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From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	luto@kernel.org, will@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 03/13] stackleak: remove redundant check
Date: Sun, 8 May 2022 21:17:01 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a604fa2b-e7c3-3fff-dd81-1a0585a9e2fa@linux.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220427173128.2603085-4-mark.rutland@arm.com>

On 27.04.2022 20:31, Mark Rutland wrote:
> In __stackleak_erase() we check that the `erase_low` value derived from
> `current->lowest_stack` is above the lowest legitimate stack pointer
> value, but this is already enforced by stackleak_track_stack() when
> recording the lowest stack value.
> 
> Remove the redundant check.
> 
> There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.

Mark, I can't agree here. I think this check is important.
The performance profit from dropping it is less than the confidence decrease :)

With this check, if the 'lowest_stack' value is corrupted, stackleak doesn't 
overwrite some wrong kernel memory, but simply clears the whole thread stack, 
which is safe behavior.

> Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
>   kernel/stackleak.c | 4 ----
>   1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/stackleak.c b/kernel/stackleak.c
> index 753eab797a04d..f7a0f8cf73c37 100644
> --- a/kernel/stackleak.c
> +++ b/kernel/stackleak.c
> @@ -78,10 +78,6 @@ static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(void)
>   	unsigned int poison_count = 0;
>   	const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long);
>   
> -	/* Check that 'lowest_stack' value is sane */
> -	if (unlikely(kstack_ptr - boundary >= THREAD_SIZE))
> -		kstack_ptr = boundary;
> -
>   	/* Search for the poison value in the kernel stack */
>   	while (kstack_ptr > boundary && poison_count <= depth) {
>   		if (*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr == STACKLEAK_POISON)


  reply	other threads:[~2022-05-08 19:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-27 17:31 [PATCH v2 00/13] stackleak: fixes and rework Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] arm64: stackleak: fix current_top_of_stack() Mark Rutland
2022-05-04 16:41   ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-04 19:01     ` Kees Cook
2022-05-04 19:55       ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-05  8:25         ` Will Deacon
2022-05-08 17:24   ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 11:36     ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] stackleak: move skip_erasing() check earlier Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 17:44   ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 11:40     ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] stackleak: remove redundant check Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 18:17   ` Alexander Popov [this message]
2022-05-10 11:46     ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-11  3:00       ` Kees Cook
2022-05-11  8:02         ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-11 14:44           ` Kees Cook
2022-05-12  9:14             ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-15 16:17               ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-24 10:03                 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-26 22:09                   ` Alexander Popov
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] stackleak: rework stack low bound handling Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] stackleak: clarify variable names Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 20:49   ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 13:01     ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-11  3:05       ` Kees Cook
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] stackleak: rework stack high bound handling Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 21:27   ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 11:22     ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-15 16:32       ` Alexander Popov
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] stackleak: rework poison scanning Mark Rutland
2022-05-09 13:51   ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 13:13     ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-15 17:33       ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-24 13:31         ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-26 23:25           ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-31 18:13             ` Kees Cook
2022-06-03 16:55               ` Alexander Popov
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] lkdtm/stackleak: avoid spurious failure Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] lkdtm/stackleak: rework boundary management Mark Rutland
2022-05-04 19:07   ` Kees Cook
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] lkdtm/stackleak: prevent unexpected stack usage Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] lkdtm/stackleak: check stack boundaries Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] stackleak: add on/off stack variants Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] arm64: entry: use stackleak_erase_on_task_stack() Mark Rutland
2022-05-04 16:42   ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-04 19:16 ` [PATCH v2 00/13] stackleak: fixes and rework Kees Cook

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