* [PATCH v4 0/3] Distinguish between variants of IBPB
@ 2024-09-13 17:32 Jim Mattson
2024-09-13 17:32 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] x86/cpufeatures: Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET Jim Mattson
` (3 more replies)
0 siblings, 4 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Jim Mattson @ 2024-09-13 17:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen,
H. Peter Anvin, Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini, Pawan Gupta,
Josh Poimboeuf, Jim Mattson, Sandipan Das, Kai Huang, x86,
linux-kernel, kvm
Prior to Zen4, AMD's IBPB did not flush the RAS (or, in Intel
terminology, the RSB). Hence, the older version of AMD's IBPB was not
equivalent to Intel's IBPB. However, KVM has been treating them as
equivalent, synthesizing Intel's CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 26] on any
platform that supports the synthetic features X86_FEATURE_IBPB and
X86_FEATURE_IBRS.
Equivalence also requires a previously ignored feature on the AMD side,
CPUID Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB_RET], which is enumerated on Zen4.
v4: Added "guaranteed" to X86_FEATURE_IBPB comment [Pawan]
Changed logic for deducing AMD IBPB features from Intel IBPB features
in kvm_set_cpu_caps [Tom]
Intel CPUs that suffer from PBRSB can't claim AMD_IBPB_RET [myself]
v3: Pass through IBPB_RET from hardware to userspace. [Tom]
Derive AMD_IBPB from X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL rather than
X86_FEATURE_IBPB. [Tom]
Clarify semantics of X86_FEATURE_IBPB.
v2: Use IBPB_RET to identify semantic equality. [Venkatesh]
Jim Mattson (3):
x86/cpufeatures: Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET
KVM: x86: Advertise AMD_IBPB_RET to userspace
KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's IBPB
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 12 +++++++++---
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--
2.46.0.662.g92d0881bb0-goog
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 1/3] x86/cpufeatures: Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET
2024-09-13 17:32 [PATCH v4 0/3] Distinguish between variants of IBPB Jim Mattson
@ 2024-09-13 17:32 ` Jim Mattson
2024-10-07 14:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-13 17:32 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] KVM: x86: Advertise AMD_IBPB_RET to userspace Jim Mattson
` (2 subsequent siblings)
3 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Jim Mattson @ 2024-09-13 17:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen,
H. Peter Anvin, Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini, Pawan Gupta,
Josh Poimboeuf, Jim Mattson, Sandipan Das, Kai Huang, x86,
linux-kernel, kvm
Cc: Venkatesh Srinivas
AMD's initial implementation of IBPB did not clear the return address
predictor. Beginning with Zen4, AMD's IBPB *does* clear the return
address predictor. This behavior is enumerated by
CPUID.80000008H:EBX.IBPB_RET[bit 30].
Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET for use in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID,
when determining cross-vendor capabilities.
Suggested-by: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index cabd6b58e8ec..a222a24677d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
#define X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD ( 7*32+24) /* AMD SSBD implementation via LS_CFG MSR */
#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS ( 7*32+25) /* "ibrs" Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* "ibpb" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier without RSB flush */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* "ibpb" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier without a guaranteed RSB flush */
#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP ( 7*32+27) /* "stibp" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* Generic flag for all Zen and newer */
#define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV ( 7*32+29) /* L1TF workaround PTE inversion */
@@ -348,6 +348,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_CPPC (13*32+27) /* "cppc" Collaborative Processor Performance Control */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_PSFD (13*32+28) /* Predictive Store Forwarding Disable */
#define X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO (13*32+29) /* Not vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET (13*32+30) /* IBPB clears return address predictor */
#define X86_FEATURE_BRS (13*32+31) /* "brs" Branch Sampling available */
/* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */
--
2.46.0.662.g92d0881bb0-goog
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 2/3] KVM: x86: Advertise AMD_IBPB_RET to userspace
2024-09-13 17:32 [PATCH v4 0/3] Distinguish between variants of IBPB Jim Mattson
2024-09-13 17:32 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] x86/cpufeatures: Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET Jim Mattson
@ 2024-09-13 17:32 ` Jim Mattson
2024-09-13 17:32 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's IBPB Jim Mattson
2024-09-27 18:52 ` [PATCH v4 0/3] Distinguish between variants of IBPB Jim Mattson
3 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Jim Mattson @ 2024-09-13 17:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen,
H. Peter Anvin, Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini, Pawan Gupta,
Josh Poimboeuf, Jim Mattson, Sandipan Das, Kai Huang, x86,
linux-kernel, kvm
Cc: Tom Lendacky
This is an inherent feature of IA32_PRED_CMD[0], so it is trivially
virtualizable (as long as IA32_PRED_CMD[0] is virtualized).
Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 2617be544480..ec7b2ca3b4d3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
F(CLZERO) | F(XSAVEERPTR) |
F(WBNOINVD) | F(AMD_IBPB) | F(AMD_IBRS) | F(AMD_SSBD) | F(VIRT_SSBD) |
F(AMD_SSB_NO) | F(AMD_STIBP) | F(AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON) |
- F(AMD_PSFD)
+ F(AMD_PSFD) | F(AMD_IBPB_RET)
);
/*
--
2.46.0.662.g92d0881bb0-goog
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 3/3] KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's IBPB
2024-09-13 17:32 [PATCH v4 0/3] Distinguish between variants of IBPB Jim Mattson
2024-09-13 17:32 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] x86/cpufeatures: Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET Jim Mattson
2024-09-13 17:32 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] KVM: x86: Advertise AMD_IBPB_RET to userspace Jim Mattson
@ 2024-09-13 17:32 ` Jim Mattson
2024-09-27 18:52 ` [PATCH v4 0/3] Distinguish between variants of IBPB Jim Mattson
3 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Jim Mattson @ 2024-09-13 17:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen,
H. Peter Anvin, Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini, Pawan Gupta,
Josh Poimboeuf, Jim Mattson, Sandipan Das, Kai Huang, x86,
linux-kernel, kvm
Cc: Venkatesh Srinivas
From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26]
enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS)
and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2],
"Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the
predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command
on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that
indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and
near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows
that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the
predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same
logical processor.**" [emphasis mine]
On the other hand, AMD's IBPB "may not prevent return branch
predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3].
However, some AMD processors have an "enhanced IBPB" [terminology
mine] which does clear the return address predictor. This feature is
enumerated by CPUID.80000008:EDX.IBPB_RET[bit 30] [4].
Adjust the cross-vendor features enumerated by KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
accordingly.
[1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/cpuid-enumeration-and-architectural-msrs.html
[2] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigations.html#Footnotes
[3] https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1040.html
[4] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/24594.pdf
Fixes: 0c54914d0c52 ("KVM: x86: use Intel speculation bugs and features as derived in generic x86 code")
Suggested-by: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index ec7b2ca3b4d3..600d79ea22be 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -690,7 +690,9 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST);
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
@@ -759,8 +761,12 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
* arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c is kind enough to
* record that in cpufeatures so use them.
*/
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB))
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET);
+ }
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS);
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
--
2.46.0.662.g92d0881bb0-goog
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 0/3] Distinguish between variants of IBPB
2024-09-13 17:32 [PATCH v4 0/3] Distinguish between variants of IBPB Jim Mattson
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2024-09-13 17:32 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's IBPB Jim Mattson
@ 2024-09-27 18:52 ` Jim Mattson
2024-09-30 16:19 ` Sean Christopherson
3 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Jim Mattson @ 2024-09-27 18:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen,
H. Peter Anvin, Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini, Pawan Gupta,
Josh Poimboeuf, Jim Mattson, Sandipan Das, Kai Huang, x86,
linux-kernel, kvm
On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 10:32 AM Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> wrote:
>
> Prior to Zen4, AMD's IBPB did not flush the RAS (or, in Intel
> terminology, the RSB). Hence, the older version of AMD's IBPB was not
> equivalent to Intel's IBPB. However, KVM has been treating them as
> equivalent, synthesizing Intel's CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 26] on any
> platform that supports the synthetic features X86_FEATURE_IBPB and
> X86_FEATURE_IBRS.
>
> Equivalence also requires a previously ignored feature on the AMD side,
> CPUID Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB_RET], which is enumerated on Zen4.
>
> v4: Added "guaranteed" to X86_FEATURE_IBPB comment [Pawan]
> Changed logic for deducing AMD IBPB features from Intel IBPB features
> in kvm_set_cpu_caps [Tom]
> Intel CPUs that suffer from PBRSB can't claim AMD_IBPB_RET [myself]
>
> v3: Pass through IBPB_RET from hardware to userspace. [Tom]
> Derive AMD_IBPB from X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL rather than
> X86_FEATURE_IBPB. [Tom]
> Clarify semantics of X86_FEATURE_IBPB.
>
> v2: Use IBPB_RET to identify semantic equality. [Venkatesh]
>
> Jim Mattson (3):
> x86/cpufeatures: Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET
> KVM: x86: Advertise AMD_IBPB_RET to userspace
> KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's IBPB
Oops. I forgot to include the v3 responses:
> For the series:
>
> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
and
> Assuming this goes through the KVM tree:
>
> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
The only substantive change was to patch 3/3.
