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Peter Anvin" , Paolo Bonzini , Pawan Gupta , Josh Poimboeuf , Sandipan Das , Kai Huang , x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Venkatesh Srinivas Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Fri, Aug 23, 2024, Jim Mattson wrote: > On Fri, Aug 23, 2024 at 3:48=E2=80=AFPM Jim Mattson = wrote: > > > > On Fri, Aug 23, 2024 at 3:12=E2=80=AFPM Tom Lendacky wrote: > > > > > > On 8/23/24 15:51, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > > > On Fri, Aug 23, 2024, Tom Lendacky wrote: > > > >> On 8/23/24 13:53, Jim Mattson wrote: > > > >>> From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=3D07H,ECX=3D0):EDX[26] > > > >>> enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IB= RS) > > > >>> and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from = [2], > > > >>> "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control th= e > > > >>> predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the com= mand > > > >>> on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note tha= t > > > >>> indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect = and > > > >>> near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it fo= llows > > > >>> that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control = the > > > >>> predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the sa= me > > > >>> logical processor.**" [emphasis mine] > > > >>> > > > >>> On the other hand, AMD's IBPB "may not prevent return branch > > > >>> predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3]. > > > >>> > > > >>> However, some AMD processors have an "enhanced IBPB" [terminology > > > >>> mine] which does clear the return address predictor. This feature= is > > > >>> enumerated by CPUID.80000008:EDX.IBPB_RET[bit 30] [4]. > > > >>> > > > >>> Adjust the cross-vendor features enumerated by KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_= CPUID > > > >>> accordingly. > > > >>> > > > >>> [1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/te= chnical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/cpuid-enumeratio= n-and-architectural-msrs.html > > > >>> [2] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/te= chnical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/speculative-exec= ution-side-channel-mitigations.html#Footnotes > > > >>> [3] https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/am= d-sb-1040.html > > > >>> [4] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-te= ch-docs/programmer-references/24594.pdf > > > >>> > > > >>> Fixes: 0c54914d0c52 ("KVM: x86: use Intel speculation bugs and fe= atures as derived in generic x86 code") > > > >>> Suggested-by: Venkatesh Srinivas > > > >>> Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson > > > >>> --- > > > >>> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 6 +++++- > > > >>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > >>> > > > >>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c > > > >>> index ec7b2ca3b4d3..c8d7d928ffc7 100644 > > > >>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c > > > >>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c > > > >>> @@ -690,7 +690,9 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) > > > >>> kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST); > > > >>> kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES); > > > >>> > > > >>> - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATUR= E_IBRS)) > > > >>> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) && > > > >>> + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) && > > > >>> + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS)) > > > >>> kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); > > > >>> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) > > > >>> kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP); > > > >>> @@ -759,6 +761,8 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) > > > >>> * arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c is kind enough to > > > >>> * record that in cpufeatures so use them. > > > >>> */ > > > >>> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) > > > >>> + kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET); > > > >> > > > >> If SPEC_CTRL is set, then IBPB is set, so you can't have AMD_IBPB_= RET > > > >> without AMD_IBPB, but it just looks odd seeing them set with separ= ate > > > >> checks with no relationship dependency for AMD_IBPB_RET on AMD_IBP= B. > > > >> That's just me, though, not worth a v4 unless others feel the same= . > > > > > > > > You thinking something like this (at the end, after the dust settle= s)? > > > > > > > > if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) && > > > > !kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))) > > > > kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET); > > > > > > I was just thinking more along the lines of: > > > > > > if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { > > > kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB); > > > if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) > > > kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET); > > > } > > > > AFAICT, there are just two reasons that X86_FEATURE_IBPB gets set: > > 1. The CPU reports CPUID.(EAX=3D7,ECX=3D0):EDX[bit 26] (aka X86_FEATURE= _SPEC_CTRL) > > 2. The CPU reports CPUID Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB] (aka X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBP= B) > > > > Clearly, in the second case, the KVM cpu capability for AMD_IBPB will > > already be set, since it's specified in the mask for > > CPUID_8000_0008_EBX. > > > > If this block of code is just trying to populate CPUID Fn8000_0008_EBX > > on Intel processors, I'd rather change all of the predicates to test > > for Intel features, rather than vendor-neutral features, so that the > > derivation is clear. But maybe this block of code is also trying to > > populate CPUID Fn8000_0008_EBX on AMD processors that may have some of > > these features, but don't enumerate them via CPUID? >=20 > There's another argument for just nuking these cross-vendor > derivations. How do we factor in CVE-2022-26373 (Post-barrier Return > Stack Buffer Predictions)? > Intel CPUs without IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.PBRSB_NO[bit 24] have a > weaker IBPB than AMD CPUs with CPUID Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB_RET], and > probably should not be enumerating that CPUID bit. >=20 > Trying to derive cross-vendor mitigation equivalence is just going to > end in tears. Agreed, but I also don't want to break existing setups. Is there a bare mi= nimum of sorts that we can advertise to userspace? E.g. something that might be imperfect, but has acceptable tradeoffs/risks for the existing code? And then put a stake in the ground saying no more of these shenanigans.