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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	corbet@lwn.net, tglx@linutronix.de,  mingo@redhat.com,
	bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
	 hpa@zytor.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, luto@kernel.org,
	 peterz@infradead.org, chao.gao@intel.com, xin3.li@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 03/19] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2025 08:20:07 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aFrCJzodXP0sT6Ny@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250328171205.2029296-4-xin@zytor.com>

On Fri, Mar 28, 2025, Xin Li (Intel) wrote:
> From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
> 
> Do not virtualize FRED if FRED consistency checks fail.
> 
> Either on broken hardware, or when run KVM on top of another hypervisor
> before the underlying hypervisor implements nested FRED correctly.
> 
> Suggested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
> Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
> ---
> 
> Change in v4:
> * Call out the reason why not check FRED VM-exit controls in
>   cpu_has_vmx_fred() (Chao Gao).
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 11 +++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          |  3 +++
>  2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
> index b2aefee59395..b4f49a4690ca 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
> @@ -400,6 +400,17 @@ static inline bool vmx_pebs_supported(void)
>  	return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PEBS) && kvm_pmu_cap.pebs_ept;
>  }
>  
> +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_fred(void)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * setup_vmcs_config() guarantees FRED VM-entry/exit controls
> +	 * are either all set or none.  So, no need to check FRED VM-exit
> +	 * controls.
> +	 */
> +	return cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED) &&

Drop the cpu_feature_enabled().  These helpers are all about checking raw CPU
support; whether or not the kernel is configured to support FRED is irrelevant.

[For these helpers; KVM obviously needs to account for FRED support in other
 paths, but that should be automagically handled by kvm_set_cpu_caps()]


> +		(vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED);
> +}
> +
>  static inline bool cpu_has_notify_vmexit(void)
>  {
>  	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index e38545d0dd17..ab84939ace96 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -8052,6 +8052,9 @@ static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void)
>  		kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_DTES64);
>  	}
>  
> +	if (!cpu_has_vmx_fred())
> +		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_FRED);
> +
>  	if (!enable_pmu)
>  		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_PDCM);
>  	kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap = vmx_get_perf_capabilities();
> -- 
> 2.48.1
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2025-06-24 15:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-03-28 17:11 [PATCH v4 00/19] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 01/19] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 02/19] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2025-04-14  7:41   ` Chao Gao
2025-04-14 16:53     ` Xin Li
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 03/19] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 15:20   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 04/19] x86/cea: Export per CPU array 'cea_exception_stacks' for KVM to use Xin Li (Intel)
2025-04-10  8:53   ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-04-10 14:18     ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-11 16:16       ` Xin Li
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 05/19] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 06/19] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR interception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 15:27   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 07/19] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 15:44   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 08/19] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:27   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-25 17:18     ` Xin Li
2025-06-26 17:22       ` Xin Li
2025-06-26 20:50         ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 09/19] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 10/19] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 11/19] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 12/19] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 13/19] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 14/19] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:32   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-25 17:38     ` Xin Li
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 15/19] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS to be advertised to guests Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:38   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-25 18:05     ` Xin Li
2025-06-25 18:29       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 16/19] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:54   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 17/19] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context management Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 18/19] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 19/19] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:25 ` [PATCH v4 00/19] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-06-24 17:06   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-24 17:43     ` Xin Li
2025-06-24 17:47       ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-06-24 18:02         ` Xin Li
2025-06-24 18:40           ` H. Peter Anvin

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