From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] x86/fpu/xstate: Invalidate fpregs when __fpu_restore_sig() fails
Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2019 12:32:36 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a8d84a2b611f3aba6be9db72c19baf5f479aa80d.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191220201621.riyrptl5vwdukztc@linutronix.de>
On Fri, 2019-12-20 at 21:16 +0100, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior wrote:
> [...]
> Now that I looked at it:
> All kernel loads don't fail. If they fail we end up in the handler and
> restore to init-state. So no need to reset `fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx' in this
> case. The variable is actually set to task's FPU state so resetting is
> not required.
Agree.
> fpu__save() invokes copy_kernel_to_fpregs() (on older boxes) and by
> resetting `fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx' we would load it twice (in fpu__save()
> and on return to userland).
That is true.
> So far I can tell, the only problematic case is the signal code because
> here the state restore *may* fail and we *may* do it in two steps. The
> error happens only if both `may' are true.
>
> > > So if this patch works for you and you don't find anything else where it
> > > falls apart then I will audit tomorrow all callers which got the
> > > "invalidator" added and check for that angle.
> >
> > Yes, that works for me. Also, most of these call sites are under fpregs_lock(),
> > and we could use __cpu_invalidate_fpregs_state().
> > I was also thinking maybe add warnings when any new code re-introduces the issue,
> > but not sure where to add that. Do you think that is needed?
>
> I was thinking about it. So the `read-FPU-state' function must be
> invoked within the fpregs_lock() section. This could be easily
> enforced. At fpregs_unlock() time `fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx' must be NULL or
> pointing to task's FPU.
> My brain is fried for today so I'm sure if this is a sane approach. But
> it might be a start.
I will also think about it. Thanks!
Yu-cheng
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-20 20:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-12 21:08 [PATCH v2 0/3] Fix small issues in XSAVES Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-12 21:08 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] x86/fpu/xstate: Fix small issues before adding supervisor xstates Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-20 20:19 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2020-01-06 18:15 ` [tip: x86/fpu] x86/fpu/xstate: Fix small issues tip-bot2 for Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-12 21:08 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] x86/fpu/xstate: Make xfeature_is_supervisor()/xfeature_is_user() return bool Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-20 20:19 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-12-20 20:33 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-01-06 18:15 ` [tip: x86/fpu] " tip-bot2 for Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-12 21:08 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] x86/fpu/xstate: Invalidate fpregs when __fpu_restore_sig() fails Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-18 15:54 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-12-18 20:53 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-19 14:22 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-12-19 16:44 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-19 17:16 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-12-19 17:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-20 19:59 ` [PATCH] x86/fpu: Deacticate FPU state after failure during state load Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2020-01-07 12:52 ` [tip: x86/fpu] x86/fpu: Deactivate " tip-bot2 for Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2020-01-07 20:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 20:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-01-07 21:11 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2020-01-08 11:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-01-08 11:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-12-20 20:16 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] x86/fpu/xstate: Invalidate fpregs when __fpu_restore_sig() fails Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-12-20 20:32 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2019-12-05 18:26 [PATCH " Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-07 4:38 ` [PATCH v2 " Yu-cheng Yu
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