Sean: Are you willing to take this through KVM/x86?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 0/3] Distinguish between variants of IBPB
2024-09-27 18:52 ` [PATCH v4 0/3] Distinguish between variants of IBPB Jim Mattson
@ 2024-09-30 16:19 ` Sean Christopherson
0 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Sean Christopherson @ 2024-09-30 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jim Mattson
Cc: Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen,
H. Peter Anvin, Paolo Bonzini, Pawan Gupta, Josh Poimboeuf,
Sandipan Das, Kai Huang, x86, linux-kernel, kvm
On Fri, Sep 27, 2024, Jim Mattson wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 10:32 AM Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > Prior to Zen4, AMD's IBPB did not flush the RAS (or, in Intel
> > terminology, the RSB). Hence, the older version of AMD's IBPB was not
> > equivalent to Intel's IBPB. However, KVM has been treating them as
> > equivalent, synthesizing Intel's CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 26] on any
> > platform that supports the synthetic features X86_FEATURE_IBPB and
> > X86_FEATURE_IBRS.
> >
> > Equivalence also requires a previously ignored feature on the AMD side,
> > CPUID Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB_RET], which is enumerated on Zen4.
> >
> > v4: Added "guaranteed" to X86_FEATURE_IBPB comment [Pawan]
> > Changed logic for deducing AMD IBPB features from Intel IBPB features
> > in kvm_set_cpu_caps [Tom]
> > Intel CPUs that suffer from PBRSB can't claim AMD_IBPB_RET [myself]
> >
> > v3: Pass through IBPB_RET from hardware to userspace. [Tom]
> > Derive AMD_IBPB from X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL rather than
> > X86_FEATURE_IBPB. [Tom]
> > Clarify semantics of X86_FEATURE_IBPB.
> >
> > v2: Use IBPB_RET to identify semantic equality. [Venkatesh]
> >
> > Jim Mattson (3):
> > x86/cpufeatures: Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET
> > KVM: x86: Advertise AMD_IBPB_RET to userspace
> > KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's IBPB
>
> Oops. I forgot to include the v3 responses:
>
> > For the series:
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>
> and
>
> > Assuming this goes through the KVM tree:
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>
> The only substantive change was to patch 3/3.
>
> Sean: Are you willing to take this through KVM/x86?
Yep, and I can fixup the reviews when applying.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 1/3] x86/cpufeatures: Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET
2024-09-13 17:32 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] x86/cpufeatures: Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET Jim Mattson
@ 2024-10-07 14:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-07 17:38 ` Jim Mattson
0 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2024-10-07 14:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jim Mattson
Cc: Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Dave Hansen, H. Peter Anvin,
Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini, Pawan Gupta, Josh Poimboeuf,
Sandipan Das, Kai Huang, x86, linux-kernel, kvm,
Venkatesh Srinivas
On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 10:32:27AM -0700, Jim Mattson wrote:
> AMD's initial implementation of IBPB did not clear the return address
> predictor. Beginning with Zen4, AMD's IBPB *does* clear the return
> address predictor. This behavior is enumerated by
> CPUID.80000008H:EBX.IBPB_RET[bit 30].
>
> Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET for use in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID,
> when determining cross-vendor capabilities.
>
> Suggested-by: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 ++-
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index cabd6b58e8ec..a222a24677d7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@
> #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
> #define X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD ( 7*32+24) /* AMD SSBD implementation via LS_CFG MSR */
> #define X86_FEATURE_IBRS ( 7*32+25) /* "ibrs" Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
> -#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* "ibpb" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier without RSB flush */
I see upstream
#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* "ibpb" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
Where does "without RSB flush" come from?
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 1/3] x86/cpufeatures: Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET
2024-10-07 14:30 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2024-10-07 17:38 ` Jim Mattson
0 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Jim Mattson @ 2024-10-07 17:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Dave Hansen, H. Peter Anvin,
Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini, Pawan Gupta, Josh Poimboeuf,
Sandipan Das, Kai Huang, x86, linux-kernel, kvm,
Venkatesh Srinivas
On Mon, Oct 7, 2024 at 7:30 AM Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 10:32:27AM -0700, Jim Mattson wrote:
> > AMD's initial implementation of IBPB did not clear the return address
> > predictor. Beginning with Zen4, AMD's IBPB *does* clear the return
> > address predictor. This behavior is enumerated by
> > CPUID.80000008H:EBX.IBPB_RET[bit 30].
> >
> > Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET for use in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID,
> > when determining cross-vendor capabilities.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@chromium.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 ++-
> > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> > index cabd6b58e8ec..a222a24677d7 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> > @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@
> > #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
> > #define X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD ( 7*32+24) /* AMD SSBD implementation via LS_CFG MSR */
> > #define X86_FEATURE_IBRS ( 7*32+25) /* "ibrs" Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
> > -#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* "ibpb" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier without RSB flush */
>
> I see upstream
>
> #define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* "ibpb" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
>
> Where does "without RSB flush" come from?
Bad git hygiene. This should have been a 4 patch set, not a 3 patch
set. Sigh. I'll send out v5.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
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2024-09-13 17:32 [PATCH v4 0/3] Distinguish between variants of IBPB Jim Mattson
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2024-10-07 14:30 ` Borislav Petkov
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