 09/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Try "unprotect for retry" iff there are indirect SPs Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 17:30 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-15 14:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-15 16:48 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-28 23:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 10/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Replace PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE with a more descriptive helper Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 17:32 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-15 14:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 11/22] KVM: x86: Move EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF to x86_emulate_instruction() Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 12/22] KVM: x86: Fold retry_instruction() into x86_emulate_instruction() Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 13/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Don't try to unprotect an INVALID_GPA Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 14/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Always walk guest PTEs with WRITE access when unprotecting Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 15/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Move event re-injection unprotect+retry into common path Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 17:43 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-26 21:52 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 16/22] KVM: x86: Remove manual pfn lookup when retrying #PF after failed emulation Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 17:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 17/22] KVM: x86: Check EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP before unprotecting gfn Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 17:53 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 18/22] KVM: x86: Apply retry protection to "unprotect on failure" path Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 19/22] KVM: x86: Update retry protection fields when forcing retry on emulation failure Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 20/22] KVM: x86: Rename reexecute_instruction()=>kvm_unprotect_and_retry_on_failure() Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 21/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Subsume kvm_mmu_unprotect_page() into the and_retry() version Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 22/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Detect if unprotect will do anything based on invalid_list Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 17:57 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-15 14:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-30 23:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 17:58 ` [PATCH 00/22] KVM: x86: Fix multiple #PF RO infinite loop bugs Paolo Bonzini
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