From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: David Kaplan <David.Kaplan@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>,
Patrick Bellasi <derkling@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Patrick Bellasi <derkling@matbug.net>,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>,
Michael Larabel <Michael@michaellarabel.com>
Subject: Re: x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX, back for moar
Date: Mon, 5 May 2025 09:30:05 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aBjnjaK0wqnQBz8M@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <LV3PR12MB9265E790428699931E58BE8D948E2@LV3PR12MB9265.namprd12.prod.outlook.com>
On Mon, May 05, 2025, David Kaplan wrote:
> > On Thu, May 01, 2025 at 09:56:44AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > Heh, I considered that, and even tried it this morning because I
> > > thought it wouldn't be as tricky as I first thought, but turns out,
> > > yeah, it's tricky. The complication is that KVM needs to ensure
> > BP_SPEC_REDUCE=1 on all CPUs before any VM is created.
> > >
> > > I thought it wouldn't be _that_ tricky once I realized the 1=>0 case
> > > doesn't require ordering, e.g. running host code while other CPUs have
> > > BP_SPEC_REDUCE=1 is totally fine, KVM just needs to ensure no guest code is
> > executed with BP_SPEC_REDUCE=0.
> > > But guarding against all the possible edge cases is comically difficult.
> > >
> > > For giggles, I did get it working, but it's a rather absurd amount of
> > > complexity
> >
> > Thanks for taking the time to explain - that's, well, funky. :-\
> >
> > Btw, in talking about this, David had this other idea which sounds
> > interesting:
> >
> > How about we do a per-CPU var which holds down whether BP_SPEC_REDUCE is
> > enabled on the CPU?
> >
> > It'll toggle the MSR bit before VMRUN on the CPU when num VMs goes 0=>1. This
> > way you avoid the IPIs and you set the bit on time.
>
> Almost. My thought was that kvm_run could do something like:
>
> If (!this_cpu_read(bp_spec_reduce_is_set)) {
> wrmsrl to set BP_SEC_REDUCE
> this_cpu_write(bp_spec_reduce_is_set, 1)
> }
>
> That ensures the bit is set for your core before VMRUN. And as noted below,
> you can clear the bit when the count drops to 0 but that one is safe from
> race conditions.
/facepalm
I keep inverting the scenario in my head. I'm so used to KVM needing to ensure
it doesn't run with guest state that I keep forgetting that running with
BP_SPEC_REDUCE=1 is fine, just a bit slower.
With that in mind, the best blend of simplicity and performance is likely to hook
svm_prepare_switch_to_guest() and svm_prepare_host_switch(). switch_to_guest()
is called when KVM is about to do VMRUN, and host_switch() is called when the
vCPU is put, i.e. when the task is scheduled out or when KVM_RUN exits to
userspace.
The existing svm->guest_state_loaded guard avoids toggling the bit when KVM
handles a VM-Exit and re-enters the guest. The kernel may run a non-trivial
amount of code with BP_SPEC_REDUCE, e.g. if #NPF triggers swap-in, an IRQ arrives
while handling the exit, etc., but that's all fine from a security perspective.
IIUC, per Boris[*] an IBPB is needed when toggling BP_SPEC_REDUCE on-demand:
: You want to IBPB before clearing the MSR as otherwise host kernel will be
: running with the mistrained gunk from the guest.
[*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250217160728.GFZ7NewJHpMaWdiX2M@fat_crate.local
Assuming that's the case...
Compile-tested only. If this looks/sounds sane, I'll test the mechanics and
write a changelog.
