From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S261644AbVFVQhY (ORCPT ); Wed, 22 Jun 2005 12:37:24 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S261642AbVFVQhX (ORCPT ); Wed, 22 Jun 2005 12:37:23 -0400 Received: from wproxy.gmail.com ([64.233.184.193]:40336 "EHLO wproxy.gmail.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S261589AbVFVQeX convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Wed, 22 Jun 2005 12:34:23 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=beta; d=gmail.com; h=received:message-id:date:from:reply-to:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:references; b=bozrbtJOkaGbZsWXdaZzct1awon7e7n0vBQnSYCSKv8A02btxJ5hlAjHqDS42Nq1nLC6CRBGpPZ0WsU80mkXhMZ+sIp8Rqbxd7cuyo2jnaLMmQnT3e2cq004JS9Rc1zuciwPQ75r5CCtmPbMet4xWctp8hibZpjVzderE8eH0XQ= Message-ID: Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2005 11:34:18 -0500 From: Eric Van Hensbergen Reply-To: Eric Van Hensbergen To: Pavel Machek Subject: Re: -mm -> 2.6.13 merge status (fuse) Cc: Miklos Szeredi , akpm@osdl.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Content-Disposition: inline References: <20050620235458.5b437274.akpm@osdl.org> <20050621142820.GC2015@openzaurus.ucw.cz> <20050621220619.GC2815@elf.ucw.cz> <20050622150839.GB1881@elf.ucw.cz> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 6/22/05, Eric Van Hensbergen wrote: ... > > If you combine these two restrictions with only allowing unprivileged > mounts in private name space I think you get 90% there. The only > thing left to resolve is the best way to allow sharing private name > spaces between threads/users -- and I still view this as more of > extended functionality than a hard-requirement. > Reviewing my notes, there were a few subtle restrictions I forgot (most of which originally suggested by Miklos): (a) User's can't mount file system types not deemed "safe" (via flag in the file system type) -- this should help mitigate user's exploiting bugs in existing file systems to interfere with the system. Judging when a file system type is "safe" is a nasty kettle of fish though... (b) Enforce NODEV along with NOSUID so that user-based synthetics can't have device inodes with compromised permissions, etc. -eric