From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, pgonda@google.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org,
gautham.shenoy@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 19/20] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2024 05:55:38 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZvQHpbNauYTBgU6M@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ef194c25-22d8-204e-ffb6-8f9f0a0621fb@amd.com>
On Wed, Sep 25, 2024, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote:
> >>>>> Are you suggesting that whenever the guest is either SNP or TDX, kvmclock
> >>>>> should be disabled assuming that timesource is stable and always running?
> >>>>
> >>>> No, I'm saying that the guest should prefer the raw TSC over kvmclock if the TSC
> >>>> is stable, irrespective of SNP or TDX. This is effectively already done for the
> >>>> timekeeping base (see commit 7539b174aef4 ("x86: kvmguest: use TSC clocksource if
> >>>> invariant TSC is exposed")), but the scheduler still uses kvmclock thanks to the
> >>>> kvm_sched_clock_init() code.
> >>>
> >>> The kvm-clock and tsc-early both are having the rating of 299. As they are of
> >>> same rating, kvm-clock is being picked up first.
> >>>
> >>> Is it fine to drop the clock rating of kvmclock to 298 ? With this tsc-early will
> >>> be picked up instead.
> >>
> >> IMO, it's ugly, but that's a problem with the rating system inasmuch as anything.
> >>
> >> But the kernel will still be using kvmclock for the scheduler clock, which is
> >> undesirable.
> >
> > Agree, kvm_sched_clock_init() is still being called. The above hunk was to use
> > tsc-early/tsc as the clocksource and not kvm-clock.
>
> How about the below patch:
>
> From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
> Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 18:29:56 +0530
> Subject: [RFC PATCH] x86/kvmclock: Prefer invariant TSC as the clocksource and
> scheduler clock
>
> For platforms that support stable and always running TSC, although the
> kvm-clock rating is dropped to 299 to prefer TSC, the guest scheduler clock
> still keeps on using the kvm-clock which is undesirable. Moreover, as the
> kvm-clock and early-tsc clocksource are both registered with 299 rating,
> kvm-clock is being picked up momentarily instead of selecting more stable
> tsc-early clocksource.
>
> kvm-clock: Using msrs 4b564d01 and 4b564d00
> kvm-clock: using sched offset of 1799357702246960 cycles
> clocksource: kvm-clock: mask: 0xffffffffffffffff max_cycles: 0x1cd42e4dffb, max_idle_ns: 881590591483 ns
> tsc: Detected 1996.249 MHz processor
> clocksource: tsc-early: mask: 0xffffffffffffffff max_cycles: 0x398cadd9d93, max_idle_ns: 881590552906 ns
> clocksource: Switched to clocksource kvm-clock
> clocksource: tsc: mask: 0xffffffffffffffff max_cycles: 0x398cadd9d93, max_idle_ns: 881590552906 ns
> clocksource: Switched to clocksource tsc
>
> Drop the kvm-clock rating to 298, so that tsc-early is picked up before
> kvm-clock and use TSC for scheduler clock as well when the TSC is invariant
> and stable.
>
> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
>
> ---
>
> The issue we see here is that on bare-metal if the TSC is marked unstable,
> then the sched-clock will fall back to jiffies. In the virtualization case,
> do we want to fall back to kvm-clock when TSC is marked unstable?
In the general case, yes. Though that might be a WARN-able offense if the TSC
is allegedly constant+nonstop. And for SNP and TDX, it might be a "panic and do
not boot" offense, since using kvmclock undermines the security of the guest.
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 11 ++++++-----
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
> index 5b2c15214a6b..c997b2628c4b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
> @@ -317,9 +317,6 @@ void __init kvmclock_init(void)
> if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT))
> pvclock_set_flags(PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT);
>
> - flags = pvclock_read_flags(&hv_clock_boot[0].pvti);
> - kvm_sched_clock_init(flags & PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT);
> -
> x86_platform.calibrate_tsc = kvm_get_tsc_khz;
> x86_platform.calibrate_cpu = kvm_get_tsc_khz;
> x86_platform.get_wallclock = kvm_get_wallclock;
> @@ -341,8 +338,12 @@ void __init kvmclock_init(void)
> */
> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC) &&
> boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC) &&
> - !check_tsc_unstable())
> - kvm_clock.rating = 299;
> + !check_tsc_unstable()) {
> + kvm_clock.rating = 298;
> + } else {
> + flags = pvclock_read_flags(&hv_clock_boot[0].pvti);
> + kvm_sched_clock_init(flags & PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT);
> + }
I would really, really like to fix this in a centralized location, not by having
each PV clocksource muck with their clock's rating. I'm not even sure the existing
code is entirely correct, as kvmclock_init() runs _before_ tsc_early_init(). Which
is desirable in the legacy case, as it allows calibrating the TSC using kvmclock,
x86_platform.calibrate_tsc = kvm_get_tsc_khz;
but on modern setups that's definitely undesirable, as it means the kernel won't
use CPUID.0x15, which every explicitly tells software the frequency of the TSC.
And I don't think we want to simply point at native_calibrate_tsc(), because that
thing is not at all correct for a VM, where checking x86_vendor and x86_vfm is at
best sketchy. E.g. I would think it's in AMD's interest for Secure TSC to define
the TSC frequency using CPUID.0x15, even if AMD CPUs don't (yet) natively support
CPUID.0x15.
In other words, I think we need to overhaul the PV clock vs. TSC logic so that it
makes sense for modern CPUs+VMs, not just keep hacking away at kvmclock. I don't
expect the code would be all that complex in the end, the hardest part is likely
just figuring out (and agreeing on) what exactly the kernel should be doing.
> clocksource_register_hz(&kvm_clock, NSEC_PER_SEC);
> pv_info.name = "KVM";
> --
> 2.34.1
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-09-25 12:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-07-31 15:07 [PATCH v11 00/20] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 01/20] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 8:48 ` [tip: x86/sev] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg() with pr_debug() tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 02/20] virt: sev-guest: Rename local guest message variables Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 8:48 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:22 ` [PATCH v11 02/20] " Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 03/20] virt: sev-guest: Fix user-visible strings Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 8:48 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:26 ` [PATCH v11 03/20] " Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 04/20] virt: sev-guest: Ensure the SNP guest messages do not exceed a page Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 8:48 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 05/20] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 06/20] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 11:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-08-28 4:47 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-08-28 9:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-08-28 10:16 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-08-28 10:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 07/20] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 08/20] virt: sev-guest: Consolidate SNP guest messaging parameters to a struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-04 14:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-05 4:35 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 09/20] virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-12 21:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-13 4:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-13 14:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 10/20] virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP message context structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 15:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 11/20] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 15:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 12/20] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:27 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-16 4:42 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 13/20] x86/cc: Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 15:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-16 4:53 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 14/20] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 15/20] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 16/20] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 17/20] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-16 6:23 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 18/20] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 19/20] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-13 17:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-16 15:20 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-18 12:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-20 5:15 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-20 7:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-20 8:54 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-25 8:53 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-25 12:55 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-09-30 6:27 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-30 21:20 ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-10-01 4:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-01 14:36 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 20/20] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-13 17:42 ` Jim Mattson
2024-09-16 11:40 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-16 20:21 ` Jim Mattson
2024-08-14 4:14 ` [PATCH v11 00/20] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A. Dadhania
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