Re: can we make anonymous memory non-EXECUTABLE?

["H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>]

Followup to:  <15419.17581.990574.160248@napali.hpl.hp.com>
By author:    David Mosberger <davidm@napali.hpl.hp.com>
In newsgroup: linux.dev.kernel
> 
> I don't consider SIGSEGV to be a silent failure.  Also, I think
> all the evidence is that it's unlikely to break many existing
> apps:
> 
> 	o The bug I described has been present for *years* on
> 	  Alpha and probably all other platforms other than x86;
> 	  even on ia64 it took almost two years before someone
> 	  noticed.  It's possible that nobody noticed because
> 	  the code generators were part of a larger program,
> 	  but it's very likely that anyone writing a test program
> 	  would have allocated the non-executable memory, so you'd
> 	  expect *someone* to have run into it at some point.
> 
> 	o Certain libraries such as the Boehm Garbage Collector
> 	  already turn off execute permission by default.  While
> 	  there may not be that many apps that use it in a production
> 	  environment, it is my impression that many developers are
> 	  using it as a memory-leak detector (e.g., Mozilla does that).
> 
> 
>   DaveM> Secondly, I do not see any
>   DaveM> real gain from any of this and my ports are those that have
>   DaveM> I-cache coherency issues :-)
> 
> I think that's fine.  If the consensus is that apps *should* use
> mprotect() to get executable permission (Linus implied as much) and
> it's an architecture specific choice as to whether this is enforced,
> I'm happy.  My belief is that we could make this change on ia64
> without undue burden on programmers.  If not, I'm sure I'll find out
> about it and I'm willing to take the responsibility.
> 

One way to do this would be to create a newbrk() syscall which takes a
permission argument (for new pages.)

	-hpa
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