---
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++-------
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 1 +
arch/x86/lib/msr.c | 2 --
4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index e6134ef2263d..0cc9267b872e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@
/* Zen4 */
#define MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG 0xc001102e
-#define MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_BP_SPEC_REDUCE_BIT 4
+#define MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_BP_SPEC_REDUCE BIT(4)
#define MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_SHARED_BTB_FIX_BIT 5
/* Fam 19h MSRs */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index cc1c721ba067..2d87ec216811 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -607,9 +607,6 @@ static void svm_disable_virtualization_cpu(void)
kvm_cpu_svm_disable();
amd_pmu_disable_virt();
-
- if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_BP_SPEC_REDUCE))
- msr_clear_bit(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_BP_SPEC_REDUCE_BIT);
}
static int svm_enable_virtualization_cpu(void)
@@ -687,9 +684,6 @@ static int svm_enable_virtualization_cpu(void)
rdmsr(MSR_TSC_AUX, sev_es_host_save_area(sd)->tsc_aux, msr_hi);
}
- if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_BP_SPEC_REDUCE))
- msr_set_bit(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_BP_SPEC_REDUCE_BIT);
-
return 0;
}
@@ -1550,12 +1544,25 @@ static void svm_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
(!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX) || !sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)))
kvm_set_user_return_msr(tsc_aux_uret_slot, svm->tsc_aux, -1ull);
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_BP_SPEC_REDUCE))
+ wrmsrl(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, kvm_host.zen4_bp_cfg |
+ MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_BP_SPEC_REDUCE);
+
svm->guest_state_loaded = true;
}
static void svm_prepare_host_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- to_svm(vcpu)->guest_state_loaded = false;
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ if (!svm->guest_state_loaded)
+ return;
+
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_BP_SPEC_REDUCE)) {
+ indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+ rdmsrl(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, kvm_host.zen4_bp_cfg);
+ }
+ svm->guest_state_loaded = false;
}
static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
@@ -5364,6 +5371,11 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
init_msrpm_offsets();
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_BP_SPEC_REDUCE)) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, kvm_host.zen4_bp_cfg);
+ WARN_ON(kvm_host.zen4_bp_cfg & MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_BP_SPEC_REDUCE);
+ }
+
kvm_caps.supported_xcr0 &= ~(XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS |
XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 88a9475899c8..629eae9e4f59 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct kvm_host_values {
u64 xcr0;
u64 xss;
u64 arch_capabilities;
+ u64 zen4_bp_cfg;
};
void kvm_spurious_fault(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/msr.c b/arch/x86/lib/msr.c
index 5a18ecc04a6c..4bf4fad5b148 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/msr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/msr.c
@@ -103,7 +103,6 @@ int msr_set_bit(u32 msr, u8 bit)
{
return __flip_bit(msr, bit, true);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(msr_set_bit);
/**
* msr_clear_bit - Clear @bit in a MSR @msr.
@@ -119,7 +118,6 @@ int msr_clear_bit(u32 msr, u8 bit)
{
return __flip_bit(msr, bit, false);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(msr_clear_bit);
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS
void do_trace_write_msr(unsigned int msr, u64 val, int failed)
base-commit: 45eb29140e68ffe8e93a5471006858a018480a45
--
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-05-05 16:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-12-02 12:04 [PATCH v2 0/4] x86/bugs: Adjust SRSO mitigation to new features Borislav Petkov
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] x86/bugs: Add SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO support Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 6:53 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-10 15:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 7:53 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-11 20:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 22:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-16 17:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-30 17:02 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov (AMD)
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] KVM: x86: Advertise SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO to userspace Borislav Petkov
2024-12-30 17:02 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov (AMD)
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 22:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-16 17:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-16 18:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-17 9:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-30 11:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 13:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-08 15:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 17:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-08 18:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 18:37 ` Jim Mattson
2025-01-08 19:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 19:43 ` Jim Mattson
2025-01-08 19:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-11 12:52 ` [PATCH] " Borislav Petkov
2025-01-17 18:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-18 15:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-23 16:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-23 17:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-23 18:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-24 12:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-11 19:19 ` Jim Mattson
2025-02-11 20:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-13 10:53 ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-13 13:44 ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-13 14:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-13 17:50 ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-14 20:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-15 0:57 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-15 9:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17 5:47 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-17 15:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-15 12:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17 5:59 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-17 16:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17 19:56 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-17 20:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17 20:32 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-18 11:13 ` [PATCH final?] " Borislav Petkov
2025-02-18 14:42 ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-18 15:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 13:25 ` x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX, back for moar Borislav Petkov
2025-04-30 23:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-01 0:42 ` Michael Larabel
2025-05-01 8:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-01 16:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-05 15:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-05 15:40 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-05 15:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-05 16:30 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-05-05 16:42 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-05 18:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-05 18:25 ` Kaplan, David
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] Documentation/kernel-parameters: Fix a typo in kvm.enable_virt_at_load text Borislav Petkov
2024-12-30 17:21 ` [tip: x86/cleanups] " tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov (AMD)
2024-12-03 14:30 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] x86/bugs: Adjust SRSO mitigation to new features Nikolay Borisov
2025-02-26 14:32 ` [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2025-05-01 15:03 x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX, back for moar Patrick Bellasi
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