From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, pgonda@google.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 19/20] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2024 05:07:08 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZurCbP7MesWXQbqZ@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9a218564-b011-4222-187d-cba9e9268e93@amd.com>
On Mon, Sep 16, 2024, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote:
> On 9/13/2024 11:00 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> >> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
> >> Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
> >> ---
> >> arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 2 +-
> >> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
> >> index 5b2c15214a6b..3d03b4c937b9 100644
> >> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
> >> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
> >> @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ void __init kvmclock_init(void)
> >> {
> >> u8 flags;
> >>
> >> - if (!kvm_para_available() || !kvmclock)
> >> + if (!kvm_para_available() || !kvmclock || cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC))
> >
> > I would much prefer we solve the kvmclock vs. TSC fight in a generic way. Unless
> > I've missed something, the fact that the TSC is more trusted in the SNP/TDX world
> > is simply what's forcing the issue, but it's not actually the reason why Linux
> > should prefer the TSC over kvmclock. The underlying reason is that platforms that
> > support SNP/TDX are guaranteed to have a stable, always running TSC, i.e. that the
> > TSC is a superior timesource purely from a functionality perspective. That it's
> > more secure is icing on the cake.
>
> Are you suggesting that whenever the guest is either SNP or TDX, kvmclock
> should be disabled assuming that timesource is stable and always running?
No, I'm saying that the guest should prefer the raw TSC over kvmclock if the TSC
is stable, irrespective of SNP or TDX. This is effectively already done for the
timekeeping base (see commit 7539b174aef4 ("x86: kvmguest: use TSC clocksource if
invariant TSC is exposed")), but the scheduler still uses kvmclock thanks to the
kvm_sched_clock_init() code.
The other aspect of this to consider is wallclock. If I'm reading the code
correctly, _completely_ disabling kvmclock will case the kernel to keep using the
RTC for wallclock. Using the RTC is an amusingly bad decision for SNP and TDX
(and regular VMs), as the RTC is a slooow emulation path and it's still very much
controlled by the untrusted host.
Unless you have a better idea for what to do with wallclock, I think the right
approach is to come up a cleaner way to prefer TSC over kvmclock for timekeeping
and the scheduler, but leave wallclock as-is. And then for SNP and TDX, "assert"
that the TSC is being used instead of kvmclock. Presumably, all SNP and TDX
hosts provide a stable TSC, so there's probably no reason for the guest to even
care if the TSC is "secure".
Note, past me missed the wallclock side of things[*], so I don't think hiding
kvmclock entirely is the best solution.
[*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZOjF2DMBgW%2FzVvL3@google.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-09-18 12:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-07-31 15:07 [PATCH v11 00/20] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 01/20] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 8:48 ` [tip: x86/sev] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg() with pr_debug() tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 02/20] virt: sev-guest: Rename local guest message variables Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 8:48 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:22 ` [PATCH v11 02/20] " Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 03/20] virt: sev-guest: Fix user-visible strings Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 8:48 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:26 ` [PATCH v11 03/20] " Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 04/20] virt: sev-guest: Ensure the SNP guest messages do not exceed a page Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 8:48 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 05/20] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 06/20] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 11:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-08-28 4:47 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-08-28 9:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-08-28 10:16 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-08-28 10:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 07/20] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 08/20] virt: sev-guest: Consolidate SNP guest messaging parameters to a struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-04 14:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-05 4:35 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 09/20] virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-12 21:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-13 4:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-13 14:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 10/20] virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP message context structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 15:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 11/20] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 15:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 12/20] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:27 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-16 4:42 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 13/20] x86/cc: Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 15:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-16 4:53 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 14/20] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 15/20] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 16/20] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 17/20] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-16 6:23 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 18/20] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 19/20] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-13 17:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-16 15:20 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-18 12:07 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-09-20 5:15 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-20 7:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-20 8:54 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-25 8:53 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-25 12:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-30 6:27 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-30 21:20 ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-10-01 4:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-01 14:36 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 20/20] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-13 17:42 ` Jim Mattson
2024-09-16 11:40 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-16 20:21 ` Jim Mattson
2024-08-14 4:14 ` [PATCH v11 00/20] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A. Dadhania
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