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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, pgonda@google.com,
	seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 06/13] x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR interception for Secure TSC enabled guests
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2024 09:08:50 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a25377ad-27ea-3a45-2a42-4bd41bde783a@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241021055156.2342564-7-nikunj@amd.com>

On 10/21/24 00:51, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
> The hypervisor should not be intercepting GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR(0xcOO10134)
> when Secure TSC is enabled. A #VC exception will be generated if the
> GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR is being intercepted. If this should occur and SecureTSC
> is enabled, terminate guest execution.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

Just a minor comment/question below.

> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 +
>  arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c         | 8 ++++++++
>  2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> index 3ae84c3b8e6d..233be13cc21f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> @@ -608,6 +608,7 @@
>  #define MSR_AMD_PERF_CTL		0xc0010062
>  #define MSR_AMD_PERF_STATUS		0xc0010063
>  #define MSR_AMD_PSTATE_DEF_BASE		0xc0010064
> +#define MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ	0xc0010134
>  #define MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH	0xc0010140
>  #define MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS		0xc0010141
>  #define MSR_AMD_PPIN_CTL		0xc00102f0
> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
> index 2ad7773458c0..4e9b1cc1f26b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
> @@ -1332,6 +1332,14 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
>  		return ES_OK;
>  	}
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * GUEST_TSC_FREQ should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is
> +	 * enabled. Terminate the SNP guest when the interception is enabled.
> +	 */
> +	if (regs->cx == MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC))

Should the cc_platform_has() check be changed into a check against
sev_status directly (similar to the DEBUG_SWAP support)? Just in case
this handler ends up getting used in early code where cc_platform_has()
can't be used.

Thanks,
Tom

> +		return ES_VMM_ERROR;
> +
> +
>  	ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx);
>  	if (exit_info_1) {
>  		ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, regs->ax);

  reply	other threads:[~2024-10-21 14:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-21  5:51 [PATCH v13 00/13] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 01/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  7:48   ` Christophe JAILLET
2024-10-22  4:12     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 02/13] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 03/13] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  8:12   ` Christophe JAILLET
2024-10-22  4:15     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-23  3:25   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-24  6:24     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-24  7:31       ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-24 10:16         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 05/13] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-24  7:56   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-24  8:44     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-24 15:34       ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 06/13] x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 14:08   ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2024-10-22  4:20     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 07/13] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 08/13] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 09/13] tsc: Use the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for discovering TSC frequency Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 14:33   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-22  4:24     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 10/13] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 11/13] tsc: Switch to native sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 14:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-22  4:26     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21 21:30   ` kernel test robot
2024-10-21 23:03   ` kernel test robot
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 12/13] x86/kvmclock: Abort SecureTSC enabled guest when kvmclock is selected Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 15:00   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-22  4:28     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 13/13] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania

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